

Teaching American Diplomacy:

Cuba

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Edited by
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Special thanks to Kandra Churchwell for graphic production of this book.

Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources

The series *Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources* began as a collaborative project of the Center for Teaching International Relations (CTIR), the Una Chapman Cox Foundation, and Karen Volker, a Foreign Service Officer with the US Department of State. The curricula in this series all focus on a specific aspect of U.S. Foreign Policy, and rely on students reading and interpreting primary documents. Each publication consists of three sections:

1. Civics Unit
2. History Unit
3. A selection of relevant Primary Documents

The lessons in the Civics and History units include engaging participatory activities and ideas for performance assessments. The lessons can be used individually or in complement with each other. Each lesson and performance assessment is based on national standards for History and Civics.

The *Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources* series includes:

- The Monroe Doctrine
- The Annexation of the Philippines
- The Creation of the State of Israel
- The Enlargement of NATO
- Cuba

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(Note: Passwords are case sensitive)

Standards in Historical Thinking

Taken from *National Standards for History*, developed and published by the National Center for History in the Schools

Standards	1. Historical Background	2. Re-Writing History	3. Cuba, Casto & the Cold War	4. How Effective is Economic Pressure	5. What Next?	6. Carter vs. Bush	History Perform. Assess.	1. Defining National Interest	2. Domestic Influence	3. Human Rights	4. Congressional Hearing	Civics Perform. Assess.
1: Chronological Thinking - distinguish between past present and future times; identify temporal structure in historical narratives; analyze patterns of historical duration and succession	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
2: Historical Comprehension - identify the central question in historical narratives; reconstruct literal meaning of historical passages			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
3. Historical Analysis and Interpretation - identify author/source of historical document; compare and contrast differing sets of ideas, values, personalities, behaviors, and institutions; consider multiple perspectives; analyze cause and effect			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. Historical Research Capabilities - formulate historical questions; obtain and interrogate historical data	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5. Analysis and Decision-Making - identify issues in the past; marshal evidence of circumstances and current factors contributing to contemporary problems and courses of action; evaluate implementation of a decision and alternative courses of action		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

World History Standards

Taken from *National Standards for History*, developed and published by the National Center for History in the Schools

Era 9 The 20th Century Since 1945

Standards	1. Historical Background	2. Re-Writing History	3. Cuba, Casto & the Cold War	4. How Effective is Economic Pressure	5. What Next?	6. Carter vs. Bush	History Perform. Assess.	1. Defining National Interest	2. Domestic Influence	3. Human Rights	4. Congressional Hearing	Civics Perform. Assess.
2: Understand the search for community, stability, and peace in an interdependent world	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3: Understand major global trends since World War II			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			

U.S. History Standards

Taken from *National Standards for History*, developed and published by the National Center for History in the Schools

Era 10 Contemporary United States (1968 to the present)

Standards	1. Historical Background	2. Re-Writing History	3. Cuba, Casto & the Cold War	4. How Effective is Economic Pressure	5. What Next?	6. Carter vs. Bush	History Perform. Assess.	1. Defining National Interest	2. Domestic Influence	3. Human Rights	4. Congressional Hearing	Civics Perform. Assess.
1: Understand recent developments in foreign policy and domestic politics	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2: Understand economic, social, and cultural developments in contemporary United States			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Civics Standards

Taken from the *National Standards for Civics and Government*, developed and published by the Center for Civic Education

Standards	1. Historical Background	2. Re-Writing History	3. Cuba, Casto & the Cold War	4. How Effective is Economic Pressure	5. What Next?	6. Carter vs. Bush	History Perform. Assess.	1. Defining National Interest	2. Domestic Influence	3. Human Rights	4. Congressional Hearing	Civics Perform. Assess.
IIB3. The role of organized groups in political life. Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on the contemporary role of organized groups in American social and political life.									<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IIIE2. Public opinion and behavior of the electorate. Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about the role of public opinion in American politics.									<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IIIE5. Associations and groups. Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about the contemporary roles of associations and groups in American politics.					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IVB2. Making and implementing United States foreign policy. Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about how United States foreign policy is made and the means by which it is carried out.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IVB3. The ends and means of United States foreign policy. Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on foreign policy issues in light of American national interests, values, and principles.			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
VD2. Dispositions that foster respect for individual worth and human dignity. Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on the importance to American constitutional democracy of dispositions that foster respect for individual worth and human dignity.										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		

Introduction to *Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources: Cuba*

Due to its important strategic location, Cuba has long been of great interest to the U.S. From the early years of the U.S., through the period of emerging U.S. strength in the Western Hemisphere, the Cold War period, and beyond, Cuba has played an important role in U.S. Foreign Policy. As a result, examining the relationship between Cuba and the U.S. can reveal important lessons in both history and civics.

This curriculum starts with an overview of U.S.-Cuba relations that can be used either for teacher or student background. Following the historical overview is a unit of activities based on National Standards for History, and a unit of activities based on National Standards for Civic Education. The activities in these units can be done individually or combined for a more in-depth study of Cuba. Each unit also contains a performance assessment based on the national standards. The last section of the curriculum contains the primary source documents that are referred to in the activities. Students will be asked to read and analyze selections from these primary source documents in each of the activities.

If you have only limited amount of time to study Cuba, several lessons in this book are specifically designed for a one-day study of U.S.-Cuba relations through the lens of either history or civics. These include:

- History Unit, Lesson 6 – Shifting Foreign Policy: Carter vs. Bush
- Civics Unit, Lesson 3 – The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy
- Civics Unit, Lesson 4 – Regional and Special Interest Influences on Public Policy

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I hope you enjoy using these lessons!

Caroline Starbird
Publications Director
Center for Teaching International Relations

- I. U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Brief History
(To be used as teacher and/ or student background reading)
- II. History Unit
History Activities Summary
Lesson 1: Historical Background of U.S. Cuban-Relations
Lesson 2: Re-Writing History – Missed Opportunities or Disaster Averted?
Lesson 3: Cuba, Castro, and the Cold War
Lesson 4: How Affective is the Use of Economic Pressure at Influencing the Behavior of Nations?
Lesson 5: What is Next for U.S. Policy Toward Cuba?
Lesson 6: Foreign Policy: Carter vs. Bush
History Unit Performance Assessment
- III. Civics Unit
Civic Activities Summary
Lesson 1: Defining Foreign Policy Interest
Lesson 2: Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy Decision-Making
Lesson 3: The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy
Lesson 4: Congressional Hearing on the Continuation of the Helms-Burton Act
Civics Unit Performance Assessment
- IV. Primary Source Documents
Document Index (with brief description)
Document 1: Letter from Thomas Jefferson to President James Monroe (October 24, 1823)
Document 2: Monroe Doctrine (December 2, 1823)
Document 3: Ostend Manifesto (October 18, 1854)
Document 4: Teller Amendment (April 20, 1898)
Document 5: Platt Amendment (introduced February 1901, adopted 1903)
Document 6: Roosevelt Corollary (December 6, 1904)
Document 7: Good Neighbor Policy speech (August 14, 1936)
Document 8: The X Article (July 1947)
Document 9: “Facing U.S. Aggression”: Castro interview (July 11, 1960)
Document 10: Letter from President Kennedy to Soviet Union Chairman Khrushchev (April 18, 1961)
Document 11: Castro interview in SIEMPRE (May 30, 1991)
Document 12: “A Kinder Cuba Policy”: *Boston Globe* editorial (August 29, 1991)
Document 13: “Through Peaceful Means We Can Help Ease Castro Out”: *Christian Science Monitor* editorial (October 10, 1991)
Document 14: “Soviets Must Stop Aid to Castro Before Gaining MFN Privileges”: Speech Before the House of Representatives (November 4, 1991)
Document 15: “Treat Castro as Irrelevant”: *Christian Science Monitor* editorial (February 6, 1992)
Document 16: “Cuba’s Impending Implosion”: *Seattle Times* editorial (March 4, 1992)
Document 17: Cuban Democracy Act (April 18, 1992)

- Document 18: Helms-Burton Act (March 12, 1996)
- Document 19: President Carter's speech to University of Havana (May 14, 2002)
- Document 20: President George W. Bush's speech on Cuba: Reaction to Jimmy Carter's speech (May 20, 2002)
- Document 21: Center for Responsive Politics' study on Cuban-American campaign contributions (2001)
- Document 22: "The Americas Canada's Hypocritical Foreign Policy Coddles Cuba": *Wall Street Journal* editorial (July 19, 1996)
- Document 23: Helms-Burton Backfire": *Washington Post* editorial (July 22, 1996)
- Document 24: "Cuba's Economic Transition and its Implications for U.S. Policy": Testimony (May 7, 1998)
- Document 25: Testimony of Ambassador Dennis K. Hays before a Senate committee (May 21, 2002).
- Document 26: "A Review of U.S. Policy Towards Cuba": Cuba Working Group policy statement (May 15, 2002)
- Document 27: U.S. census table of Cuban agricultural exports (1998-2002)

Section I

This overview of U.S.-Cuban relations covers the 19th, 20th, and beginning of the 21st Century. Throughout the overview, you will find references to historical documents found in Section IV of this publication. You may, of course, choose to examine each document, but it is not necessary to understand the basic history of U.S.-Cuban relations.

U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Brief History

In 1492, Christopher Columbus arrived in Cuba and he claimed the island as a Spanish colony. The native population was soon wiped out by conquest and disease. The Spanish brought slaves from Africa to supply labor for the newly developed, flourishing sugar and coffee plantations. Due to its location at the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico, Cuba became an important point of trade between the New World and Spain. Spain controlled the island with severe and exploitative rule, harshly repressing any signs of revolt.

Since the founding of the U.S. in 1776, America has shown a great interest in Cuba. Thomas Jefferson recognized the island as a strategically important piece of territory that would give its owner control of sea traffic in the Caribbean (Document 1). Many also felt that Cuba's booming slave trade would make the island a profitable possession for the U.S. By the mid 1800's, the movement to acquire Cuba was gaining momentum. During the expansionist Polk administration (1845-1849), Secretary of State James Buchanan unsuccessfully attempted to purchase Cuba from Spain. Only a few years later, Buchanan's name reappeared along with two other officials on the **Ostend Manifesto** (Document 3), which stated that it was of "paramount importance" that the U.S. acquire Cuba, even if it meant using force to do so.

The Spanish American War

At the start of the 19th century, Spain rivaled Britain in colonial power. But soon, world powers started to shift as Spain began to lose territory while the U.S. expanded its reach. In the mid 1800s, independence movements spread throughout much of Spanish controlled Latin America. In 1895, fighting broke out in Cuba. Jose Marti and other leaders fought for Cuban independence. Over the next several years the Spanish used brutal tactics to put down the Cuban insurrection. U.S. newspapers published by William Randolph Hearst, Joseph Pulitzer, and others exposed the human rights abuses that the Spanish were committing, and demanded that the U.S. do something to help the Cuban people.

After riots in Havana occurred in January 1898, the U.S. government grew concerned about being able to protect U.S. citizens and property in the Cuba. With the reluctant agreement of Spain, the U.S. sent the U.S.S. Maine to Havana Harbor. Less than a month after the battleship arrived, an explosion sunk the ship and killed over 250 crew members. The cause of the explosion was unclear (possibilities include an explosive device placed under the ship, sabotage on board, a random fire), but the U.S. press, and consequently U.S. public opinion, immediately assigned blame to Spain. American sentiment grew strongly against Spanish colonial rule, and in favor of Cuban independence.

With strong public support, President William McKinley requested Congressional authorization for war against Spain. In order to avoid appearing imperialistic, Congress included the **Teller Amendment** (Document 4) in the declaration of war. The Teller Amendment stated that the U.S. had no intention of conquering Cuba.

After a rapid defeat of the Spanish, the U.S. assumed temporary control over Cuba. In drafting the constitution of the new Cuban government, the U.S. demanded that the new Cuban constitution include provisions of the Platt Amendment. **The Platt Amendment** (Document 5) legalized U.S. military intervention in Cuba, limited the Cuban government's ability to enter treaties with other nations, and established the right of the U.S. to maintain naval bases on the island. With the inclusion of the Platt Amendment, the U.S. made it clear, despite the Teller Amendment, that it intended to exercise considerable control over Cuba.

Early 20th Century Pre Cold War policy in Latin America

With the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the U.S. warned European powers not to interfere in the Western Hemisphere. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt added to this policy by stating that the U.S. had the right to act as an international police force throughout Latin America. This became known as the **Roosevelt Corollary** (Document 6).

The U.S. acted as the police authority for Latin American until 1936. At that time, President Franklin Roosevelt adopted the **Good Neighbor Policy** (Document 7). This policy assured the governments of Latin America that the U.S. had no designs of conquest in the region.

Although the Good Neighbor Policy suggested that the U.S. would keep its hands off Cuban affairs, President F.D. Roosevelt supported the establishment of a military dictatorship run by Fulgencio Batista. Roosevelt also negotiated an economic agreement to purchase Cuban sugar, which reaffirmed Cuban economic dependence on the U.S. With political and economic support from the U.S., Batista controlled Cuba from 1933 to 1959. Although Batista grew personally wealthy as a result of his position, the Cuban population suffered from serious poverty and repression. The massive number of people living in poverty in Cuba made conditions ripe for a socialist uprising.

In 1953, a man named Fidel Castro organized and led an uprising against the Cuban government. This uprising was shut down by the Cuban government and Castro was exiled to Mexico. There, he began organizing another revolutionary movement. Eventually, Castro returned to Cuba. Batista fled to the U.S. when Castro's forces entered the capitol in January 1, 1959. By February, Castro had gained control of Cuba. Although he had promised democratic elections and constitutional rule, Castro used the military to repress dissidents (people who publicly opposed Castro) and secure power. In 1961, Castro declared Cuba to be a socialist state.

Cuba and the Cold War

In the 1950s and mid 1960s, communism became a serious threat to democracy and the Soviet Union became a superpower rival to the U.S. In response to these threats, the U.S. adopted a policy of containment. Containment meant the U.S. would not allow communism to spread to other countries. The U.S. was especially nervous about communist influence growing in the Western Hemisphere.

Castro's rise to power became a major cause for U.S. concern when he began nationalizing U.S. property in Cuba (such as sugar companies, refineries, banks and telephone companies). In response to these actions, President Eisenhower ended all U.S. purchases of Cuban sugar in order to hurt the Cuban economy (Document 9). By the time John F. Kennedy became U.S. president, he

inherited a tense situation with Cuba, as well as plans for an invasion of the island by CIA trained Cuban exiles. The **Bay of Pigs** invasion (named for the site of the invasion) ended in disaster. Kennedy failed to provide the invaders with military support because he had publicly declared that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. Consequently, Castro's forces easily defeated the invasion. Soon after, Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist and officially aligned his government with the Soviet Union. In response to these developments, President Kennedy discontinued all U.S. trade with Cuba. As a result, the Soviet Union began providing financial support to Cuba (including buying large amounts of Cuban sugar that had previously been bought by the U.S.).

The danger that the Soviet-Cuban alliance posed became even more apparent when U.S. spy planes photographed Soviet missile installations in Cuba. This meant nuclear missiles were now extremely close to the U.S. (only 90 miles from the Florida Keys). The showdown between President Kennedy and Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev brought the U.S. as close as it has ever been to nuclear war (Document 10). Known as the **Cuban Missile Crises**, the U.S. began a naval quarantine around Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from bringing additional missiles and military construction equipment to Cuba. As the next group of Soviet ships and supplies came into Cuban waters, there were only three options: the U.S. backing down and letting the ships through, the Soviet backing down and leaving, or military confrontation which could escalate to nuclear war. The tension finally ended when Chairman Khrushchev ordered the Soviet ships to leave Cuban waters.

Following Kennedy's assassination in 1963, the U.S.-Cuba relationship continued to be tense. This was partially as a result of Castro's continued involvement in supporting Communist revolution in Africa and Latin America. In 1965, Castro announced that anyone who wished to leave the island for the U.S. could do so. Over the next eight years, over 200,000 Cubans emigrated to the U.S. These immigrants were generally well-educated and strongly anti-Castro. They quickly developed into a powerful political force in Florida by voting in high numbers and voting only for those candidates who promised to support policies designed to drive Castro from power.

In 1980 Castro again announced that anyone wishing to leave Cuba could depart. Over 130,000 Cubans seized this opportunity and headed to the U.S. and different parts of Latin America. But unlike the earlier wave, when elites and professionals left Cuba, this wave included a number of prisoners, criminals, poor, and mentally handicapped people. Although the criminal element was relatively small, it was a large focus for the U.S. media. This presentation of a criminal influx from Cuba only increased American hostility toward Cuba.

In the final decade of the Cold War, the Reagan and Bush administrations continued a hard-line policy of tightening trade restrictions and reestablishing the ban on travel to Cuba. Both measures were designed to hurt the Cuban economy.

Post Cold War

During the Cold War, Cuba had traded mostly with communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. With the collapse of Communism in these areas, Cuba lost almost all of its major trading partners. Sensing possible economic disaster, Castro implemented a strict rationing program to conserve Cuba's now scarce resources. Cuba began to rely heavily on tourism for its economic health. By the end of the 1990's, further economic problems forced Castro to enact limited market reforms, allowing some Cubans to run their own small businesses (Document 11).

In the U.S., the fall of the Soviet Union prompted some people to call for a softening of American policy toward Cuba (Documents 12, 13, 15). However, many in Congress felt that increasing pressure on the Castro regime would speed its collapse and bring democracy to Cuba. The passage of the **Cuban Democracy Act** in 1992 encouraged the President to impose sanctions (economic punishments) on countries that continued to trade with Cuba (Document 17). It also made it illegal for foreign branches of American companies to trade with Cuba.

When President Bill Clinton entered office, he expressed a desire to improve relations with Cuba. However, when Cuba shot down two planes belonging to Brothers to the Rescue, a Cuban-American organization that sponsors rescue flights for Cubans trying to flee to the U.S., Clinton reverted to the hard line policies of his predecessors. He signed the highly restrictive **Helms-Burton Act** (Document 18), which made it clear that the President must consult with Congress before attempting to lift the embargo. Additionally, the Helms-Burton Act made it legal for U.S. nationals whose property had been confiscated during the Cuban Revolution to sue anyone utilizing them. This made it possible for U.S. citizens to sue many international companies using property/resources in Cuba. Critics claimed that the U.S. was using the Helms-Burton Act to force the rest of the world to stop trade with Cuba. Canada and Mexico both adopted counter-legislation to protect their nationals against American lawsuits. As it turned out, both President Clinton and President George W. Bush have waived the portion of the Helms-Burton Act that allows such lawsuits.

The 21st Century

In 2000, a new saga refocused national attention on American policy towards Cuba. A six year old boy, named Elian Gonzalez, and his mother were among a group of Cubans, trying to leave Cuba. They boarded a make-shift boat to sail to Florida, where they could claim political refugee status in the U.S. The boat capsized and Elian's mother, along with other passengers, drowned. Elian was rescued at sea and taken in by relatives living in Florida. But his father, who was divorced from Elian's mother, was in Cuba and wanted the boy returned to him. The Miami Cuban community demanded that the boy be kept in the U.S. away from his father while Castro rallied support in Cuba by advocating on behalf of Elian's father. Elian was eventually forcibly taken by the U.S. government from his relatives in Florida and returned to his father in Cuba.

With the threats of the Cold War gone and Castro no longer a threat to U.S. security, many in Congress and the American business community have called for increased trade with Cuba. However, President George W. Bush has taken a hard line toward Cuba throughout his administration (Document 20). In 2003, Castro gave President Bush further justification for maintaining his hard-line policy by arresting 75 dissidents and executing three men accused of hijacking a ferry and attempting to take it to the U.S.

The future of U.S.-Cuban relations remains unclear. With a Congressional Working Group demanding an overhaul of U.S. policy toward Cuba (Document 26) the next few years will be pivotal for U.S.-Cuban relations.

Section II History Activities

These activities can be used individually, or together as a complete unit on U.S.-Cuba relations. The individual lessons can be integrated into different units, including:

- A unit on the Cold War and the study of containment
- A unit on U.S. relations within the Western Hemisphere
- Part of a study of current U.S. international relations issues

Lesson 1:

Historical background of U.S.-Cuba relations

This lesson provides background knowledge on U.S.-Cuba relations. The activity can be done in different ways, depending on varying amounts of time, student responsibility, and use of historical documents. This lesson can be a teacher-led lecture or a student-driven examination and discussion of the evolution of U.S.-Cuba relations.

Purpose

- To give a solid background on U.S.–Cuba relations
- To see and understand how U.S.-Cuba relations have changed
- To analyze the significance of specific events and issues
- To work as a team in cooperative learning

Main Historical Thinking Standards Addressed

- 1: Chronological Thinking - distinguish between past, present, and future times; identify temporal structure in historical narratives; analyze patterns of historical duration and succession
- 4: Historical Research Capabilities - formulate historical questions; obtain and interrogate historical data

Prior Knowledge

No prior knowledge is required.

Additional Historical Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- As part of a larger Cold War unit leading up to an analysis of the U.S. support of the Bay of Pigs invasion and/or the Cuban Missile Crisis
- As a case study of U.S. relations with either Latin America as a whole and specifically U.S. involvement in Honduras, El Salvador, Panama and other nations
- As the starting point for a comparison of U.S. relations with other areas affected by the Spanish-American War including Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico

Materials

- “Historic U.S.-Cuba Relations : A Note Taking Guide” handout
- “Reading Primary Sources and Documents” handout

Procedure

Teacher Note: Teachers have three different procedure options

Option A - A student-led approach

(This option will take two 50-minute class periods.)

1. Provide background information.

Ask students what they know about the current relationship between the U.S. and Cuba.

2. Have students become experts on one topic.

Break the class into 5 groups. Give each group one of the sections from the note-taking guide and tell them that they will serve as the experts on their section.

Either as homework or in class, have the students use their textbooks, outside sources, or Section I “U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Brief History” to fill in the description of their sections. Students should write a key word or phrase under “Key Issues” as well as write a description or list key points under each issue/event listed. This part can be done two ways:

- Individually – Have each student complete his or her section. Then compare descriptions with others in the group to insure a more complete and accurate description.
- Group - Divide up the events among group members and compile their findings, or discuss each event as a group as students fill in their section.

Once students have a solid grasp of their issues and events, have them choose one word or phrase (of three words or less) to describe the key issue or big picture surrounding their time frame.

3. Discuss the topics as a class.

When each group has completed the task above, select one of the following ways to disseminate the information.

- a. Choose a member of the group to present their topic to the class, having the other students complete the note-taking guide as each presentation is given. (These presentations could be livened up by having each group draw a picture of what they see as their most significant event, or act out the most significant event of their time frame and then explain why they chose this specific event.) At the conclusion of each group’s presentation, have other students come up with words for the left column of that particular group’s topic. Compare their ideas with what the group responsible for that section chose.
- b. Jigsaw the groups and create new groups with at least one member from each of the original groups. Have each new group go through the note-taking guide with the “expert” on each topic explaining it to the others in the group. Once each group has completed their note-taking guides, come back as a class and discuss the word or phrase that each group picked as the key for their section. Use these words or phrases to discuss trends or big picture ideas regarding U.S.-Cuba relations.

Option B -Using historical documents

(This option will take two 50-minute class periods.)

1. Provide background information.

Ask students what they know about the current relationship between the U.S. and Cuba.

2. Have students become experts on one topic.

Approach the background information just as you would in Option A but have the groups read key documents and incorporate them into their explanations of their topics.

- Group 1 (Early Economic Interests) - Documents 1, 2 and 3
- Group 2 (Spanish-American War) – Documents 4 and 5
- Group 3 (Pre-Castro Relations) – Documents 6 and 7
- Group 4 (The Rise of Castro) – Documents 8, 9 and 10
- Group 5 (Post Soviet Union Breakup) – Documents 13, 16, 17 and 18

NOTE: For this option, you may need to discuss how to look at and read documents prior to having the students read and interpret the documents themselves. Use “Reading Primary Source Documents” for this discussion.

Option C - A teacher directed approach

(This option will take one 50-minute class period.)

1. Provide background information.

Ask students what they know about the current relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. Using the “Historic U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Note Taking Guide” give a standard lecture on the key events (listed on the handout) that have impacted U.S.-Cuba relations over the past 200 years. Students should write key points and ideas under each issue/event listed.

2. Discuss the “big ideas” related to Cuba.

Once all of the information has been given to complete the note-taking guide, do the following:

- a. Have students pick a word or phrase (of three words or less) to describe each section and write it in the left-hand column of the handout. They can do this individually or in small groups.
- b. While they develop their words/phrases, create five columns (one for each time frame) on the chalkboard and have students write their words/phrases on the board (or take several answers and write them in yourself).
- c. Use these words or phrases to discuss trends or big picture ideas regarding U.S.-Cuba relations.

Wrap-up for all options

Have the students go back to their initial groups and rank the seven most significant events (in order of significance) leading to the current relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. Present and defend these choices to the class.

Historic U.S.-Cuba Relations : A Note Taking Guide

Early Economic Interests (1800-1860s)

<u>Key Issue</u> (word or phrase)	<u>Date/</u> <u>Time Frame</u>	<u>Issue/Event</u>
	<i>Early 1800s</i>	Connection to U.S. slave trade
	1823	Monroe Doctrine
	1854	Ostend Manifesto

Historic Cuba-U.S. Relations : A Note Taking Guide

Spanish-American War (1895-1901)

<u>Key Issue</u> (word or phrase)	<u>Date/</u> <u>Time Frame</u>	<u>Issue/Event</u>
	1895	Cuban Revolution Jose Marti Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst
	1898	Start of the Spanish-American War
	Feb. 1898	U.S.S. Maine
	April 1898	Declaration of War and the Teller Amendment
	1901	Platt Amendment

Historic Cuba-U.S. Relations : A Note Taking Guide

Post-Revolution/Pre-Castro (1901-1959)

<u>Key Issue</u> (word or phrase)	<u>Date/</u> <u>Time Frame</u>	<u>Issue/Event</u>
	1904	Roosevelt Corollary
	1936	FDR's Good Neighbor Policy
	1947	Containment policy of the U.S.
	1952	Batista overthrows constitutionally elected government

Historic Cuba-U.S. Relations : A Note Taking Guide

The Rise of Castro (1959-1991)

<u>Key Issue</u> (word or phrase)	<u>Date/</u> <u>Time Frame</u>	<u>Issue/Event</u>
	Jan. 1, 1959	Castro takes power
		Cuba and Communism
	1960	Castro nationalizes U.S. property in Cuba
	1960	U.S. imposes economic sanctions on Cuba
	1961	U.S. breaks off diplomatic relations with Cuba
	April 1961	Bay of Pigs invasion
	1962	Full embargo of Cuban products and trade
	Oct. 1962	Cuban Missile Crisis
	mid 1960s -1991	Cuba's relationship to Soviet Union

Historic Cuba-U.S. Relations : A Note Taking Guide

Post Soviet Union Breakup Relations (1991-present)

<u>Key Issue</u> (word or phrase)	<u>Date/</u> <u>Time Frame</u>	<u>Issue/Event</u>
	1991	Breakup of the Soviet Union
	1991-present	Cuban economic problems
	1992	Cuban Democracy Act
	1993	Brothers to the Rescue planes shot down
	1996	Helms-Burton Act
	2000	Elian Gonzalez

Reading Primary Sources and Documents

Determining several key pieces of information about a primary source document helps you understand the document/source in its correct time and place in history. Knowing this can indicate both perspective and bias. Before reading a document, you should:

1. Note the date of the document/source.
2. Note the author.
3. Note any governmental relationship or geographic location being represented.
4. Read the document carefully being aware of the probable perspective of the author/location.
5. Look carefully for loaded words which bias the reader to a pre-determined conclusion.
6. Note the publication and whether it tends to represent a certain view point.
7. When using multiple documents, compare and contrast the date of the documents, author and geographic locations. This can help determine similarities and differences between time periods, locations, and sources of information.

Lesson 2: Re-writing History- Missed Opportunities or Disaster Averted?

In this lesson, students will look at major historical decisions in U.S.-Cuba relations. With the benefit of hindsight, students will brainstorm alternative choices and potential outcomes.

Purpose

- To analyze the key time periods that have impacted U.S.-Cuba relations
- To project if different outcomes, both positive and negative, could have occurred if different decisions would have been made at these critical points
- To understand and use historical inquiry and analysis throughout the lesson

Main Historical Thinking Standards Addressed

- 1: Chronological Thinking - distinguish between past, present, and future times; identify temporal structure in historical narratives; analyze patterns of historical duration and succession
- 4: Historical Research Capabilities - formulate historical questions; obtain and interrogate historical data
- 5: Analysis and Decision-Making - identify issues in the past; marshal evidence of circumstances and current factors contributing to contemporary problems and courses of action; evaluate implementation of a decision and alternative courses of action

Prior Knowledge

This lesson is based on a solid grasp of key historical events in U.S.-Cuba relations.

Additional Historical Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- With singular events within the U.S.–Cuba relationship such as the Cuban Missile Crisis
- As the basis to look at several Cold War events/conflicts throughout the world
- As a format for virtually any other conflict/time of decision such as the periods leading up to World War I, World War II, Vietnam or U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf

Materials

- “Actions and Outcomes” handout

Procedure

1. Discuss key decisions from history.

Ask students if they can come up with times in history when a different decision or a different outcome of a specific event would have dramatically changed the history of a nation or of the world. Briefly discuss their examples. Emphasize how history is not pre-determined but a result of decisions and outcomes.

2. Look at decision outcomes.

Break the students into groups. Explain to the class that each group is going to have the opportunity, with the benefit of hindsight, to try to come up with different decisions throughout history to ease the tensions between the U.S. and Cuba.

Give each group a copy of the “Actions and Outcomes” chart and tell them to fill out the “Actual Outcome” column. Once they have done this, quickly review as a class what they see as the outcomes. Have them note that while there may be positive effects, there are also negative effects of virtually all situations.

3. Determine alternate options.

At this point, there are two lesson options. This lesson is designed as a cooperative learning lesson and can be done with or without the use of historical documents.

Option A – A broad perspective.

In their groups, have students brainstorm:

- a. other policy options for each of the key time frames
- b. the likely potential outcomes and percentage chance of success for these options

Encourage students to think about all relevant influences for each timeframe and to think creatively in their options. Remind them that other potential policy options could also have negative consequences. (This should take each group about 25 minutes. To save time, you could give each group only one or two time frames.)

Option B – A specific look using primary source documents.

- a. Assign each group only one time frame from below and give them the documents listed.
 - The Spanish-American War: Documents 4 and 5
 - Post-Spanish American War-Pre-Castro: Documents 6 and 7 (Also have them focus on U.S. support of Batista and U.S. economic involvement in Cuba.)
 - The Rise of Castro and Nationalization: Documents 9 and 10
 - The Breakup of the Soviet Union: Documents 11 and 13.
- b. Have students use the documents as a means of looking at the positive and negatives effects of the policies pursued for each time frame and for ideas of alternative policies that could have been pursued.
- c. Have the students prepare their options, including a brief summary of their documents and what influence these documents had on their thinking.

4. Discuss the alternative outcomes. (For both Option A and Option B)

Discuss students' options and potential outcomes as a class. During this discussion, key issues to be brought out include:

- a. Should the U.S. have been more or less involved in Cuba following the Spanish-American War?
- b. Did the U.S. push Castro into an alliance with the Soviet Union? (This question is the basis for Lesson 3.)
- c. Was the conflict with Cuba inevitable based on the actions of Castro and Cuba?

5. Discuss stability in the region.

Emphasize the issue of stability within the region. If that was a goal of the U.S., did it achieve it? Arguments could go both ways here.

Actions and Outcomes

TIME FRAME	U.S. ACTIONS	OUTCOME	OTHER OPTIONS	POTENTIAL OUTCOME?	EST. % SUCCESS?
Spanish-American War	Teller Amend Platt Amend				
Post-Spanish-American War/Pre-Castro	Good Neighbor Policy U.S. support of Batista				
Rise of Castro and Nationalization	Bay of Pigs Sanctions Ending diplomatic relations				
Breakup of the Soviet Union	Increased pressure on Cuba Continued embargo				

Lesson 3:

Cuba, Castro, and the Cold War

This lesson looks at how the American view of communism in the late 1950s and early 1960s impacted U.S. foreign policy decisions toward Fidel Castro and Cuba. This lesson can be used to understand the issues studied in Lesson 2 with greater depth.

Purpose

- To understand the ideology of communism and Cuba's connection with the Soviet Union
- To look at the mindset and political philosophies of the U.S. in the late 1950s and early 1960s regarding communism
- To see how that mindset may have added to the already inherent conflict between the U.S. and Cuba under Fidel Castro
- To understand how the American view of the nature of communism at the time impacted U.S. foreign policy decisions

Main Historical Thinking Standards Addressed

- 2: Historical Comprehension - identifying the central question in historical narratives; reconstruct literal meaning of historical passages
- 3: Historical Analysis and Interpretation - identify author/source of historical document; compare and contrast differing sets of ideas, values, personalities, behaviors, and institutions; consider multiple perspectives; analyze cause and effect
- 4: Historical Research Capabilities - formulate historical questions; obtain and interrogate historical data
- 5: Analysis and Decision-Making - identify issues in the past; marshal evidence of circumstances and current factors contributing to contemporary problems and courses of action; evaluate implementation of a decision and alternative courses of action

Prior Knowledge

This lesson requires some knowledge of the origins of the Cold War and a basic understanding of the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba prior to Castro taking power. The lesson may be used on its own or following Lesson 3.

Additional Historical Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- In analyzing Cold War ideological differences
- As a starting point for a comparison with U.S. actions and outcomes in Vietnam regarding Ho Chi Minh
- As the basis of an examination of public statements vs. public policy and propaganda

Materials

- "Sources of U.S.-Cuba Conflict" handout

Procedure

NOTE: If your class has not yet studied communism as a philosophy and its application to the Cold War, use sections 1 and 2 below and then proceed with the rest of the lesson (It will take approximately 30-45 minutes.) If your class has already covered this, start with section 3.

1. Discuss communism.

Begin with a brief discussion of what communism is and the forms that it has taken.

2. Read and Discuss the “X Article.”

Have students read George Kennan’s “X Article” (Document 8 – this could also be assigned as homework prior to this lesson).

Discuss why the U.S. was worried about the spread of communism, especially into the western hemisphere. Discuss the following:

- Issues related to the evolutionary process that is assumed in communist philosophy
- The desire of communist nations and especially the Soviet Union to help “push” nations toward communism
- The historical causes of the split between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during and after World War II
- The security concerns of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union

Follow up the concrete content issues by analyzing the state of communism in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As a class, discuss the following questions:

- Were all communist countries the same?
- Could a leader be a communist philosophically without subscribing to the system created and exported by the Soviet Union? For example, if they were both communist, why were the U.S.S.R and China not allies?
- While Fidel Castro certainly did not trust the U.S. when he came to power, did the actions of the U.S. push him toward the Soviet Union and create more instability within the region? Was the Cuban-Soviet alliance and U.S.-Cuba conflict inevitable?

3. Read about Cuba’s relationship to the Soviet Union.

Give the students the “Sources of U.S.-Cuba Conflict” handout. This lists events and influential issues related to the development of Cuba’s close alliance with the Soviet Union. Have the students either individually or in pairs go through the events and issues. Next, have students read Castro’s comments following the imposition of the U.S.’ trade embargo on Cuba (Document 9).

4. Discuss Cuba’s relationship to the U.S.

Once the students have looked at the events leading up to the Cuba-Soviet alliance and the document, have them answer the question:

Do the words of Fidel Castro and the events surrounding his movement toward the Soviet Union show that the U.S. pushed Castro toward the Soviet Union?

or

Do they show Castro had no real intentions of forging positive relations with the U.S. to begin with?

This answer needs to have references to specific events and statements made by Castro. It could take the form of a formal writing or as a class or small group discussion.

As a class, discuss the students' responses. During this discussion, have them consider issues such as:

- Did U.S. policy leave few economic choices for Castro other than to go to the Soviet Union?
- Did the U.S. embargo weaken a nation that would inevitably be hostile to the U.S.?
- Was Castro a significant threat to the U.S.?
- Was Castro philosophically and/or economically tied to the Soviet Union or both?
- Did U.S. policy successfully diminish Castro's destabilizing influence within the region?
- How much of what Castro says in his speech seems logical and how much is propaganda?
- How could both sides twist many of these events to blame the other side for the problems?

7. Discuss perspective.

Discuss with the class the fact that events do not happen in a vacuum. This time period is in the middle of the Cold War with a bi-polar world. This view of the world clouded virtually all international decisions and interactions. Oftentimes it also sent unintended messages or implied unintended connections to other nations. The development of the relationships between Cuba and the Soviet Union and Cuba and the U.S. are no different. Logical connections can be made to issues such as Vietnam where the Cold War mindsets of the early 1960s produced a largely black and white picture of a complex situation.

Extension activity – *This extension adds a modern look back through the use of more documents.*

Have the students read Document 11, an interview Castro gave in 1991. Start with Castro's response to the second question regarding the degree of cordiality between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Read his answer to the next question on international public opinion. Finally, read his answer to the question if Cuba would have to surrender its principles to lessen tensions with the U.S. Make sure that the students note the date of this interview and the fact that it is looking back on the relationship.

As a class, discuss Castro's main points – that Cuba and the Soviet Union are philosophically different and that he blames U.S. "imperialistic psychology" for the conflicts. How much of this is propaganda and how much of this is legitimate criticism of the U.S.?

Sources of US-Cuba Conflict

The Soviet Connection

The following are all events or issues that occurred after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba on January 1, 1959. Assess the significance each one had on the creation and tightening of the alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union

- Castro went to the U.S. in April 1959 to meet with U.S. officials regarding Cuba's economic dependence on the U.S. and the economic imbalances and social injustices within Cuba. The meetings produced no positive results.
- Castro needed political support from the communists within his revolutionary movement to continue the organizational and political support for his movement.
- Many within Castro's revolutionary movement were strongly anti-American due to the economic power of the U.S. within Cuba and U.S. support for Batista.
- Prior to the revolution (in 1956) Americans owned 80% of Cuban utilities, 40% of Cuba's sugar, 90% of Cuba's mining wealth, and the key strategic location of Guantanamo Bay.
- Castro needed resources to finance the socioeconomic changes that he wanted and had promised. Therefore, he confiscated or nationalized property without compensating those who originally owned it.
- Cuba signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in February 1960 agreeing to trade sugar for oil, machinery, and technicians.
- In July 1960, the U.S. cut the Cuban sugar quota to the U.S. to zero.
- In the beginning of 1960, trade with the Soviet Union accounted for 2% of all Cuban trade. By the end of 1961, trade with the Soviet Union accounted for 80% of all Cuban trade.
- In August 1960, the U.S. attempted to create opposition to Cuba throughout the Western Hemisphere.
- According to U.S. thought and policy at the time, other Latin American nations were vulnerable to similar communist revolutions like the one in Cuba.
- In 1959, President Eisenhower established the Inter-American Development Bank to provide low-interest loans to Latin American nations to promote economic development.
- In March 1961, President Kennedy proposed the "Alliance for Progress" to improve Latin American development and inter-hemispheric relations. It had minimal results.
- In April 1961, Cuban exiles attempt to overthrow Castro in the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Information for this handout comes from LaFeber, Walter; America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-84. Random House, New York. 1985.

Lesson 4:

Using Economic Pressure to Influence Other Nations?

This lesson analyzes the broader issue of using economic power and pressure to impact political decisions of other nations. This lesson is set up as a guided, teacher-led discussion. Students will discuss.....

Purpose

- To identify economic methods that nations use to influence the political decisions of other nations
- To analyze the effectiveness of using economic power and pressure to impact political decisions of other nations
- To explain and analyze historic uses of different types of trade restrictions and then apply this issue to the outcomes of the Cuban embargo

Main Historical Thinking Standards Addressed

- 4: Historical Research Capabilities - formulate historical questions; obtain and interrogate historical data
- 5: Analysis and Decision-Making - identify issues in the past; marshal evidence of circumstances and current factors contributing to contemporary problems and courses of action; evaluate implementation of a decision and alternative courses of action

Prior Knowledge

General knowledge of trade and U.S.-Cuba relations is required.

Additional Historical Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- To look at the use of economic pressure at other times throughout history simply (by changing example of Cuba to examples from other countries)
- To analyze U.S. power within Latin America and the world as a whole based on American economic size and strength

Materials

- “Applying Economic Pressure” handout

Procedure

1. Discuss trade and the economy.

Discuss the significance of trade to a nation's economy. Ask the students to explain why nations trade. List their answers on the board.

Ask the following questions and discuss student opinions and answers:

- Is trade necessary for economic prosperity?
- What types of things influence how significant trade is to the potential economic success of a nation? (diversity of resources, world demand for its products, limits on domestic production of key products, etc.)
- Given the problems that we often hear about in the news associated with trade, would we be better off without trade and our dependency on foreign products and foreign markets?

2. Identify trade restrictions.

Discuss trade restrictions as a means of influencing the behavior of other nations.

Ask students for a list of types of trade restrictions. These include boycotts of specific goods, full embargoes, quotas, tariffs, and selectively trading during wartime. List these on the board and provide examples that the students may not come up with.

Explain that some uses are primarily for economic purposes (tariffs and quotas), while others are used to influence the political behavior of other nations.

3. Identify historical uses of trade restrictions.

Ask the students to list past and present examples of the use of economic pressure and write them on the board. Have the students attempt to determine:

- The primary goal of each example
- The outcome (how successful each example was/is). Use a rating of "S" for successful, "P" for partially successful, "U" for unsuccessful or "D" for debatable.

Note: This activity should reveal that the interpretation of the success of the outcome depends on perspective. Consequently many outcomes may be "D" (debatable). For example, some people would argue that the trade sanctions on South Africa had a great impact on ending Apartheid and some would argue that the change was inevitable.

Structure the discussion of these examples around the "Applying Economic Pressure: Does the Squeeze Work?" handout. (Depending on the knowledge base of your students, either give each student a copy to fill out on his/her own, have students work in small groups, or use the handout as an overhead and discuss as a class.)

The following are possible examples you can use, but keep in mind you should use examples that you and your class are most familiar with:

- The embargoes of Britain and France prior to the war of 1812
- The blockade of the Confederacy during the Civil War
- Attempts to influence Germany prior to World War I

- Trade sanctions against Vietnam
- The recent embargoes of Iraq, Iran, and South Africa
- Trade restrictions against China

Create a list on the board of factors that determine the relative success or failure of trade sanctions. (For example: How much does the sanctioned nation need outside products/markets? How much does the rest of the world follow the embargo or capitalize from it? What ideological, philosophical, or religious issues impact the resolve of the embargoed nation? How much is the nation imposing the sanctions hurt by its own actions?)

4. Discuss trade restrictions in relation to Cuba.

- Discuss the goals of the Cuban embargo. It began as a means to loosen the hold of communism on the island and has lately focused more on the human rights record of Castro and the Cuban government and the welfare of the Cuban people.
- Ask the students if the Cuban embargo has been successful or not. Have them fill out the bottom of “Applying Economic Pressure: Does the Squeeze Work?” to determine the effectiveness of the embargo in achieving mentioned goals. In doing so, have them add specific evidence regarding the situation in Cuba or changes that have or have not taken place in the “Outcome” column.
- Discuss students’ positions on the effectiveness of the embargo. In this discussion, have the students brainstorm reasons why the embargo was successful or unsuccessful in regards to the goal and its particular outcomes. (Answers may include: issues relating to economic help of the Soviet Union, Cuban’s view of the U.S. as an aggressor, other communist activity in the region, U.S. influence on world markets, etc.)

NOTE: Since the goals of the embargo have changed, there may be answers that appear to be contradictory. (e.g., the students may say it was successful in weakening communism because it has made Cuba poor and therefore weaker, but they may also say that the embargo has been unsuccessful in improving the conditions of the Cuban people because it has created widespread poverty and hurt the Cuban people more than the Cuban government.)

5. Optional activity extension through the use of primary sources and the analysis of “experts.”

Give each student one of the documents listed below. Each is an article on the success of the embargo following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

- Use Documents # 12, 13, 24, 25
 - (For document 24 use only the last section “Implications for U.S. Policy” including the section of “Promoting Change.”)
 - (Document 25 is longer and may need to be split up to create a more balanced timing for each reading).
- Have each student individually highlight/underline his or her article and determine the main point being made by the author.

- d. Once the students have read their articles, discuss the opinions from the articles as a class. Randomly call on students to present their articles. Have others with the same article add more depth or varying viewpoints.
- e. Within the discussion remind students of the Cuban Democracy Act passed in 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act passed in 1996. Connect the laws to the list you made earlier regarding what makes an embargo successful. Pay particular attention to how much the rest of the world follows along since Cuba no longer has the Soviet Union to rely on.
- f. Make additions to the bottom section of “Applying Economic Pressure” on the successes and failures of the Cuban embargo.

6. Discuss the effects of economic pressure.

Explain that economic pressure is just one of many actions that governments take to influence other nations. Economic pressure is also complicated by many outside issues such as the world economy, the domestic economy of the nation doing the embargo, and the political relationships the two nations involved have with other nations in the region.

Applying Economic Pressure
Does the squeeze work?

Historical
Example

Goal

Outcome

Rate of
Success

Cuban Embargo

*Destroy/Weaken
Communism*

Cuban Embargo

*Promote Human Rights/
Welfare of Cuban People*

Lesson 5:

What is Next for U.S. Policy Toward Cuba?

The fall of the Soviet Union created a critical juncture in U.S.-Cuba relations. This lesson is designed to examine the options available to President George H.W. Bush (U.S. President from 1989-1993) upon the fall of the Soviet Union and to debate the further use of economic sanctions as a means of breaking the Castro regime in Cuba. Students will be required to look at policy options, analyze documents, and create logical arguments to support their positions.

Purpose

- To examine the options available to President George H.W. Bush upon the fall of the Soviet Union
- To debate the further use of economic sanctions as a means of breaking the Castro regime in Cuba

Main Historical Thinking Standards Addressed

- 3: Historical Analysis and Interpretation - identify author/source of historical document; compare and contrast differing sets of ideas, values, personalities, behaviors, and institutions; consider multiple perspectives; analyze cause and effect
- 4: Historical Research Capabilities - formulate historical questions; obtain and interrogate historical data
- 5: Analysis and Decision-Making - identify issues in the past; marshal evidence of circumstances and current factors contributing to contemporary problems and courses of action; evaluate implementation of a decision and alternative courses of action

Prior Knowledge

The students will need to have a solid understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuba relationships. The ideas of how economic pressure impacts nations (Lesson 4) is useful.

Additional Historical Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- As a format for an “All-Star Debate” of virtually any other historical topic

Materials

- “All Star Debate - Comment Sheet” handout

Procedure

1. Discuss how the fall of the Soviet Union affected Cuba.

Students should be familiar with the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba through the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Begin by asking why the fall of the Soviet Union was so significant to Cuba. (Answers should include the access to a major trading partner for Cuba, the loss of Soviet subsidies to Cuba, security issues for both the U.S. and for Cuba, and the potential collapse of the Cuban economy.)

2. Discuss the resulting effect on U.S. policy towards Cuba.

Have students brainstorm the dominant policy options available to the U.S. regarding Cuba. These options include tightening the embargo, loosening the embargo, or completely ending the embargo.

3. Prepare for the debate.

Break the students into six groups. Assign each group the task of supporting or opposing one of these specific options (tighten, loosen, or end the embargo) and tell them that they will be required to debate their topic with the opposing group assigned to their specific option. Remind students:

- a. They will need to read the assigned documents (listed below) to find support for their position and to prepare two points that can be presented in three minutes or less to support their position.
- b. Each group should also anticipate the points to be made by the opposing side and be prepared to respond the best that they can.
- c. Note the dates of each document. Some of them are from right after the fall of the Soviet Union (1991-92) while others have a greater period of hindsight. Projections from the time and the more recent analysis of what has happened are both relevant to the discussion, but the students need to recognize when the document was written.

Give students ample time to go through the documents (either in class or as homework) and to work in their groups to bring out the arguments presented in their reading. Encourage them to look at the broader issues involved but also to have specific examples and information to support their points. (If you have a traditional 45-50 minute period, preparation may take one full day while the debate could take a second day. Preparation will take at least 25 minutes even if the students have already read the articles as homework. This entire lesson could be done in a 90 minute block.)

Documents for each group:

Tightening the embargo:

Pro-Side – Document 20

Anti-Side – Documents 13, 15, 16 and 23

Loosening the embargo:

Pro-Side – Documents 13, 16 and 15

Anti-Side – Documents 20 and 25

Ending the embargo:

Pro-Side – Documents 12, 15, 23 and 26

Anti-Side – Documents 25

4. Set up the debate.

- a. Once the students are prepared, choose one or two from each group to participate in an “All-Star Debate.” Have these students come to the front of the class and identify their positions (either by having them sit under their position written on the board or near name tags).
- b. Open the debate by explaining to the class that there are obviously natural allies among the differing opinions represented (e.g. the group that wants to tighten the sanctions will largely be in agreement with the group against ending the embargo completely). Therefore the debate will be held in three separate sections regarding each proposal but individuals from the other topics will also be given a chance to support or attack positions on topics that are not officially theirs.
- c. Instruct the students not on the “all-star” panel to use the “All-Star Debate Comment Sheet” to keep track of key persuasive points that any of the panel members make and of any questions or comments that they would like to ask/make later.

5. Debate the issue.

- a. Start the debate with any position you choose. Give both the pro and anti sides a maximum of three minutes each to make their cases.
- b. Once a side has been presented, open the topic up to rebuttal by the opposing side and the other members of the panel. Moderate this discussion trying to keep the students focused on one argument or sub-topic at a time. Allow this discussion to go for a pre-set amount of time (e.g. seven minutes resulting in about 13 minutes per topic).
- c. Repeat the process for the other two positions.
- d. When you have finished with the panel debate, open the discussion up to the class as a whole. Take questions that they have written throughout the debate first and then take comments.
- e. Finally, have the rest of the class evaluate the positions objectively based on the key points that they have written down. There does not need to be a formal winner but this discussion should bring out more depth in the arguments than the panel provided in order to wrap up this lesson.

“All-Star Debate” Comment Sheet

**Strong points supporting the
TIGHTENING of trade sanctions**

**Strong points supporting the
LOOSENING of trade sanctions**

**Strong points supporting the
ENDING of trade sanctions**

Questions/Comments to be asked/made later:

Lesson 6:

Shifting Foreign Policy: Carter vs. Bush

This lesson has students compare and contrast speeches (Documents 19 and 20) made by President Jimmy Carter and President George W. Bush. Both speeches were made in May 2002. They are excellent examples of the conflicting views on how much of a hard-line stance the U.S. should take regarding Cuba. Teachers are given several options on how students can present evaluations of the positions.

Purpose

- To understand that foreign policy is not rigid but can change with time and politics
- To compare two conflict points in U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba

Main Historical Thinking Standards Addressed

- 2: Historical Comprehension - identifying the central question in historical narratives; reconstruct literal meaning of historical passages
- 3: Historical Analysis and Interpretation - identify author/source of historical document; compare and contrast differing sets of ideas, values, personalities, behaviors, and institutions; consider multiple perspectives; analyze cause and effect
- 4: Historical Research Capabilities - formulate historical questions; obtain and interrogate historical data
- 5: Analysis and Decision-Making - identify issues in the past; marshal evidence of circumstances and current factors contributing to contemporary problems and courses of action; evaluate implementation of a decision and alternative courses of action

Prior Knowledge

Students need only a simple explanation of U.S. involvement in Cuba since the Cold War.

Additional Historical Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- As a means of discussing U.S. policy goals and methods which could then be applied to virtually any controversial historical foreign policy situation
- As a basis for a discussion of the various foreign policy philosophies within the U.S. and the two dominant political parties

Procedure

1. Read speeches by President Carter and President Bush.

Have the students read and highlight/underline the May 2002 speeches by Presidents Carter and President Bush (Documents 19 and 20).

- For homework, have the students make a list of key points from both speeches.
- Given U.S. economic, security, and political and ideological concerns, which speech do students think best articulates the direction the U.S. should go in its relationship with Cuba?

2. Present student options.

How the students express their evaluation of Carter's and Bush's positions could be done several ways. Choose from one of the following options:

- Have the students write a standard compare and contrast essay.
- Lead an open class discussion based on the question. Before the discussion begins, write columns headed "Economic", "Security" and "Political and Ideological" on the board. Then, as the students identify key points from each author, categorize their concerns under one of the three headings and put a "C" (Carter) or a "B" (Bush) next to each point that comes from one of the authors.
- Divide students into small groups and have each group try to come to a consensus on who they agreed with most. The groups should report back to the class on why they made the choice that they did.
- Create an informal debate/discussion. For this debate:
 - Begin by writing "Carter" and "Bush" on opposite sides of the board and having students move to the side of the room with the name of the person they most agree with.
 - Next, open a discussion by calling on students from both sides to support their opinions.
 - With this option, students could also be in the middle (on the fence) and then pick a side later (or even switch sides) while being required to state why they choose the side they did. This would allow for some friendly competition between the two sides.

3. Discuss the impact of external influences.

The wrap-up of this lesson needs to stress the fact that the situation with Cuba is complex and ever-changing due to external influences (the fall of the Soviet Union, the actions of other Latin American nations, outside economic interests, other American international concerns, etc.), the fluid nature of American politics, and the changing situation within Cuba itself. The debate over Cuba and its movement into the economic integration of the Americas and specifically the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is one that will continue to play a role in American politics and in hemispheric relations as a whole.

History Unit

Performance Assessment

Inquiry Question

After the fall of the Soviet Union, what options might the 1990-1994 Bush Administration have pursued regarding its policy toward Cuba?

Main Historical Thinking Standards Addressed

- 1: Chronological Thinking - distinguish between past, present, and future times; identify temporal structure in historical narratives; analyze patterns of historical duration and succession
- 2: Historical Comprehension – identify the central question in historical narratives; reconstruct literal meaning of historical passages
- 3: Historical Analysis and Interpretation - identify author/source of historical document; compare and contrast differing sets of ideas, values, personalities, behaviors, and institutions; consider multiple perspectives; analyze cause and effect
- 4: Historical Research Capabilities - formulate historical questions; obtain and interrogate historical data
- 5: Analysis and Decision-Making - identify issues in the past; marshal evidence of circumstances and current factors contributing to contemporary problems and courses of action; evaluate implementation of a decision and alternative courses of action

Teacher Notes

Students will prepare an article for the American Historical Review Journal examining the options President Bush could have pursued in crafting his administration’s policy toward Cuba following the fall of the Soviet Union. They will use primary source documents from Section IV to support their analysis.

Student essays should include the following:

- **U.S.-Cuba Relations** and how they have developed throughout history
- **Major Events** that have shaped U.S. relations with Cuba
- **Policy Options** from which the President and his advisors could have chosen in regards to Cuba. This can be done in two way:
 - Give students specific policy options (i.e. tightening the embargo, loosening or ending the embargo, or maintaining the status quo)
 - Have students rely on a packet of primary documents to determine the policy options
- **Historical Forces** that would have made the available policy options more or less appealing for the President
- **Student Assessment** of what policy option the Bush Administration should have pursued and why

Materials

- “Cuba: The Cold War and Beyond” handout
- “History Assessment Scoring Guide” handout for teacher and students

- Primary Documents from Section IV of this publication

Cuba: The Cold War and Beyond

You are a nationally acclaimed authority on the historical relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. The editor of the American Historical Review Journal has asked you to contribute an article to the upcoming issue of the magazine. The focus is on examining the options that President G.W. Bush faced in shaping U.S. policy towards Cuba following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Using primary documents, your article should address:

- **U.S.-Cuba Relations** and how they have developed throughout history
- **Major Events** that have shaped U.S. relations with Cuba
- **Policy Options** from which the President and his advisors could have chosen between 1990 and 1994
- **Historical Forces** that would have made the available policy options more or less appealing for the President
- **Assessment** of what policy option you think the Bush Administration should have pursued and why

History Assessment Scoring Guide

Goal	Evidence	Points
Historic Knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explains realistic policy options available to the President at the time of the Soviet Union breakup • Discusses major events that have shaped the U.S.-Cuba relationship • Discusses how U.S. interests in Cuba have evolved over time 	25
Historic Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides clear statement of how historical forces made options more or less appealing to the President at time of the Soviet Union breakup • Includes well thought assessment of which policy option the Bush administration should have pursued 	25
Use of Documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uses specific examples and facts from primary source documents to support arguments • Connects facts and statistics to the argument in a clear and logical manner 	25
Writing Skills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uses correct syntax, spelling, and sentence structure • Organizes article in a clear and easy to follow manner 	25
TOTAL POINTS		100

Section III

Civics Activities

In the following activities it is sometimes necessary (and always helpful) for the students to have a solid background on U.S.-Cuba relations. Lesson #1 from the History Unit or “U.S. Cuba Relations: A Brief History” (Section I) can be used to provide this background.

Lesson 1: Defining Foreign Policy Interests

This lesson begins with a class discussion of current foreign policy actions, and then moves into the application of foreign policy goals in a cooperative learning setting. It concludes with an examination of the Helms-Burton Act and what goals it was attempting to achieve.

Purpose

- To identify and examine foreign policy goals that all nations have
- To examine how foreign policy priorities are created
- To analyze the adoption of the Helms-Burton Act to the foreign policy interests of the U.S.

Main Civics Standards Addressed

- IVB2: Making and implementing U.S. foreign policy - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about how U.S. foreign policy is made and the means by which it is carried out
- IVB3: The ends and means of U.S. foreign policy - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on foreign policy issues in light of American national interests, values, and principles

Prior Knowledge

This lesson requires that students have a solid grasp of the history of U.S.-Cuba relations.

Additional Civics Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- To examine the goals of foreign policy decisions
- As the basis for looking at national priorities as a whole
- The set-up of a comparative assessment of the foreign policies of one or more presidents

Materials

- “Goals of Foreign Policy” overhead

Procedure

1. Discuss recent U.S. policy actions.

Begin by having students use their knowledge of current issues to brainstorm recent foreign policy actions that the U.S. has taken. (Do not limit your discussion to U.S.-Cuba relations.) Write their ideas/suggestions on the board.

Display the “Goals of Foreign Policy” overhead. Explain that nations create international policy based on many goals and interests. (Sometimes these goals are contradictory to each other.) These goals include:

- National security
- Economic growth and stability
- Differences in political ideology
- Humanitarian concerns

Have the class identify the key goal for each example of foreign policy action that they have brainstormed. (Limit this opening to about 10 minutes.)

2. Identify goals of foreign policy.

Break the students into groups and assign each group one of the four goals listed above.

Distribute the “Historic U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Note Taking Guide” (this is a note-taking guide for History Lesson #1 - students need to have a handle on the basic background). Refer to this handout to create a list of events in the history of U.S.-Cuba relations that relate to their particular foreign policy goal.

Based on their list, have groups rate the significance of their goal on a scale of 1-4 in reference to each of the events in U.S.-Cuba relations. (For example, on page one, the national security group might put a 4 by “Connection to U.S. Slave Trade” to denote they think the slave trade is not a key security issue. They may put a 1 by “Ostend Manifesto” to denote it is highly related to security issues.) Discuss their lists and the changes in U.S. goals. (Again hold this to about 10 minutes or so.)

3. Analyze the Helms-Burton Act.

Give students some background on the Helms-Burton Act if they do not already have sufficient knowledge of it. (For more information, refer to “U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Brief History” at the beginning of this book.) Specifically, include issues like the Cuban Democracy Act and the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes.

Have students within their groups (this could also be done individually or in pairs) go through the Helms-Burton Act (Document 18). Next to each section of the Act, have students write down which foreign policy goal (or goals) is being addressed. Remind them that there may be more than one goal within a section. This part could be done as homework if necessary.

Once the students have gone through the entire document, have each group discuss the priorities of the act and rank the four goals in order of priority within the act.

4. Compare articles on U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Have students read the editorial “Helms-Burton Backfire” by Ana Julia Jatar (Document 23) in which she argues that the Helms-Burton Act focused more on economic issues and the politics of the Castro government while missing an opportunity to connect politically with the people of Cuba.

Compare Jatar’s article to the Pat Holt’s editorial “Treat Castro as Irrelevant” (Document 15) which urges efforts to start creating a positive relationship with the next Cuban leader in an effort to create stability within the overall system of international politics.

Discuss how Cuba is a good example of how foreign policy efforts aimed at a leader may also impact the population in the way that could be counterproductive to the overall policy goal.

Goals of Foreign Policy

- National Security
- Economic Growth and Stability
- Differences in Political Ideology
- Humanitarian Concerns

Lesson 2: Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy Decision-Making

This lesson is a guided discussion about domestic influence on the creation of a country's international policy. Students will read portions of the Helms-Burton Act to determine guidelines in creating the law, what it actually does, and if the provisions address the problems used to justify the necessity of the law. Portions of this lesson are set up to be done individually or in pairs.

Purpose

- To explore the influences on the development of foreign policy
- To identify the reasoning for the Helms-Burton Act
- To analyze domestic influences on the passage of the Act
- To analyze if the purposes of the Act are met by the provisions of the Act

Main Civics Standards Addressed

- IIB3: The role of organized groups in political life - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on the contemporary role of organized groups in American social and political life
- IIIE2: Public opinion and behavior of the electorate - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about the role of public opinion in American politics
- IIIE5: Associations and groups -students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about the contemporary roles of associations and groups in American politics
- IVB2: Making and implementing U.S. foreign policy - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about how U.S. foreign policy is made and the means by which it is carried out
- IVB3: The ends and means of U.S. foreign policy - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on foreign policy issues in light of American national interests, values, and principles

Prior Knowledge

Students must have or be given a basic understanding of the history of the Cuban Trade Embargo, the Cuban Democracy Act, and the shooting down of the two Brothers to the Rescue planes by the Cuban military.

Additional Civics Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- As a means of allowing students to analyze the format and complexity of actual legislation
- To examine the powers of the executive branch vs. the powers of the legislative branch
- To assess the U.S.' potential methods of influencing the behavior of other nations (including those beyond Cuba) through economic power

Procedure

1. Discuss how U.S. laws are generated.

Begin by asking students how American policies/laws are generated (not made). Answers may include things like being based on public benefits, public fears or concerns, political gain, etc. Tell the students that they will be looking at the creation and impact of the Helms-Burton Act as an example of the creation of public policy.

2. Provide background information on the Helms-Burton Act.

If you have not already done so, provide students with the relevant background of the Helms-Burton Act. Discuss the long-standing conflict between the two nations (the creation of the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992, the shooting down of two Brothers to the Rescue planes by the Cuban government) that sparked the call for this action. (For more information read Section I - U.S. Cuba Relations: A Brief History.)

3. Analyze domestic influences on the Helms-Burton Act.

Have students either individually or in pairs read “Section-2 Findings” and “Section-3 Purposes” from the Helms Burton Act (Document 18). After students have finished reading discuss:

- Why is strong action against Cuba seen as necessary? (Write these on the board.)
Answers include:
 - a. The welfare and health of Cuban people continues to deteriorate.
 - b. Cuba continues to violate human rights standards (such as using torture).
 - c. Cuba engages in illegal, international narcotics trade (which increases illegal drug levels in the U.S.).
 - d. Cuba engages in subversion and terrorism through training and supplying groups dedicated to international violence.
- How might the Helms-Burton Act benefit the American people? Answers include:
 - a. An increase in national security by having a friendly neighbor
 - b. Economic benefit from a new trading partner
 - c. Protection of U.S. nationals’ property in Cuba
 - d. Increased opportunities for tourism and investment

4. Identify interest groups that supported the Helms-Burton Act.

Have students, either individually or in pairs, look at Section 103 through Section 401 of the Helms-Burton Act. Identify interest groups that supported the Helms-Burton Act.

- In the left margin of Act, students should:
 - Summarize each section in a single phrase or sentence
 - List any domestic groups they think would support or be hurt by each provision (Tell students these groups may be economic groups, branches of the government, or non-governmental groups.)
- In the right margin, student should:
 - Write what reason for action (listed on the board in Step #3a) is being addressed

5. Discuss student responses.

Once students have finished reading, discuss student responses about which interests groups would be hurt or helped by the Act. Turn this into a broader discussion on the passage of the act and include:

- a. Philosophical beliefs of the American people which may have led to the passage of this Act
- b. Domestic interest groups or constituencies likely to support the Act
- c. Political or regional motivations behind specific provisions (For example, Florida has the largest and politically strongest population of anti-Castro Cuban-Americans. Did this potentially impact the 2000 Presidential election?)
- d. Potential external impacts from the Act

5. Analyze political implications related to the Helms-Burton Act.

Conclude this lesson by analyzing broader political implications and the issue of presidential vs. congressional power. To which branch of the government does this law shift power? (The answer is legislative. The President must consult with Congress before ending the embargo and Congress has the power to override presidential decisions within the law.)

Note that at this point in time the Republicans (more hard line concerning Cuba) controlled the Congress while President Clinton, a Democrat (traditionally not as hard line although the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 was sponsored by two Democrats), was in the White House. Why would President Clinton sign this bill? (Connect back to the downed planes and the sway of public opinion.)

Lesson 3: The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy

This lesson is designed to either be an extension of Civics Lesson 1 or to stand on its own. It begins with a series of introductory questions regarding the role of human rights in foreign policy and then has students look at three statements on the Cuban embargo (from President George W. Bush, former President Jimmy Carter, and a journalist for the Wall Street Journal) in a jigsaw format. It concludes with a class discussion of the authors' views and differing philosophies on the significance of human rights and how best to promote them.

Purpose

- To evaluate the role of human rights as a foreign policy objective
- To develop analytical skills through the use of historical documents and articles
- To evaluate the use of economic power in promoting human rights

Main Civics Standards Addressed

- IVB2: Making and implementing U.S. foreign policy -students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about how U.S. foreign policy is made and the means by which it is carried out
- IVB3: The ends and means of U.S. foreign policy - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on foreign policy issues in light of American national interests, values, and principles
- VD2: Dispositions that foster respect for individual worth and human dignity - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on the importance to American constitutional democracy of dispositions that foster respect for individual worth and human dignity

Prior Knowledge

Students must have a basic understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuba relations and of the impacts of the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. You can refer to “U.S. Cuba Relations: A Brief History” (found in Section I) to brief students on this information.

Additional Civics Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- As a basis for a discussion of human rights in general
- To examine the U.S.' role in protecting human rights throughout the world by using the Carter speech as a starting point for the discussion

Procedure

1. Define the term “Human Rights.”

Open with the following questions:

- **Is the state of human rights in other nations any of our concern?**
- **Is the promotion of human rights our responsibility?**

At some point, stop the discussion and ask the students to write a definition of human rights. Have students volunteer to read their definitions. These may vary considerably.

Discuss if “democracy” and “human rights” are the same thing. (In the articles used for this lesson they are often used interchangeably.) Explain that this variation and the spectrum of definitions is part of the complexity of the issue. Common definitions are:

Democracy: A political system in which the power lies with the citizens who elect people to represent them.

Human Rights: The basic freedoms to which all people are entitled (such as life and liberty).

2. Read and report on three articles related to human rights in Cuba.

Explain to the class that they will be reading three articles on Cuba and human rights by three authors:

- President George W. Bush (document 20)
- President Jimmy Carter (document 19)
- Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Journalist from the *Wall Street Journal* (document 22)

Break the students into groups of three and give each person a different article. (Depending on student reading level – you may create groups of six so weaker readers have a partner to help decipher their articles). Have the students read and highlight/underline the document assigned to them.

Once the students have read the documents, within each group have the students explain the key points being argued in their particular document:

- What does the author see as the human rights problem?

Answers:

- **President Carter** focuses on voting, speech, and political freedom.
 - **President Bush** sees voting and freedom of speech as key issues but also focuses on economic freedom within Cuba.
 - **Ros-Lehtinen** focuses on Canada’s relationship with Cuba but within it she cites issues such as Cuban political prisoners being held and tortured.
- What does the author see as possible solutions?

Have the groups determine what the three arguments have in common and in what ways they are different.

3. Discuss the articles as a class.

Keeping the students in their groups, move the discussion to the class as a whole.

Write “Human Rights” in the middle of the board and then form a web with “Carter,” “Bush,” and “Ros-Lehtinen/WSJ” as spokes from the web. Call on different groups to explain the human rights problems presented by each of the three authors and add these to the appropriate spoke on the web.

4. What is the best way to promote human rights in other countries?

Call on various groups of students to explain the positions of President Carter, President W. Bush, and Ros-Lehtinen.

Answers:

- **Former President Carter** sees working together with the Cuban government (including increased contact between the two nations and a “blue ribbon commission” to address property disputes) and admitting differences as the first steps in peacefully resolving human rights issues.
- **President W. Bush** supports increasing economic pressure to force Cuba to change to more of a market structure with increased political and economic freedom (“meaningful reform”). He believes Cuba needs a completely new government in order to improve human rights and improve relations with the U.S.
- **Ros-Lehtinen** argues nations such as Canada must end their relationships with nations like Cuba in order to stand up for human rights.

5. Discuss economic measures and domestic change.

Discuss if economic measures can create domestic change within a foreign nation. Use examples such as:

- China and its acceptance into the World Trade Organization (how much change took place?)
- the economic sanctions against South Africa and the end of Apartheid (were the sanctions the real cause for change?)
- the embargoes on Iraq and Iran

6. Redefine human rights.

Relate back to the beginning of the lesson and the discussion of human rights. Can a nation negatively impact another nation’s government and leaders for violating their citizens’ human rights without also hurting the citizens of that nation? As President Carter states in his speech, international relations and the role of human rights are complicated issues without easy answers.

Lesson 4: Congressional Hearing on the Continuation of the Helms-Burton Act: Regional and Special Interest Influences on Foreign Policy

In this lesson, students focus on the future of the Helms-Burton Act (which tightened restrictions on Cuba and made it clear that the President must consult with Congress before attempting to lift the embargo). It is assumed that at this point the students have a fair amount of knowledge concerning the history and present situation of U.S.-Cuba relations. Based on this knowledge, students will hold a Congressional hearing to determine the fate of the Helms-Burton Act. This lesson will take either two 50 minute periods or one full 90 minute block to complete.

Purpose

- To see the diverse influences on the creation of laws
- To appreciate the workings of the committee system within Congress
- To connect domestic interests with the creation of foreign policy

Main Civics Standards Addressed

- IIB3: The role of organized groups in political life - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on the contemporary role of organized groups in American social and political life
- IIIE2: Public opinion and behavior of the electorate - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about the role of public opinion in American politics
- IIIE5: Associations and groups - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about the contemporary roles of associations and groups in American politics
- IVB2: Making and implementing U.S. foreign policy - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about how U.S. foreign policy is made and the means by which it is carried out

Prior Knowledge

As a culminating activity, it is assumed that students have a fair amount of knowledge concerning the history and present situation of U.S.-Cuba relations. If this lesson is used alone, a fair amount of background will need to be provided regarding this relationship and the Helms-Burton Act.

Additional Civics Applications

This lesson could also be used:

- As a means of teaching the Congressional hearing systems
- As a means of looking at the impact of regional interests and special interest groups in the formulation of American policy

Materials

- “The Senators: List of Roles” handout
- “The Lobbyists: List of Roles” handout

Procedure

Note: As homework, prior to the lesson, have students read the Helms-Burton Act (if they have not already done so) and make a list of its key provisions. Begin class with a brief discussion of the Act.

1. Explain how Congressional hearings work.

Explain to the students that they are going to hold a Congressional hearing to decide the fate of the Helms-Burton Act. Explain how Congressional hearings work if you have not already done so in your class. Explain that the committee would have members from several but not all states and would take testimony regarding the proposed bill from people with expertise or direct interest in the topic. (How much depth you want here will depend on your purpose for using this lesson. If the purpose is to teach the Congressional committee system, you will need greater depth.)

2. Prepare for role-play.

Break the class into groups of two or three and have each group draw (or choose) a role from the list on the “The Senators List of Roles” and “The Lobbyists List of Roles.” (There are eight lobbying groups on the handout. You do not have to use all of them, but be sure to keep the testimony for and against the Act fairly even.) Each pair will either serve as a Senator on the committee or as a lobbyist arguing for or against the continuation of the Helms-Burton Act.

Give each Senator and lobbyist their relevant documents and a specified amount of time (15-20 minutes) to prepare their initial position on the law (Senators) or their testimony (lobbyists).

- Give each Senator a copy of “The Senators: List of Roles” and Documents 26 and 27. Senators should have some idea of how their constituents might be affected by the law.
- Give each lobbyist a copy of “The Lobbyists: List of Roles” and the relevant document as noted on the handout. Lobbyists need to determine if they are for or against the continuation of the law and prepare a logical argument to support that position based on the interest group they are representing.

3. Hold a Senate Committee Hearing.

a. Set Up

- Once the pairs are prepared, convene the hearing. Have the Senators sit in a row in the front of the room.
- Have the committee choose a chairperson to run the hearing.
- Explain that the lobbyists will be called upon to state their case and that the Senators are allowed and encouraged to ask questions of the lobbyists.

b. The Hearing

- Have the chairperson open the hearing by explaining the key elements of the Helms-Burton Act.
- Next, have the chairperson call individual lobbyists to present their case. Limit the testimony of any one lobbyist to a pre-determined amount of time depending on your own time constraints. Encourage a dialogue between the lobbyists and the Senators.

c. Committee Debate

- Once all of the lobbyists have presented their positions, have the Senators debate the continuation of the act amongst themselves openly in front of the class.

- Have each Senator vote either for or against the continuation of the Helms-Burton Act and briefly state why he or she chose that particular side.

4. Debrief after the hearing.

Hold a concluding discussion of the process. Ask the Senators what influenced their votes the most.

- a. Was it the arguments from the lobbyists (meaning access to public officials is very important)?
- b. Was it the original interests of their constituencies?
- c. Was it regional economic interests?
- d. Was it their personal opinion on what was best for the nation as a whole?
- e. Did arguments by Lobbyists or fellow Senators make them change their opinion/vote?

Within this discussion, show the students Document 21 (either as an overhead or on paper) which shows the relationship between money being given to Congressmen by Cuban-American groups and how they voted. Ask the students:

- a. What does this document show? (The document shows that money had little impact on the Senators' votes.)
- b. Do you think that is typical? It may also be relevant to note that the Cuban Democracy Act was submitted by a Senator from Florida (Senator Graham).

Conclude by having the students comment on the process as a whole. What does it tell them about influences of U.S. policy?

The Senators: List of Roles

California – You are from a state with substantial ethnic diversity but a small Cuban-American population. Economically, your state produces more agricultural products than any other state in the nation. Your state is a popular tourist destination for both Americans and foreign visitors. California also has a vocal liberal constituency that is concerned about human rights.

Florida – You are from a state that has a large and powerful Cuban-American population. The vast majority of anti-Castro Cubans (many with substantial wealth) who fled the island immigrated to South Florida where they are both vocal and politically connected. Your state is a leading producer of agricultural products, especially fruits and melons that are exported throughout the world. Florida is both a popular tourist destination and a jumping off point for cruise ships and flights to vacations throughout the Caribbean.

Hawaii – You are from a small state where tourism is a dominant industry largely dependent on foreign visitors from around the world as well as domestic visitors. Your state produces a great deal of sugar for export.

Indiana – You are from a state dominated by agriculture but with some industry as well. Your state exports corn and other agricultural products throughout the world. Parts of the state produce automobile parts, large truck engines, and other types of machinery. Your state is also home to a major pharmaceutical company. Indiana is considered politically conservative with “Midwestern values.”

Michigan – You are from a state that still has a great deal of manufacturing and industry. Exports to other nations are a significant part of the business for these manufacturing companies.

The Lobbyists: List of Roles

Amnesty International – You represent an organization dedicated to supporting human rights throughout the world. (Document 22)

The American Tourist Bureau – You are a representative for the interests of the American tourism industry. You represent American hotel chains, airlines, resorts, etc. (Document 26)

Cuban-American Association – You represent the political, economic, and social interests of Cuban American in the U.S. While many Cuban-Americans did not specifically flee from the rule of Fidel Castro, there are many who did. The majority of your organization is very anti-Castro and supports his removal from power. (Document 21)

Potential American Investors in Cuba – You represent people who see Cuba as a place for potential economic investment and profits. While stability in Cuba is important, access to Cuba is even more important for the economic growth and prosperity of your individuals and companies. (Document 26)

State Department Official for President Bush – You represent the position of President Bush. (Document 20)

Representative from the Organization of American States – You represent an organization that attempts to promote cooperation and general prosperity throughout the Americas. All North, Central and South American nations have input into the direction of this organization with the exception of Cuba. (Document 23)

Dennis Hays, Executive VP of the Cuban American National Foundation – You have studied the situation and come to the conclusion that the trade restrictions with Cuba have benefited the U.S. You question the potential benefits of future trade with Cuba. (Document 25)

American Pharmaceutical Industry – You represent American drug companies who produce drugs for both domestic and foreign sale. Your industry sees Cuba as another potential market for your products. (Document 26)

Civics Unit

Performance Assessment

Inquiry Question

Should the U.S. repeal the Helms-Burton Act?

Main Civics Standards Addressed

- IIB3: The role of organized groups in political life - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on the contemporary role of organized groups in American social and political life
- IIIE2: Public opinion and behavior of the electorate - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about the role of public opinion in American politics
- IIIE5: Associations and groups - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about the contemporary roles of associations and groups in American politics
- IVB2: Making and implementing U.S. foreign policy - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about how U.S. foreign policy is made and the means by which it is carried out
- IVB3: The ends and means of U.S. foreign policy - students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on foreign policy issues in light of American national interests, values, and principles

Teacher Notes

Students will write a policy memorandum advising the President of the U.S. on whether or not to propose a bill repealing the Helms-Burton Act to Congress. The memorandum should include the perspectives of the primary domestic and international interest groups concerned with the U.S. policy toward Cuba. The perspectives discussed should include:

- The Cuban-American community in Miami
- Business lobbying groups like the farm industry
- Congressional leaders
- The U.N.
- U.S. allies in Latin American and Europe

Students should use primary source documents from Section IV to support their analysis. The final product will take the form of a policy memo (2 pages), which outlines the pros and cons of a policy and concludes with a recommendation.

Students should receive a copy of the assessment rubric.

Materials

- “Memo to the President” handout
- “Rubric for Civics Unit Assessment” for teacher and students
- Primary source documents from Section IV

NOTE: This assessment could be adapted to a student debate or roundtable discussion.

Memo to the President

You are the Latin America advisor to the President of the U.S. Write a policy memorandum advising the President on whether or not he/she should propose a bill to Congress repealing the Helms-Burton Act. The memorandum should include the perspectives of the primary domestic and international interest groups concerned with U.S. policy toward Cuba. The perspectives discussed should include:

- The Cuban-American community in Miami
- Business lobbying groups like the farm industry
- Congressional leaders
- The U.N.
- U.S. allies in Latin American and Europe

Use primary source documents to support your analysis. Your final product should be in the form of a two page policy memo outlining the pros and cons of continuing or repealing the Helms-Burton Act. You should write your recommended action in the first sentence of the memo. The body should explain the pros and cons of your recommendation. End with your recommended statement of action, and the single most important supporting reason.

Rubric for Civics Unit Assessment

Goal	Evidence	Points
Knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion of how U.S. interests in Cuba have evolved over time • Understanding of interests of various domestic and international groups in relations to the Act 	25
Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Includes well thought assessment (pros and cons) of keeping/repealing the Act • Comprehensive explanation of how domestic politics influences foreign policy • Logical reasoning and support for decision to keep/repeal the Act 	25
Use of Documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uses specific examples and facts from primary source documents to support arguments • Connects facts and statistics to the argument in a clear and logical manner 	25
Writing Skills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uses correct syntax, spelling, and sentence structure • Organizes article in a clear and easy to follow manner 	25
TOTAL POINTS		100

Section IV

Document Index (with brief description)

1) *Letter from Thomas Jefferson to President James Monroe (October 24, 1823)*

In this letter Thomas Jefferson expresses his long held belief that Cuba would be a valuable addition to the U.S., giving it control over the entire Caribbean. However, he goes on to say that the U.S. should not try to acquire colonies in the hemisphere, but instead should protect the other nations of the hemisphere from interference from European powers.

2) *Monroe Doctrine (December 2, 1823)*

In his annual message to Congress, President Monroe declared that the U.S. would consider any effort by a European country to interfere in the affairs of Western Hemisphere nations as a threat to U.S. security. In doing so, Monroe proclaimed the U.S. to be the protector of these nations.

3) *Ostend Manifesto (October 18, 1854)*

A secret document written by U.S. diplomats Buchanan, Mason, and Soule to Secretary of State William Marcy arguing that the U.S. would be justified in seizing Cuba from the Spanish.

4) *Teller Amendment (April 20, 1898)*

Attached to the U.S. declaration of war against Spain (for the Spanish-American War), this amendment declared that the U.S. had no intention of conquering Cuba.

5) *Platt Amendment (introduced February 1901)*

This amendment to the Cuban Constitution of 1902, which the U.S. government demanded be included, legalized U.S. military intervention in Cuba, limited the Cuban government's ability to enter treaties with other nations, and established the right of the U.S. to maintain naval bases on the island.

6) *Roosevelt Corollary (December 6, 1904)*

Angry about increased European interference in the Western hemisphere, President Roosevelt announced the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his annual address to Congress. In it he asserted the U.S.' right to exercise "international police power" to maintain stability in the Western Hemisphere. While the Monroe Doctrine was designed to prevent European interference in the affairs of Latin America, the Roosevelt Corollary justified U.S. intervention in the region.

7) *Good Neighbor Policy speech (August 14, 1936)*

In an address at Chautauqua, New York, President Roosevelt detailed the many measures his administration had taken to demonstrate that the U.S. had no designs of conquest in Latin America. One of the measures he discussed was the abandonment of the Platt Amendment.

8) *The X Article (July 1947)*

Authored by George Kennan, this article pronounced a belief that appeasing the Soviet Union was counterproductive and that the U.S. should actively prevent the spread of Communism. This policy of containment would ultimately become the official security strategy of the U.S.

9) *Facing U.S. Aggression: Castro interview (July 11, 1960)*

In this interview, Castro criticizes the U.S. for imposing an embargo five days earlier and for meddling in the affairs of Latin America by manipulating dictators in the region. Additionally, he argues that an influx of economic aid from the Soviet Union has compensated for any damage that might have been done by the imposition of an embargo.

10) *Letter from President Kennedy to Soviet Union Chairman Khrushchev (April 18, 1961)*

Written the day after the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy reassures Khrushchev that the U.S. has no intention of intervening militarily in Cuba. However, he does stress the American government's support of "Cuban patriots" in their efforts to topple Castro's regime.

11) *Castro interview in Journal Siempre (May 30, 1991)*

In this interview Castro discusses how Cuba will be impacted by decreased trade with Eastern Europe. Additionally, he reaffirms his commitment to socialism, describes the weakness he sees in the Soviet system, and declares his belief that improved relations with the U.S. are dependent on the actions of the American government and not his own.

12) *"A Kinder Cuba Policy": Boston Globe editorial (August 29, 1991)*

In this staff editorial, the writer calls for the American government to help the Cuban people through the hardships they will face with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

13) *"Through Peaceful Means We Can Help Ease Castro Out": Christian Science Monitor editorial (October 10, 1991)*

Member of House Foreign Relations Committee, Representative Lee H. Hamilton (Democrat, Indiana) argues that a more aggressive policy towards Cuba would be counterproductive. However, he argues that the U.S. should not lift the embargo until Castro is out of power.

14) *"Soviets Must Stop Aid to Castro Before Gaining MFN Privileges": Speech before the House of Representatives (November 4, 1991)*

In this speech, Representative Guarini (Democrat, New Jersey) does not directly address the embargo. He argues that the Soviet Union should not be granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status as long as it is providing any aid to Cuba. Throughout his speech he denounces Castro's human rights record. He expresses his belief that Castro's situation is desperate and that he would not be able to survive the loss of Soviet aid.

15) *"Treat Castro as Irrelevant": Christian Science Monitor editorial (February 6, 1992)*

Former Chief of Staff for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pat M. Holt's editorial in the Christian Science Monitor argues that Castro is likely to fall no matter what the U.S. does. Therefore U.S. policy should be geared toward establishing a positive relationship with Castro's successor. This would involve, among other things, lifting trade restrictions and reestablishing diplomatic contact.

16) *“Cuba's Impending Implosion -- Castro's Economic Props are Gone; The End is Near”*:
Seattle Times editorial (March 4, 1992)

The *Seattle Times* editorial declares that the breakup of the Soviet Union spells the imminent collapse of the Castro regime.

17) *Cuban Democracy Act* (April 18, 1992)

Sponsored by Representative Robert Torricelli and Senator Bob Graham, this act tightened economic restrictions on Cuba in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union in hopes of speeding its transition to democracy. It also encouraged the President to impose sanctions on countries that continue to trade with Cuba. Additionally it made it illegal for foreign branches of American companies to trade with Cuba.

18) *Helms-Burton Act* (March 12, 1996)

Passed in response to Cuba shooting down two Brothers to the Rescue Planes, this act further tightened restrictions on Cuba and made it clear that the President must consult with Congress before attempting to lift the embargo. The most controversial portion of the Act made it legal for U.S. nationals, whose property had been confiscated during the Revolution, to sue anyone utilizing those confiscated assets. As this made it possible for U.S. citizens to sue foreign companies, many in the international community felt the Helms-Burton Act amounted to the U.S. forcing its trade policies toward Cuba on the rest of the world.

19) *President Carter's speech to University of Havana* (May 14, 2002)

In a historic, uncensored address aired on television throughout Cuba, former President Jimmy Carter criticized both Cuba and the U.S. for contributing to the poisonous relationship between the two nations. While praising the nation's health and education system, he frankly criticized Castro for preventing democratic reforms in Cuba. He pointed out that most Americans support an end to the embargo and travel restrictions, but also believe that the Cuban government must improve its human rights record. He called for a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Cuba.

20) *President George W. Bush's speech on Cuba: Reaction to Jimmy Carter's speech* (May 20, 2002)

On the 100th anniversary of Cuban Independence, days after Carter's speech, President Bush declared that the U.S. would not liberalize its trade policy until Castro made a commitment to democratic reforms.

21) *Center for Responsive Politics' study on Cuban-American campaign donations* (2001)

The study examines how receiving money from Cuban Americans affected congressmen's voting on the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms Burton Act.

22) *“The Americas Canada's Hypocritical Foreign Policy Coddles Cuba”*: *Wall Street Journal* editorial (July 19, 1996)

In this article, Ros-Lehtinen criticizes Clinton for caving to international criticism of the Helms-Burton Act, and goes on to condemn critical nations like Canada for trading with Cuba in spite of its poor human rights record. She defends the theory that diplomatic

measures have failed to change the Cuban government's behavior, and that added economic pressure like that outlined in the Helms-Burton Act was necessary to improve the human rights situation.

23) *“Helms-Burton Backfire”*: *The Washington Post* editorial (July 22, 1996)

In this article, by Ana Julia Jatar, a senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, she criticizes the Helms-Burton Act. Jatar argues that by passing the Helms-Burton Act and focusing on the issue of American property rights in Cuba, the U.S. missed a great opportunity to harness disaffection among the Cuban people toward the government. Instead the passage of this hostile act allowed Castro to rally support for his government in opposition of the "cruel" policies of the U.S.

24) *“Cuba's Economic Transition and its Implications for U.S. Policy”*: *Testimony* (May 7, 1998)

Testimony of Philip Peters, Senior Fellow of the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution, before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House, Ways and Means Committee. Peters argues that rather than maintaining economic restrictions, the U.S. government should, through trade, encourage Cuba to add to the limited market reforms it has enacted since the fall of the Soviet Union. He argues that it is time for the U.S. to recognize that sanctions have clearly failed in their stated goal to remove Castro from power.

25) *Testimony of Ambassador Dennis K. Hays before a Senate committee* (May 21, 2002)

Testimony of Ambassador Dennis K. Hays, Executive Vice President of Cuban American National Foundation before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Sub-Committee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism Hearing on U.S. Trade Policy with Cuba. The Ambassador praises current U.S. policy. Responding to a movement in Congress to ease restrictions on trade with Cuba, Hays argues that sanctions have forced Castro to reduce the size of his military and have made it economically unfeasible for him to support revolutionary movements in other parts of Latin America. Referencing Cuba's economic weakness, he argues that U.S. businesses would not benefit from increased economic ties.

26) *“A Review of U.S. Policy Towards Cuba”*: *Cuba Working Group policy statement* (May 15, 2002)

Criticizing current U.S. policy towards Cuba, this group of congressmen argues that current policy is not supported by the American public and does not make sense strategically. They call for ending travel restrictions, allowing unrestricted exports of medical and agricultural products to Cuba, expanding educational exchange programs between the two nations, repealing the Helms-Burton Act and expanding security cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba.

27) *U.S. census table of Cuban agricultural exports (1998-2002)*

The table demonstrates the dramatic increase in agricultural exports to the U.S. from Cuba as a result of eased trade restrictions.

DOCUMENT 1
October 24, 1823

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to President James Monroe regarding the Monroe Doctrine

In this letter Thomas Jefferson expresses his long held belief that Cuba would be a valuable addition to the U.S., giving it control over the entire Caribbean. However, he goes on to say that the U.S. should not try to acquire colonies in the hemisphere, but instead should protect the other nations of the hemisphere from interference from European powers.

To the President of the United States (James Monroe)
Monticello, October 24, 1823

DEAR SIR,

The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. . .

But we have first to ask ourselves a question. Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being. Yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, even with her own consent, but by war; and its independence, which is our second interest, (and especially its independence of England,) can be secured without it, I have no hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances, and accepting its independence, with peace and the friendship of England, rather than its association, at the expense of war and her enmity.

I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country; but that we will oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially, their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way. I should think it, therefore, advisable, that the Executive should encourage the British government to a continuance in the dispositions expressed in these letters, by an assurance of his concurrence with them as far as his authority goes; and that as it may lead to war, the declaration of which requires an act of Congress, the case shall be laid before them for consideration at their first meeting, and under the reasonable aspect in which it is seen by himself.

I have been so long weaned from political subjects, and have so long ceased to take any interest in them, that I am sensible I am not qualified to offer opinions on them worthy of any attention. But the question now proposed involves consequences so lasting, and effects so decisive of our future destinies, as to rekindle all the interest I have heretofore felt on such occasions, and to induce me to the hazard of opinions, which will prove only my wish to contribute still my mite towards anything which may be

useful to our country. And praying you to accept it at only what it is worth, I add the assurance of my constant and affectionate friendship and respect.

Thomas Jefferson

DOCUMENT 2
December 2, 1823

Monroe Doctrine

In his annual message to Congress, President Monroe declared that the U.S. would consider any effort by a European country to interfere in the affairs of Western Hemisphere nations as a threat to its own security. In doing so, Monroe proclaimed the U.S. to be the protector of these nations. This message became known as the Monroe Doctrine.

. . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . .

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the results have been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course. . . .

DOCUMENT 3
1854

Ostend Manifesto

A secret document written by U.S. diplomats James Buchanan (American Minister to Great Britain), J.Y. Mason (American Minister to France), and Pierre Soule (American Minister to Spain) to Secretary of State William Marcy. It argued that the U.S. would be justified in seizing Cuba from the Spanish.

We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the time has arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale, as those of the United States in the purchase, of the island and that the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.

Under these circumstances we cannot anticipate a failure, unless possibly through the malign influence of foreign powers who possess no right whatever to interfere in the matter.

We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this conclusion, and, for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two distinct heads:

1. The United States ought, if practicable to purchase Cuba with as little delay as possible.
2. The probability is great that the government and Cortes of Spain will prove to sell it, because this would essentially promote the highest and best interests of the Spanish people.

It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity of its geographic position, and the considerations attendant on it, Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to the great family of States of which the Union is the providential nursery.

From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean.

On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some thirty thousand miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river into the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the populations within the last ten years amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time Louisiana was annexed to it.

The natural and main outlet to the products of this entire population, the highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and the Pacific States, can never be secure, but more ever be endangered whilst Cuba is a dependency of a distant power in whose possession it has proved to be a source of constant annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.

Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.

Its immediate acquisition by our government is of paramount importance, and we cannot doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished for by its inhabitants.

The intercourse which its proximity to our coasts begets and encourages between them and the citizens of the United States, has, in the progress of time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes that they now look upon each other as if they were one people and had but one destiny.

Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of this island exceedingly dangerous to the United States.

The system of immigration and labor lately organized within its limits, and the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers, threaten an insurrection at every moment which may result in direful consequences to the American people.

Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent cause of anxiety and alarm...

Besides, the commercial nations of the world cannot fail to perceive and appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people from a dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection between Spain and Cuba, and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of England and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an importance and profitable character, and rapid extend with the increasing population and prosperity of the island.

But if the United States and every commercial nation would be benefited by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be greatly and essentially promoted. She cannot but see what such a sum of money as we are willing to pay for the island would effect in the development of her vast natural resources... Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for developing her resources, and removing her financial embarrassments, it may never again return...

But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba, without remuneration. Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted, justifies any people in endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting local administration necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba, cannot fail to stimulate and keep alive that spirit of resistance and revolution against Spain, which has, of late year, been so often manifested. In this condition of affairs it is vain to expect that the sympathies of the people of the United States will not be warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed neighbors.

We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to execute the neutrality laws; but should the Cubans themselves rise in revolt against the oppression which they suffer, no human power could prevent citizens of the United States and liberal minded men of other countries from rushing to their assistance...

It is not improbably, therefore, that Cuba may be wrestled from Spain by a successful revolution; and in the event she will lose both the island and the price which we are now willing to pay for it...

It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an insurrection against the Spanish government, and should other independent nations come to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our opinion, prevent the people and government of the United States from taking part in such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends...

What out to be the course of the American government under such circumstances? Self preservation is the first law of nature, with States as well as with individuals...After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the questions, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power, and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of a neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own house...

...[O]ur recommendations, now submitted, are dictate by the firm belief that the cession of Cuba to the United States, with stipulations as beneficial to Spain as those suggested, is the only effective mode of settling all past differences and of securing the two countries against future collisions.

We have already witnessed the happy results for both countries which followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.

James Buchanan
J.Y. Mason
Pierre Soule

DOCUMENT 4
1898

Teller Amendment

Attached to the U.S. declaration of war against Spain (Spanish-American War), this amendment declared that the U.S. had no intention of conquering Cuba.

Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with two hundred and sixty six of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited:

Therefore, [the U.S. resolves:]

First That the people of the Island of Cuba are, of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.

DOCUMENT 5
1903

Platt Amendment

This amendment to the Cuban Constitution of 1902, which the U.S. government demanded be included, legalized U.S. military intervention in Cuba, limited the Cuban government's ability to enter treaties with other nations, and established the right of the U.S. to maintain naval bases on the island.

The President of the U.S. is hereby authorized to 'leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people' so soon as a government shall have been established in said island under a constitution which, either as a part thereof or in an ordinance appended thereto, shall define future relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:

I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or other wise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island . . .

III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba. .

VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.

DOCUMENT 6
1904

Roosevelt Corollary

Angry about increased European interference in the Western hemisphere, President Roosevelt announced the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his annual address to Congress. In it he asserted the U.S.' right to exercise "international police power" to maintain stability in the Western Hemisphere. While the Monroe Doctrine was designed to prevent European interference in the affairs of Latin America, the Roosevelt Corollary justified U.S. intervention in the region.

To the Senate and House of Representatives

... In treating of our foreign policy and of the attitude that this great Nation should assume in the world at large, it is absolutely necessary to consider the Army and the Navy, and the Congress, through which the thought of the Nation finds its expression, should keep ever vividly in mind the fundamental fact that it is impossible to treat our foreign policy, whether this policy takes shape in the effort to secure justice for others or justice for ourselves, save as conditioned upon the attitude we are willing to take toward our Army, and especially toward our Navy. It is not merely unwise, it is contemptible, for a nation, as for an individual, to use high-sounding language to proclaim its purposes, or to take positions which are ridiculous if unsupported by potential force, and then to refuse to provide this force. If there is no intention of providing and keeping the force necessary to back up a strong attitude, then it is far better not to assume such an attitude.

The steady aim of this Nation, as of all enlightened nations, should be to strive to bring ever nearer the day when there shall prevail throughout the world the peace of justice. There are kinds of peace which are highly undesirable, which are in the long run as destructive as any war. Tyrants and oppressors have many times made a wilderness and called it peace. Many times peoples who were slothful or timid or shortsighted, who had been enervated by ease or by luxury, or misled by false teachings, have shrunk in unmanly fashion from doing duty that was stern and that needed self-sacrifice, and have sought to hide from their own minds their shortcomings, their ignoble motives, by calling them love of peace. The peace of tyrannous terror, the peace of craven weakness, the peace of injustice, all these should be shunned as we shun unrighteous war. The goal to set before us as a nation, the goal which should be set before all mankind, is the attainment of the peace of justice, of the peace which comes when each nation is not merely safe-guarded in its own rights, but scrupulously recognizes and performs its duty toward others.

If these self-evident truths are kept before us, and only if they are so kept before us, we shall have a clear idea of what our foreign policy in its larger aspects should be. It is our duty to remember that a nation has no more right to do injustice to another nation, strong or weak, than an individual has to do injustice to another individual; that the same moral law applies in one case as in the other. But we must also remember that it is as much the duty of the Nation to guard its own rights and its own interests as it is the duty of the individual so to do. Within the Nation the individual has now delegated this right to the State, that is, to the representative of all the individuals, and it is a maxim of the law that for every wrong there is a remedy. But in international law we have not advanced by any means as far as we have advanced in municipal law. There is as yet no judicial way of enforcing a right in international law. When one nation wrongs another or wrongs many others, there is no tribunal before which the wrongdoer can be brought. Either it is necessary supinely to acquiesce in the wrong, and thus put a premium upon brutality and aggression, or else it is necessary for the aggrieved nation valiantly to stand up for its rights. Until some method is devised by which there shall be a degree of international control over offending nations, it would be a wicked thing for the most civilized powers, for those with most sense of international obligations and with keenest and most generous appreciation of the difference between right and wrong, to disarm. If the great civilized nations of the present day should completely disarm, the result would

mean an immediate recrudescence of barbarism in one form or another. Under any circumstances a sufficient armament would have to be kept up to serve the purposes of international police; and until international cohesion and the sense of international duties and rights are far more advanced than at present, a nation desirous both of securing respect for itself and of doing good to others must have a force adequate for the work which it feels is allotted to it as its part of the general world duty. Therefore it follows that a self-respecting, just, and far-seeing nation should on the one hand endeavor by every means to aid in the development of the various movements which tend to provide substitutes for war...and on the other hand that it should keep prepared, while scrupulously avoiding wrongdoing itself, to repel any wrong, and in exceptional cases to take action which in a more advanced stage of international relations would come under the head of the exercise of the international police. A great free people owes it to itself and to all mankind not to sink into helplessness before the powers of evil.

... It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. If every country washed by the Caribbean Sea would show the progress in stable and just civilization which with the aid of the Platt Amendment Cuba has shown since our troops left the island, and which so many of the republics in both Americas are constantly and brilliantly showing, all question of interference by this Nation with their affairs would be at an end. Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence can not be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.

In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, ... we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large. There are, however, cases in which, while our own interests are not greatly involved, strong appeal is made to our sympathies. Ordinarily it is very much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with striving for our own moral and material betterment here at home than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations. We have plenty of sins of our own to war against, and under ordinary circumstances we can do more for the general uplifting of humanity by striving with heart and soul to put a stop to civic corruption, to brutal lawlessness and violent race prejudices here at home than by passing resolutions and wrongdoing elsewhere. Nevertheless there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our manifest duty to endeavor at least to show our disapproval of the deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it. The cases must be extreme in which such a course is justifiable. There must be no effort made to remove the mote from our brother's eye if we refuse to remove the beam from our own. But in extreme cases action may be justifiable and proper. What form the action shall take must depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it. The cases in which we could interfere by force of arms as we interfered to put a stop to

intolerable conditions in Cuba are necessarily very few. Yet it is not to be expected that a people like ours, which in spite of certain very obvious shortcomings, nevertheless as a whole shows by its consistent practice its belief in the principles of civil and religious liberty and of orderly freedom, a people among whom even the worst crime, like the crime of lynching, is never more than sporadic, so that individuals and not classes are molested in their fundamental rights--it is inevitable that such a nation should desire eagerly to give expression to its horror on an occasion like that of the massacre of the Jews in Kishenef, or when it witnesses such systematic and long-extended cruelty and oppression as the cruelty and oppression of which the Armenians have been the victims, and which have won for them the indignant pity of the civilized world.

Theodore Roosevelt

DOCUMENT 7
August 14, 1936

Good Neighbor Policy speech

In an address at Chautauqua, New York, President Roosevelt detailed the many measures his administration had taken to demonstrate that the U.S. had no designs of conquest in Latin America. One of the measures he discussed was the abandonment of the Platt Amendment.

. . . . A few days ago I was asked what the subject of this talk would be; and I replied that for two good reasons I wanted to discuss the subject of peace . . . because in the hurly-burly of domestic politics it is important that our people should not overlook problems and issues which, though they lie beyond our borders, may, and probably will, have a vital influence on the United States of the future.

Many who have visited me in Washington in the past few months may have been surprised when I have told them that personally and because of my own daily contacts with all manner of difficult situations I am more concerned and less cheerful about international world conditions than about our immediate domestic prospects.

I say this to you not as a confirmed pessimist but as one who still hopes that envy, hatred and malice among Nations have reached their peak and will be succeeded by a new tide of peace and good-will. I say this as one who has participated in many of the decisions of peace and war before, during and after the World War; one who has traveled much; and one who has spent a goodly portion of every twenty-four hours in the study of foreign relations.

Long before I returned to Washington as President of the United States I had made up my mind that pending what might be called a more opportune moment on other continents, the United States could best serve the cause of a peaceful humanity by setting an example. That was why on the 4th of March, 1933, I made the following declaration:

“In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor- the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others- the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.”

This declaration represents my purpose; but it represents more than a purpose, for it stands for a practice. To a measurable degree it has succeeded; the whole world knows that the United States cherishes no predatory ambitions. We are strong; but less powerful Nations know that they need not fear our strength. We seek no conquests; we stand for peace.

In the whole of the Western Hemisphere our good-neighbor policy has produced results that are especially heartening.

The noblest monument to peace and to neighborly economic and social friendship in all the world is not a monument in bronze or stone, but the boundary which unites the United States and Canada- 3,000 miles of friendship with no barbed wire, no gun or soldier, and no passport on the whole frontier.

Mutual trust made that frontier. To extend the same sort of mutual trust throughout the Americas was our aim.

The American Republics to the south of us have been ready always to cooperate with the United States on a basis of equality and mutual respect, but before we inaugurated the good-neighbor policy there were

among them resentment and fear, because certain Administrations in Washington had slighted their national pride and their sovereign rights.

In pursuance of the good-neighbor policy, and because in my younger days I had learned many lessons in the hard school of experience, I stated that the United States was opposed definitely to armed intervention. We have negotiated a Pan American convention embodying the principle of non-intervention. We have abandoned the Platt Amendment, which gave us the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba. We have withdrawn American marines from Haiti. We have signed a new treaty which places our relations with Panama on a mutually satisfactory basis. We have undertaken a series of trade agreements with other American countries to our mutual commercial profit. At the request of two neighboring Republics I hope to give assistance in the final settlement of the last serious boundary dispute between any of the American Nations.

Throughout the Americas the spirit of the good neighbor is a practical and living fact. The twenty-one American Republics are not only living together in friendship and peace; they are united in the determination so to remain. To give substance to this determination a conference will meet on December 1, 1936, at the capital of our great Southern neighbor, Argentina, and it is, I know, the hope of all Chiefs of State of the Americas that this will result in measures which will banish wars forever from this vast portion of the earth.

DOCUMENT 8

July 1947

The X Article

Authored by George Kennan, this article pronounced a belief that appeasing the Soviet Union was counterproductive and that the U.S. should actively prevent the spread of Communism. This policy of containment would ultimately become the official security strategy of the U.S.

Of the original ideology [of communism], nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it....

[There is an] innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumptions of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime and, therefore, to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the war suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one of the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such changes. But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.

This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final coup de grace. Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland"--- that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union--- should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature "adventuristic" revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even counter-revolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow. . .

But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purpose in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain

baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, increasing constant pressure toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of the individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the other hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent momentary whims of democratic opinion but only intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries--- policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.

In light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community . . .

The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's

challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

DOCUMENT 9
July 9, 1960

“Facing U.S. Aggression”: Castro interview

In this interview, Castro criticizes the U.S. for the imposition of the U.S. embargo five days earlier and for meddling in the affairs of Latin America by manipulating dictators in the region. Additionally, he argues that an influx of economic aid from the Soviet Union has compensated for any damage that might have been done by the imposition of an embargo.

The Cuban FIEL radio network on July 9 began an interview with Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Replying to the first question on what measures are to be adopted by the revolutionary government in the present economic situation Castro said in brief:

The first measure is not to lose patience. I think we must not lose our patience, calm, or good humor. We must take this struggle to victory, forcing our reason to prevail and knowing how to do this.

We are acting with reason and right on our side. They [the U.S.] are acting against reason, right, and history. We are certain we will emerge victorious in this struggle. We are absolutely certain we will win the economic battle. We should act in a manner that would be of no benefit to them. They always expect certain reactions from the revolutionary government. They are always mistaken. These mistakes are characteristic of U.S. foreign policy.

They have done all they can to remove the revolutionary government. From the first there have been campaigns, aggressions, lies, aerial incursions. Note how they have used all these weapons at different times. Before the harvests they permitted the planes to fly over. Now that the harvest is done the planes have stopped--as if by order. Now they have reached the stage of direct economic aggression. They have been using the policy of provocation, defamation, and aggression but they will not budge Cuba from its path.

They tell the tourists to stay away yet we, on the other hand, treat the tourists well. We always try to act in the correct manner, with sincerity and clarity. We have never lied. All we have done is defend ourselves from aggression. Until they began their campaign of aggressions what did we do? We did not eject the *United Press* or *Associated Press*. They are still here. We brought newsmen from all over to see the truth about Cuba. When they began the air attacks we mobilized the people. We expressed the people's protest. It was proved that the planes were coming from Florida even after the U.S. Government declared they did not come from U.S. territory.

We have never been guilty of any act of aggression. We have only been doing the revolutionary thing in defending ourselves. The result was that President Dorticos was received everywhere with sympathy and Latin American solidarity was seen all over. Eisenhower went to Latin America first and his tour took place amid turmoil and tear gas. Our President went and the result was a triumphant tour. We have been winning all the battles. We won the battle against slander . . .

Then came the oil battle. They conceived the plot of leaving us without fuel. They had great hopes in this maneuver. They were convinced that the oil matter would defeat the revolution. The result of this is that we have taken over the refineries and we have not been left without oil. There are 19 Soviet ships on the way to Cuba with oil . . .

We have been facing all these aggressions, adopting always the correct policy needed to win battles now and in the future. We have taken measures to grant the power to nationalize U.S. firms when the interests

of the country demanded it. In reply to aggression we have adopted a law that will protect the interests of the nation.

All U.S. firms have been here without suffering infringement. The laws we have passed have been aimed at those interests that exploited our country. The fact that American interests still are here proves that the aggression is not on our part. We have been the object of subversive plots and aggressions. These aggressions have been the policy of the U.S. Government...

We have continued to be victims of a series of aggressions. We shall continue to be victims of this series of aggressions but our weapon is reason. We shall show the world that this unjustified attack is being carried out against a small country by a powerful country. The Latin American nations will see that the U.S. Government does not want people to develop. It does not want hunger to end; does not want the peasants to have land; does not want illiterates to have schools; does not want nations to have culture or high living standards; does not want them to enjoy their work and their land...

Marti [one of Cuba's great poets and statesmen] said that one must do whatever must be done at all times. We must mobilize the entire nation so the world may see how Cuba mobilizes against aggression and protests aggression. This is to be an appeal to the public opinion of the world. The world is to see how this aggression will fail in the face of the worthiness of our people. This is a chance for all Cubans to act at an important time in the struggle of nations to be free and to progress.

We must remember that we are a small nation, that we are right, that we have many virtues, that we have a long tradition and that we are intelligent. We shall be victorious in our struggle. We are certain we shall face all difficulties and the people too shall face them. We will not withdraw a single step. We shall not be conquered should they commit the ultimate mistake of attacking us. . .

The Cuban revolution has shown that it can go ahead; that an economy can be developed despite the fact that not a cent comes from abroad. We are destroying the lie upon which the policy of oligarchy in Latin America was based. It is necessary to improve industry, education, living standards. Everything must be done to produce more. Everything must be done to improve consumption without investments from the United States. . .

DOCUMENT 10
April 18, 1961

Letter from President Kennedy to Soviet Union Chairman Khrushchev

Written the day after the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy reassures Khrushchev that the U.S. has no intention of intervening militarily in Cuba. However, he does stress the American government's support of Cuban patriots in their efforts to topple Castro's regime.

Mr. Chairman [Khrushchev]:

You are under a serious misapprehension in regard to events in Cuba. For months there has been evident and growing resistance to the Castro dictatorship. More than 100,000 refugees have recently fled from Cuba into neighboring countries. Their urgent hope is naturally to assist their fellow Cubans in their struggle for freedom. Many of these refugees fought along side Dr. Castro against the Batista dictatorship; among them are prominent leaders of his own original movement and government.

These are unmistakable signs that Cubans find intolerable the denial of democratic liberties and the subversion of the 26th of July Movement by an alien-dominated regime. It cannot be surprising that, as resistance within Cuba grows, refugees have been using whatever means are available to return and support their countrymen in the continuing struggle for freedom. Where people are denied the right of choice, recourse to such struggle is the only means of achieving their liberties.

I have previously stated, and I repeat now, that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba. In the event of any military intervention by outside force we will immediately honor our obligations under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression. While refraining from military intervention in Cuba, the people of the United States do not conceal their admiration for Cuban patriots who wish to see a democratic system in an independent Cuba. The United States Government can take no action to stifle the spirit of liberty.

I have taken careful note of your statement that the events in Cuba might affect peace in all parts of the world. I trust that this does not mean that the Soviet Government, using the situation in Cuba as a pretext, is planning to inflame other areas of the world. I would like to think that your government has too great a sense of responsibility to embark upon any enterprise so dangerous to general peace.

I agree with you as to the desirability of steps to improve the international atmosphere. I continue to hope that you will cooperate in opportunities now available to this end. A prompt cease-fire and peaceful settlement of the dangerous situation in Laos, cooperation with the United Nations in the Congo and a speedy conclusion of an acceptable treaty for the banning of nuclear tests would be constructive steps in this direction. The regime in Cuba could make a similar contribution by permitting the Cuban people freely to determine their own future by democratic processes and freely to cooperate with their Latin American neighbors.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you should recognize that free peoples in all parts of the world do not accept the claim of historical inevitability for Communist revolution. What your government believes is its own business; what it does in the world is the world's business. The great revolution in the history of man, past, present and future, is the revolution of those determined to be free.

John F. Kennedy

DOCUMENT 11
May 30, 1991

Castro interview in *Journal Siempre*

In this interview by Beatriz Pages Rebollar, Castro discusses how Cuba will be impacted by decreased trade with Eastern Europe. Additionally, he reaffirms his commitment to socialism, describes the weakness he sees in the Soviet system, and declares his belief that improved relations with the U.S. are dependent on the actions of the American government and not his own.

Pages: Do you think that the political and economic changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe were historically inevitable, or did Eastern European leaders have an opportunity to delay or avoid those changes?

Castro: I do not think that those changes were historically inevitable. I cannot think that way. I cannot adopt that fatalistic approach, because I do not think that the return to capitalism and the disappearance of the socialist field was inevitable. I think that subjective factors played an important role in this process. There were all kinds of mistakes, for example, the divorce from the masses. If we were to delve deeply into this subject, we would say that there were large ideological weaknesses because the masses moved away from the ideals of socialism, among which human solidarity is primary. The real values of socialism were being neglected, and the material questions received more attention as time went by. The ideological part of this kind of process was being neglected, while the materialistic part was being stressed. It suddenly appeared as if the objective of socialism, according to the statements, speeches, and documents, had focused only on improving the standard of living of the population every year: A little more cloth fabric, a little more cheese, a little more milk, a little more ham, more material stuff. To me, socialism is a total change in the life of the people and the establishment of new values and a new culture which should be based mainly on solidarity between men, not selfishness and individualism...

Eastern European countries are now beginning to have millions of jobless people, as well as all the vices of capitalist society. They are beginning to have tremendous social inequality, injustice, discontent, and repentance, because they thought that they would live like they do in Paris the day after the famous changes, without even having to work. What they are really learning is the nature of capitalism and all its inequalities, injustices, and calamities . . .

Pages: What degree of cordiality exists between Cuba and the USSR after all these changes?

Castro: If the Soviets decide to make a number of reforms, of any type, even if they establish capitalism, we can have our opinion on this but we will still respect them. Of course, they have never said that they will establish capitalism, they never talked about giving up socialism, nor have they talked about this yet. They talked about a number of economic and political reforms and our position was to respect that belief. We even approved many of the positions that they set out at the beginning. Yes, for example, they said that an end had to be put to income that was not generated at the job site, that a struggle has to be made against those who rob, those who speculate, the middlemen, the parasites, and all those types of people. Who is not going to agree with that? When they set out to accelerate the socialist development based on the intense application of science and technology, who was not going to agree with that? When they set out to perfect socialism and the socialist mechanisms, and when they criticized historical errors, who was not going to agree with that? Nevertheless, I am very conscious, and I have been very conscious for a long time, of the historical errors made in different fields of the Soviet Union's revolutionary process. They made errors on several issues. The phenomena of personality cults, the abuse of power, all those

things happened. All the political processes and all the revolutions have made mistakes. If we analyze the errors made by the French Revolution, they too were significant...

The current Soviet leadership that initiated this reform process has always been very respectful and friendly to us. This leadership undertook all efforts to develop our relations. We signed a friendship and cooperation agreement with Gorbachev during his visit to Cuba and our meetings with him were always very good, pleasant, and friendly. Therefore, in the midst of this process they never demanded that we do what they were doing, nor could we demand anything, nor did we interfere in what they were doing. There is a principle of respect that has been maintained until today, and this is why our relations have been cordial. We have here a Soviet diplomatic mission, an ambassador, technicians, and significant economic relations. I think that there could not be any other possible policy, nor rules, principles, or notions to develop relations between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Pages: Has international public opinion exerted any pressure on Cuba to change its direction, like the Soviets?

Castro: We were accused of being a satellite of the Soviet Union for 30 years, and we were accused of doing whatever the Soviet Union did-which was a big lie because we were never a satellite and we were never obedient followers of Moscow's orders, and we never received such orders-and now, because the situation has completely changed, we are told to do what the Soviets do.

What does the West want us to do? We are revolutionaries on our own and at our own risk. We are not revolutionaries for someone else, and we will not be demoralized or discouraged by all those campaigns. What do they demand, that we implement a market economy? What do they demand, that we become capitalists? What do they demand, that we become addicted to the lifestyle, both political and economic, of the West, of imperialism, of capitalism? Is that what they demand? They will undoubtedly fail to achieve this.

This type of pressure has been exerted, but not by the Soviets. The consequences of what occurred represent an entirely different thing, and the effects have been quite serious and deep, but they have not been intentional. The USSR has not tried to exert economic pressure on us, instead, the Soviets currently face a serious economic crisis, lack of organization, and chaos that affects their economy. Thus, without intending to affect us or to exert pressure on our country, the consequences have seriously affected our economic relations, not to mention the serious blow dealt by the disappearance of the Socialist bloc, which truly affected us. What affects us the most is the problems which result from the difficulties of the Soviet Union. Referring to this, we have not been subjected to pressure, but we have suffered serious consequences. We can say that the consequences have been disastrous for our country's economy, for our country's security, and for the revolution.

Pages: Cuba has to find itself a new place in the world after the collapse of Eastern Europe. Where will the country turn to, commander? Could the PRC or the DPRK be the answer? . . .

Castro: We must try to broaden our economic relations with the entire world. Of course, as far as we are concerned, because of its blockade, the United States is not included. This is a great obstacle to our economic development. Mexicans will understand this very well because we had a greater percentage of trade with the United States than what you have, and we have been deprived of all that. You will understand what a big obstacle the U.S. blockade has meant for our development. This forced us to look for the broadest possible economic relationships with the rest of the world, fighting pressure from the United States, which not only exercises an economic blockade against us, but pressures everyone with all their might to prevent the rest of the world from trading with us. The United States tries to extend its blockade the world over. Some countries do not trade with us on account of U.S. pressure. Many

commercial operations are sabotaged by them and they complicate commercial operations in whatever way they can.

Pages: Commander, it is said that Fidel Castro has always been a great prophet and whatever he predicts occurs. What do you believe Gorbachev's future will be?

Castro: I do not know who says I have these prophetic qualities.

One can always observe historical trends, events, a series of circumstances. Here, for example, we have been analyzing a number of international problems.

Gorbachev is a very clever man, that is one of his characteristics. I mention this because I notice he is a man of great capacity and he works to find solutions to his country's great problems. Right now he is fighting a battle to avoid the breakup of the Soviet Union. The USSR's very existence is what is at stake today. No one can say for sure that the breakup of the Soviet Union is going to take place. I believe that Gorbachev's historic role will depend on what he can do to preserve the USSR as a multinational state, as a great country, and as a superpower. Really, the idea of a unipolar world under U.S. protection is something that does not please anyone at all, and even less so the better they get to know the United States. This would be humanity's great tragedy. We hope that Gorbachev's talent and intelligence, his wisdom, his good intentions-which no one questions- helps him find the formula that will allow him to preserve the USSR as a great country and as a great power. If he is able to do this under current circumstances, the people will be grateful. However, no one can predict these events. It would be irresponsible for me to attempt this.

All I can say is that I have hope that this can be achieved.

Pages: Could U.S. tensions lessen without Cuba having to surrender its principles?

Castro: I consider it very difficult that given the present circumstances the United States can lessen its hostilities toward us. Only time can make this possible, only when the United States sees the amount of heroism our people have, only when they learn to respect the heroic capacity of our people. It will depend a great deal on us, on our capacity to resist economic difficulties, on our capacity to dash their hopes that our revolution can collapse, the capacity to defend the country if at any moment they attempt to forcibly destroy the revolution. I believe that only then would they be capable of reflecting on these terms, something very difficult to do just now when they are possessed by a very great triumphant spirit, when they speak of a 1000-year North American order, and when they know that Cuba has maintained its principles with much bravery and firmness.

It is very difficult for them to show the minimum honesty that is needed to respect, as they should, a country such as Cuba; a country that deserves their respect and that is even worthy of their admiration, because, how many adversaries like us have they encountered? And what danger does Cuba pose for the United States? There is no Socialist bloc today and they can no longer claim that U.S. security is being threatened or any of those other fantasies, foolish acts, and idiocies; they are simply facing a problem of arrogance, hegemony, and an inability to admit that someone is standing up to them in a world where they are very much used to virtually everyone obeying them.

This is why it is not realistic to think it possible that they are willing to decrease tension between us; to stop their hostilities without us making principle concessions. Making principle concessions is tantamount to renouncing the revolution, independence, and everything else. This would be useless. We know them too well. You make a simple concession to them and they will demand others. We know about the imperialist mentality, the imperialist psychology, and that country's history not only through

what they have done to us, but by what we have seen them do to other countries under other circumstances. Imperialism will be imperialism. Its nature cannot be changed by spontaneous generation, quite the contrary, it tends to be reaffirmed.

Pages: Then, it is not up to Cuba to decrease the tension of the relationship with the United States?

Castro: That really does not depend on Cuba; it certainly does not depend on Cuba. It depends on the United States.

Pages: Reagan applied a very aggressive policy toward Latin America and particularly toward the island. That is my opinion. Have things changed with Bush?

Castro: No, they have not changed. The eight years of the Reagan administration and Reagan's threat led our country to make great efforts to strengthen its defense, its combat capabilities, its ability to resist in the military arena, and to draft and develop a war concept that includes the participation of all the people, including its millions of citizens, men, and women.

Today our country is organized. It is much stronger in its ability to resist and defend itself militarily than it was during the Reagan era. A part of the Bush era has gone and we have continued to seriously prepare ourselves in this area. This has made us stronger and better capable of resisting threats. However, there is absolutely no indication that those threats have disappeared with the new administration...

Pages: What do you think about Bush?

Castro: In Bush I see a genuine and capable representative of Yankee imperialism. I think he is perfectly well prepared to exercise the functions he is carrying out. I think that his many years as CIA director and as vice president of the United States gave him experience and he is now accomplishing his role as chief of the empire. I am not going to characterize him as a person. The empire is the essence of injustice, arrogance, hegemony, warmongering, and aggressiveness, and its representatives express this philosophy and these ideas. So, I will limit myself to passing judgment on the system they represent. I do not want to state any opinion of a personal nature. . .

Pages: Could the changes in the Soviet Union and the socialist world encourage the United States to attack Cuba militarily? Is there that possibility?

Castro: The situation that exists now did not exist before and still the United States attacked Vietnam, launched a naval squadron on, and intervened in, Grenada, one of the smallest countries of the world, and invaded Panama, a country it is still occupying. What guarantees can the United States offer any country? What security can the United States offer us? We will not make the mistake of believing in ethical values or in moderation that does not exist for them. We have to trust only in our ability to resist any military aggression.

The current situation did not exist earlier and still they carried out a few interventions. The current situation, logically, could encourage them to carry out any kind of military adventure.

DOCUMENT 12
August 29, 1991

“A Kinder Cuba Policy”: *Boston Globe* editorial

In this staff editorial, the writer calls for the American government to help the Cuban people through the hardships they will face with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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Poor, struggling Cubans, already suffering terrible shortages of food, clothing and fuel, are now to be victims of the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. Political fallout from the failed coup in Moscow is expected to cut off Cuba from supplies formerly provided by the Kremlin.

It is time for the United States to step in with a helping hand. Whether Fidel Castro welcomes help from the United States or sneers at it is immaterial at this point. America's isolation of Cuba, however justified when initiated, has long been pointless and now becomes blatantly cruel.

The Cuban people, denied any expression of their political will by special forces of government police, are trapped. Castro, like China's hard-line leaders, tolerates no dissent.

Castro's foolishness, however, does not justify the blindly hostile posture that the US maintains toward Cuba. Cuba is no military threat to the security of the United States. Thirty years have passed since Castro let Nikita Khrushchev begin installing nuclear-missile bases in Cuba and John F. Kennedy set up a naval blockade to stop it.

Nor does Cuba's heavy-handed brand of communism hold any appeal for Latin American or Caribbean countries. Though fulfilling its promise to bring education and medical care to the masses, Castro's regime has fallen far short of creating a people's paradise for the 10 million Cubans who live amid deprivation on the potentially bountiful island 90 miles off Florida.

Cuba's problems with its Soviet benefactors did not begin with the coup. Rather, as economic woes deepened in the USSR and as Gorbachev opened the way to democratic practices, Castro's old-style dictatorship lost favor. The amounts of supplies and oil exchanged for Cuban sugar were reduced.

Food rationing already limits each person to one roll a day and a family to five eggs a week and five pounds of rice and a chicken per month. Now, all Soviet aid to Cuba is to end. Oxen to pull farm machinery are replacing cattle to feed people. Tension over food might detonate violence, according to *The Wall Street Journal*.

There is no need for the US to consign the Cuban populace to such hardship. Castro's reign cannot survive in a vacuum.

At the Pan American games in Cuba, Castro looked his age - 65. And despite his bravado, he knows that his options are running out. He has made tentative overtures to the US from time to time to lift the decades-old American embargoes against trade and travel.

In keeping with the expansive spirit of the day, the US should make the first move and extend a neighborly hand to the hard-pressed Cubans. Renewing ties would be good for them and for us.

DOCUMENT 13
October 10, 1991

"Through Peaceful Means We Can Help Ease Castro Out": Christian Science Monitor editorial
Member of House Foreign Relations Committee, Representative Lee H. Hamilton's (Democrat, Indiana) argues that a more aggressive policy towards Cuba would be counterproductive. However, he argues that the U.S. should not lift the embargo until Castro is out of power.

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ECONOMIC crisis threatens the survival of Fidel Castro's communist regime in Cuba. New noncommunist governments in Eastern Europe have cut economic ties with Cuba. The Soviet Union is ending the special relationship that Cuba long enjoyed.

The Cuban economy is in dismal shape and remains deeply dependent on the Soviet Union, which still accounts for more than 70 percent of Cuba's trade. Over the past five years, Soviet aid accounted for 20 percent of Cuba's national income and 90 percent of its fuel supply. In 1990, Soviet aid declined by 30 percent and oil shipments by 25 percent. These trends have continued in 1991. Russian President Boris Yeltsin called last month for the end to all aid and subsidies to Cuba. Shrinking aid and trade, combined with the economic failures of communism, have led to shortages of food, energy, and nearly all consumer goods.

The decline in Soviet aid is bankrupting Cuba. Faced with the possible termination of all Soviet subsidies, Castro recently announced severe austerity measures. Gasoline consumption will be cut 30 to 50 percent, electricity usage will be reduced by 10 percent, and more food items will be rationed.

The end of Cuba's special relationship with the Soviet Union raises questions of whether Castro will survive. Many analysts predict that worsening discontent in Cuba will bring him down. Before the recent coup in Haiti, Castro was the only leader in Latin America not democratically elected. He has rejected economic and political reform and continues repressive policies.

Castro's days are numbered, but he may last longer than some people think. It is possible that his regime can scrape through for a few years. Even his opponents point out that no one starves or goes barefoot in Cuba, education and basic medical care are universal, and crime is low. So far, Castro's domestic opposition has been weak and easily contained by security forces. Continued anti-Castro statements from the US give him a foreign enemy and an excuse to demand further sacrifices from the Cuban people.

The end of the cold war and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe offer an opportunity to reassess US policies toward Cuba.

The US wants internal change in Cuba, but the major source of tension in relations always has been Cuba's close ties with the Soviet Union. Now that the Soviets no longer export revolution to the third world, Cuba's role as a Soviet proxy has vanished. Cuban troops have come home from Africa, and the Soviets plan to remove their troops from Cuba. This poor and isolated country no longer threatens anyone but itself.

Whether Castro lasts another three months or three years, Washington should begin to think about post-Castro Cuba. Better relations between the US and Cuba would reduce regional tensions, promote

economic development in the Caribbean, and provide the US with a valuable trading partner.

I do not think it is possible for the US to have normal relations with a Castro-led Cuba, or to lift the economic embargo so long as Castro remains in charge. Nonetheless, we should begin to discuss issues of specific interest to us. To the extent that Cuba accommodates the US on issues such as immigration, drug trafficking, and support for rebels in Central America, we should take modest steps to improve relations. We should also permit travel to Cuba and a wider range of personal exchanges. If we hope to influence change in Cuba, we need to increase our dialogue and engagement with the Cuban people, especially the youth.

President Bush has properly rejected any US military move against Castro. A more aggressive policy would disrupt US relations with Latin America, lend credence to Castro's propaganda, and give him an excuse for domestic repression.

The US should, however, step up international political pressure on Castro. We should demand free elections, supervised by international observers. We should do all we can to make Castro accountable to the Cuban people, and let them decide whether he stays or goes. It would be far better for the future of US-Cuban relations if Castro were removed peacefully by his own people rather than by forces from abroad.

DOCUMENT 14
November 4, 1991

“Soviets Must Stop Aid to Castro Before Gaining MFN Privileges”: Speech before the House of Representatives

In this speech, Representative Guarini (Democrat, New Jersey) does not directly address the embargo. He argues that the Soviet Union should not be granted Most Favored Nation status as long as it is providing any aid to Cuba. Throughout his speech he denounces Castro's human rights record. He expresses his belief that Castro's situation is desperate and that he would not be able to survive the loss of Soviet aid.

Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a bill which provides that the United should not grant Most-Favored-Nation status [MFN] to the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union ceases all military and economic support for the regime of Fidel Castro, simply stated, we should not be giving trade privileges to a nation while it sends billions of dollars to prop up a Cuban dictatorship that could be a threat to our national security and that makes mockery of human rights.

We must not forget the lessons of history, the Cuban Missile Crisis awakened Americans to the reality that there could be armed nuclear warheads just minutes from our population centers. Fidel Castro's military-oriented economy has lowered the standard of living of the Cuban people. As everyone knows, he has no regard for internationally accepted human rights standards or the promotion of democratic values, and has instigated guerrilla activities in Latin America and other parts of the world for years. Mr. Castro allows no freedom of the press, no religious activities, no workers' rights, and no criticism of his regime.

The Cuban people who live under this despot yearn for freedom. They endure harsh prison sentences merely for seeking the same fundamental human rights that people in most nations take for granted. Each year, thousands of Cubans risk their lives crossing by boat or on home-made rafts to Florida to escape this ruthless dictator, while millions more continue their daily drudgery, working for a failed system.

We must learn a lesson from history. This same man is far more desperate today than he was in the 1960's. He is cornered, he has ruined the economy, and he is increasingly isolated in a world that has all but abandoned a fatally flawed Communist ideology.

Mr. Speaker, Fidel Castro has counted on the Soviet Union for survival. Indeed, 70 percent of Cuban trade is with the Soviet Union. Cuba receives almost all of its oil -- vital to Cuban industry -- from the vast Soviet petroleum reserves.

Moreover, at least \$1 trillion in Soviet military aid flows to Cuba annually, in addition to over \$3,500 million in economic assistance.

Over the past few years, we have watched one Communist government after another being swept aside, giving rise to democracy, freedom, human rights, and economic opportunity. Eastern Europe is now free. The Baltic states are free. The Soviet Union is collapsing into loosely associated republics with newfound rights and economic opportunities for their citizens.

But, unfortunately for the Cuban people, Fidel Castro stubbornly clings to his repressive Communist ideology, Cubans are no closer to true freedom today than they were in 1960, and Mr. Castro, a die-hard Marxist, is trying to keep it that way.

Mr. Speaker, every day that this tyrant stays in power, thousands of innocent Cubans languish in prison for no crime other than the desire to be free. Millions more suffer under the yoke of totalitarianism. If Congress does not seize every opportunity to effect change in Cuba, the pain and suffering of an entire country will be on our hands.

Today, as we watch the drastic new steps the Kremlin is taking, we must begin serious debate on whether to grant MFN status to the Soviet Union while it continues to support the tyrannical Castro regime. I am here to remind my colleagues that trade privileges to the Soviet Union at this time would indirectly assist the Communist government of Fidel Castro. The money the Soviet Union saves in lower import duties in the United States could very well free up other Soviet funds to help prop up Mr. Castro. This is clearly contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.

The Soviet Union has become a vast potential market for United States exporters, and improved trade relations between our two countries will help support the fledgling Soviet democracy, but in the interest of ensuring the security of the Western Hemisphere and promoting human rights, we must encourage the Soviet Union to stop supporting the despotic Cuban regime before we extend any trade privileges to the Soviet Union.

I welcome President Gorbachev's announcement that he will cut back Soviet troops in Cuba. My bill provides an incentive for him to continue these cutbacks. If the Soviet Union is serious about democratization, and if it wants trade privileges from the United States, then its foreign policy and foreign aid must reflect this commitment. Subsidies to Fidel Castro must stop. I urge my colleagues to support and cosponsor this important legislation.

DOCUMENT 15
February 6, 1992

"Treat Castro as Irrelevant": Christian Science Monitor editorial

Former Chief of Staff for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pat M. Holt's editorial in the Christian Science Monitor argues that Castro is likely to fall no matter what the U.S. does. Therefore U.S. policy should be geared toward establishing a positive relationship with Castro's successor. This would involve, among other things, lifting trade restrictions and reestablishing diplomatic contact.

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The Soviet Union has disintegrated. Albania has abandoned communism and rejoined the West. Even North Korea is negotiating nuclear arms control questions with South Korea and the United States. There has been a remarkable outbreak of peace in Central America, first in Nicaragua and now in El Salvador, two countries where Cuba was accused of roiling the waters for so long. Surely, change is about to come to Cuba as well.

But not, apparently, if Fidel Castro can help it. He has lost his multibillion-dollar annual subsidies from the Soviet Union. His economy is a shambles. He is using horses and oxen for transport because there is no gasoline for trucks. He is cracking down even harder on dissent. And he continues to exhort his people to keep the true faith of Marxism.

Observers (including this one) have been mistaken before in predicting Mr. Castro's imminent fall. Tough Latin American dictators have shown that they can survive a great deal. Castro is preeminently a survivor, but his prognosis is still bleak.

For more than 30 years, American policy toward Cuba has been paralyzed by the obsession of removing Castro from power. This in turn has fed Castro's paranoia and formed the basis of his anti-Yankee propaganda. And so the American and Cuban views of each other have become mutually reinforcing. This has made it difficult for Americans to focus on what our real interests in Cuba are. Now, even if Castro is not on the way out, he has become irrelevant, and maybe we can see our interests more clearly.

They are not very great. They require that Cuba not be a threat to its neighbors (including the US), and that it not provide a base for any hostile foreign power. Those conditions now exist.

In addition, the US has an interest in economic and cultural relations with Cuba. At one time, the US had large investments in Cuba and a profitable trade. Castro nationalized the investments, and the US ended the trade through imposing an economic embargo. (The trade would no doubt have dwindled anyway because of the reorientation of Cuba's economy to the Soviet Union and because of a Cuban shortage of hard currency.) There was also at one time a lively exchange of tourists, students, artists, writers, and baseball players.

It would be nice if Cuba had a democratic government that respected human rights, but American interests have flourished in many countries with less than ideal standards in this regard.

THERE are four steps the US can take now. None is very dramatic, but they would put US policy on a

sounder basis for the long term:

One, end Radio-TV Marti, the anti-Castro broadcasting operation from offshore. It is an unnecessary irritant that we should never have started to begin with. Many Cubans can get American broadcasts anyway.

Two, end trade restrictions. This won't result in much trade, because the Cubans don't have any money (and are too poor a credit risk for loans); but it would be a useful symbolic step.

Three, end travel restrictions. This doesn't mean opening the country to Cuban immigration; it means recognizing that a Cuban participating in an academic or scientific meeting in the US is not a threat to our national security.

Four, reestablish full diplomatic relations, ending the charade of an "interests section" in the Swiss Embassy in Havana.

It will be objected that these steps would help Castro out of a jam. Actually, they would only put Cuban policy in a sensible framework to position us to deal with Castro's successor. We ought not to try to pick that successor.

The Miami exiles will want American help to return, overthrow Castro, and form a government. The Bush administration may be tempted to provide that help. But it would be a mistake. The exiles talk about democracy, but what they really mean is a return to the status quo ante - a status quo ante that produced Castro in the first place.

The exiles might be able to pull this off even without help from Washington. And the Cuban people will have to wait a while longer for a decent government.

DOCUMENT 16
March 4, 1992

“Cuba's Impending Implosion -- Castro's Economic Props are Gone; The End is Near”: *Seattle Times* editorial

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In this staff editorial the Seattle Times declares that the collapse of the Soviet Union spells the imminent collapse of the Castro regime. *Seattle Times*: Seattle, WA. March 4, 1992, Pg A10.

SHOCK waves from the collapse of the Soviet Union soon will bring down Fidel Castro's crumbling regime in Cuba.

He survived 32 years on the kindness of strangers, and the demise of communism has left him without indulgent patrons or even patient socialist creditors.

President Bush last week used a Miami Herald newspaper column to renew a challenge to Castro to hold free, democratic elections. Last May the president said elections were the key to improved relations with the United States.

Ten months later, closer ties with Havana are a moot point. As the president noted, "Castro's days are numbered."

Just as the administration need not worry about getting friendlier, neither does it have to contemplate getting tougher.

Some elements in Congress want to tighten the U.S. economic blockade against Cuba, but the president has said he will veto any such legislation, to avoid needless tension with allies.

Castro and Cuba are doomed without Soviet aid. Three-fourths of Cuba's imports - including most of its oil - came from the former Soviet Union. Castro was overpaid for Cuban sugar, and he underpaid for Russian petroleum.

Mikhail Gorbachev took Cuba off the dole as the Soviet Union's own economic troubles escalated. None of the independent states that succeeded the empire have shown any interest in renewing the old money-losing relationship.

Likewise, Cuba has found itself isolated from other Latin nations in this hemisphere. Susan Kaufman Purcell, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, said those countries went through their own traumatic withdrawal from dependence on foreign loans.

The last decade was a period of brutal economic adjustments in Latin America, and many of those leaders are not sympathetic to Castro's unwillingness to overhaul Cuba's economy. His refusal to adapt will cause his demise.

Cuba has no hard currency to buy goods abroad, and it has limited basic resources to sustain itself. Daily life is grinding to a halt. Factories are closing for lack of fuel and raw materials, bicycles and ox carts have replaced cars and trucks, and food supplies are dwindling.

As the unrest grows, the question is how Castro will react to save himself. The fear is that he will use violence to repress discontent.

The unknown element is the military, which may put a higher value on institutional survival than protecting Castro to the bitter end. Soldiers also may be reluctant to turn on the Cuban citizenry.

Military support for Castro may have been stretched thin after he ordered a popular general tried and executed for treason. The general, a decorated hero from Angolan campaigns, was perceived by Castro as a dangerous rival.

Castro survived for three decades on artificial life supports. The plug has been pulled, and the end is very near.

DOCUMENT 19
April 18, 1992

Cuban Democracy Act

Sponsored by Representative Robert Torricelli and Senator Bob Graham, this act tightened economic restrictions on Cuba in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in hopes of speeding its transition to democracy. It also encouraged the President to impose sanctions on countries that continued to trade with Cuba. Additionally it made it illegal for foreign subsidiaries of American companies to trade with Cuba.

Section 6001. Findings

The Congress makes the following findings:

- (1) The government of Fidel Castro has demonstrated consistent disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights and for democratic values. It restricts the Cuban people's exercise of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and other rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948. It has refused to admit into Cuba the representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission appointed to investigate human rights violations on the island.
- (2) The Cuban people have demonstrated their yearning for freedom and their increasing opposition to the Castro government by risking their lives in organizing independent, democratic activities on the island and by undertaking hazardous flights for freedom to the United States and other countries.
- (3) The Castro government maintains a military-dominated economy that has decreased the well-being of the Cuban people in order to enable the government to engage in military interventions and subversive activities throughout the world and, especially, in the Western Hemisphere. These have included involvement in narcotics trafficking and support for the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador.
- (4) There is no sign that the Castro regime is prepared to make any significant concessions to democracy or to undertake any form of democratic opening. Efforts to suppress dissent through intimidation, imprisonment, and exile have accelerated since the political changes that have occurred in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
- (5) Events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have dramatically reduced Cuba's external support and threaten Cuba's food and oil supplies.
- (6) The fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the now universal recognition in Latin America and the Caribbean that Cuba provides a failed model of government and development, and the evident inability of Cuba's economy to survive current trends, provide the United States and the international democratic community with an unprecedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.
- (7) However, Castro's intransigence increases the likelihood that there could be a collapse of the Cuban economy, social upheaval, or widespread suffering. The recently concluded Cuban Communist Party Congress has underscored Castro's unwillingness to respond positively to increasing pressures for reform either from within the party or without.

(8) The United States cooperated with its European and other allies to assist the difficult transitions from Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Therefore, it is appropriate for those allies to cooperate with United States policy to promote a peaceful transition in Cuba.

Section 6002. Statement of Policy

It should be the policy of the United States—

(1) to seek a peaceful transition to democracy and a resumption of economic growth in Cuba through the careful application of sanctions directed at the Castro government and support for the Cuban people;

(2) to seek the cooperation of other democratic countries in this policy;

(3) to make clear to other countries that, in determining its relations with them, the United States will take into account their willingness to cooperate in such a policy; . . .

(5) to continue vigorously to oppose the human rights violations of the Castro regime;

(6) to maintain sanctions on the Castro regime so long as it continues to refuse to move toward democratization and greater respect for human rights;

(7) to be prepared to reduce the sanctions in carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in Cuba;

(8) to encourage free and fair elections to determine Cuba's political future;

(9) to request the speedy termination of any military or technical assistance, subsidies, or other forms of assistance to the Government of Cuba from the government of any other country; and

(10) to initiate immediately the development of a comprehensive United States policy toward Cuba in a post-Castro era.

Section 6003. International cooperation

(a) Cuban trading partners. The President should encourage the governments of countries that conduct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of this title . . .

(b) Sanctions against countries assisting Cuba.

(1) Sanctions. The President may apply the following sanctions to any country that provides assistance to Cuba:

(A) The government of such country shall not be eligible for assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or assistance or sales under the Arms Export Control Act.

(B) Such country shall not be eligible, under any program, for forgiveness or reduction of debt owed to the United States Government.

(2) Definition of assistance. For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "assistance to Cuba"-

(A) means assistance to or for the benefit of the Government of Cuba that is provided by grant, concessional sale, guaranty, or insurance, or by any other means on terms more favorable than that generally available in the applicable market, whether in the form of a loan, lease, credit, or otherwise, and such term includes subsidies for exports to Cuba and favorable tariff treatment of articles that are the growth, product, or manufacture of Cuba;

(B) includes an exchange, reduction, or forgiveness of Cuban debt owed to a foreign country in return for a grant of an equity interest in a property, investment, or operation of the Government of Cuba (including the government of any political subdivision of Cuba, and agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba) or of a Cuban national; . . .

Section 6004. Support for the Cuban people

(b) Donations of food. Nothing in this or any other Act shall prohibit donations of food to nongovernmental organizations or individuals in Cuba.

(c) Exports of medicines and medical supplies. Exports of medicines or medical supplies, instruments, or equipment to Cuba shall not be restricted-- . . .

(2) . . . except in a case in which there is a reasonable likelihood that the item to be exported will be used for purposes of torture or other human rights abuses;

(3) except in a case in which there is reasonable likelihood that the item to be exported will be reexported; and

(4) except in a case in which the item to be exported could be used in the production of any biotechnological product. . .

(g) Assistance to support democracy in Cuba. The United States Government may provide assistance, through appropriate nongovernmental organizations, for the support of individuals and organizations to promote nonviolent democratic change in Cuba.

Section 6005. Sanctions

(b) Prohibition on vessels

(1) Vessels engaging in trade. A vessel which enters a port or place in Cuba to engage in the trade of goods or services may not, within 180 days after departure from such port or place in Cuba, load or unload any freight at any place in the United States, except pursuant to a license issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(2) Vessels carrying goods or passengers to or from Cuba. Except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, a vessel carrying goods or passengers to or from Cuba or carrying goods in which Cuba, or a Cuban national has any interest may not enter a United States port. . .

(c) Restrictions on remittances to Cuba. The President shall establish strict limits on remittances to Cuba by United States persons for the purpose of financing the travel of Cubans to the United States, in order to ensure that such remittances reflect only the reasonable costs associated with such travel, and are not used by the Government of Cuba as a means of gaining access to United States currency. . .

Sec. 6006. Policy toward a transitional Cuban government

Food, medicine, and medical supplies for humanitarian purposes should be made available for Cuba under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 if the President determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the government in power in Cuba—

- (1) has made a public commitment to hold free and fair elections for a new government within 6 months and is proceeding to implement that decision;
- (2) has made a public commitment to respect, and is respecting, internationally recognized human rights and basic democratic freedoms; and
- (3) is not providing weapons or funds to any group, in any other country, that seeks the violent overthrow of the government of that country.

Sec. 6007. Policy toward a democratic Cuban government

(a) Waiver of restrictions. The President may waive the requirements of section 1706 [22 USCS Sec. 6005] if the President determines and reports to the Congress that the Government of Cuba—

- (1) has held free and fair elections conducted under internationally recognized observers;
- (2) has permitted opposition parties ample time to organize and campaign for such elections, and has permitted full access to the media to all candidates in the elections;
- (3) is showing respect for the basic civil liberties and human rights of the citizens of Cuba;
- (4) is moving toward establishing a free market economic system; and
- (5) has committed itself to constitutional change that would ensure regular free and fair elections that meet the requirements of paragraph (2)

(b) Policies. If the President makes a determination under subsection (a), the President shall take the following actions with respect to a Cuban Government elected pursuant to elections described in subsection (a):

- (1) To encourage the admission or reentry of such government to international organizations and international financial institutions.
- (2) To provide emergency relief during Cuba's transition to a viable economic system
- (3) To take steps to end the United States trade embargo of Cuba

DOCUMENT 18
March 12, 1996

Helms-Burton Act

Passed in response to Castro shooting down two Brothers to the Rescue Planes, this act further tightened restrictions on Cuba and made it clear that the President must consult with Congress before attempting to lift the embargo. The most controversial portion of the Act made it legal for U.S. nationals whose property had been confiscated during the Revolution to sue anyone utilizing those confiscated assets. As this made it possible for U.S. citizens to sue foreign companies, many in the international community felt the Helms-Burton Act amounted to the U.S. forcing its trade policies toward Cuba on the rest of the world.

Sec. 2 FINDINGS

The Congress makes the following findings:

- (1) The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of at least 60 percent in the last 5 years as a result of--
 - (A) the end of its subsidization by the former Soviet Union of between 5 billion and 6 billion dollars annually;
 - (B) 36 years of communist tyranny and economic mismanagement by the Castro government;
 - (C) the extreme decline in trade between Cuba and the countries of the former Soviet bloc; and
 - (D) the stated policy of the Russian Government and the countries of the former Soviet bloc to conduct economic relations with Cuba on strictly commercial terms.
- (2) At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this economic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to permit free and fair democratic elections in Cuba.
- (3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it will not engage in any substantive political reforms that would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an economic recovery.
- (4) The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on free and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations of fundamental human rights, have isolated the Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western Hemisphere.
- (5) As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the economic condition of the country and the welfare of the Cuban people will not improve in any significant way.
- (6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve their condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens to risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape from Cuba to freedom . . .
- (8) The consistent policy of the United States towards Cuba since the beginning of the Castro regime, carried out by both Democratic and Republican administrations, has sought to keep faith with the people of Cuba, and has been effective in sanctioning the totalitarian Castro regime.
- (9) The United States has shown a deep commitment, and considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- (11) The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 calls upon the President to encourage the governments of countries that conduct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of that Act. . .
- (13) The Cuban Government engages in the illegal international narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from justice in the United States.

(14) The Castro government threatens international peace and security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups dedicated to international violence.

(15) The Castro government has utilized from its inception and continues to utilize torture in various forms (including by psychiatry), as well as execution, exile, confiscation, political imprisonment, and other forms of terror and repression, as means of retaining power. . .

(17) The Castro government holds innocent Cubans hostage in Cuba by no fault of the hostages themselves solely because relatives have escaped the country.

(19) The Castro government continues to utilize blackmail, such as the immigration crisis with which it threatened the United States in the summer of 1994, and other unacceptable and illegal forms of conduct to influence the actions of sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere in violation of the Charter of the Organization of American States and other international agreements and international law.

(20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights situation in Cuba . . .

(27) The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 years, improper conduct by the international community.

(28) For the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and continues to pose a national security threat to the United States.

Section 3. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this Act are:

(1) to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining the community of democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere;

(2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government;

(3) to provide for the continued national security of the United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro government of terrorism, theft of property from United States nationals by the Castro government, and the political manipulation by the Castro government of the desire of Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United States;

(4) to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba, conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers;

(5) to provide a policy framework for United States support to the Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition government or a democratically elected government in Cuba; and

(6) to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime. . .

SECTION 102. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF CUBA.

(a) Policy.--

(1) Restrictions by other countries.-- The Congress hereby reaffirms section 1704(1) of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, that the President should encourage foreign countries to restrict trade and credit relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of that Act.

(2) Sanctions on other countries.-- The Congress further urges the President to take immediate steps to apply the sanctions described in section 1704(b)(1) of that Act against countries assisting Cuba.

(h) Codification of Economic Embargo--

The economic embargo of Cuba, as in effect on March 1, 1996, including all restrictions under part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, shall be in effect upon the enactment of this Act, and shall remain in effect subject to section 204 of this Act.

SECTION 103. PROHIBITION AGAINST INDIRECT FINANCING OF CUBA

(a) Prohibition.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no loan, credit, or other financing may be extended knowingly by a United States national, a permanent resident alien, or a United States agency to any person for the purpose of financing transactions involving any confiscated property the claim to which is owned by a United States national as of the date of the enactment of this Act, except for financing by the United States national owning such claim for a transaction permitted under United States law. . .

SECTION 109. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

(a) Authorization-- . . . the President is authorized to furnish assistance and provide other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba, including the following:

- (1) Published and informational matter, such as books, videos, and cassettes, on transitions to democracy, human rights, and market economies, to be made available to independent democratic groups in Cuba.
- (2) Humanitarian assistance to victims of political repression, and their families.
- (3) Support for democratic and human rights groups in Cuba.
- (4) Support for visits and permanent deployment of independent international human rights monitors in Cuba. . .

TITLE II--ASSISTANCE TO A FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

SECTION 201. POLICY TOWARD A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN CUBA.

The policy of the United States is as follows:

(2) To recognize that the self-determination of the Cuban people is a sovereign and national right of the citizens of Cuba which must be exercised free of interference by the government of any other country

(5) In solidarity with the Cuban people, to provide appropriate forms of assistance--

(A) to a transition government in Cuba;

(B) to facilitate the rapid movement from such a transition government to a democratically elected government in Cuba that results from an expression of the self-determination of the Cuban people; and

(C) to support such a democratically elected government.

(6) Through such assistance, to facilitate a peaceful transition to representative democracy and a market economy in Cuba and to consolidate democracy in Cuba

(7) To deliver such assistance to the Cuban people only through a transition government in Cuba, through a democratically elected government in Cuba, through United States Government organizations or through United States international, or indigenous nongovernmental organizations.

(8) To encourage other countries and multilateral organizations to provide similar assistance and to work cooperatively with such countries and organizations to coordinate such assistance . . .

(12) To be prepared to enter into negotiations with a democratically elected government in Cuba either to return the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.

(13) To consider the restoration of diplomatic recognition . . . when the President determines that there exists a democratically elected government in Cuba.

(14) To take steps to remove the economic embargo of Cuba when the President determines that a transition to a democratically elected government in Cuba has begun.

(15) To assist a democratically elected government in Cuba to strengthen and stabilize its national currency.

(16) To pursue trade relations with a free, democratic, and independent Cuba. . .

SECTION 206 REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERMINING A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT.

For purposes of this Act, a democratically elected government in Cuba . . . is a government which--

(1) results from free and fair elections--

(A) conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers; and

(B) in which--

(i) opposition parties were permitted ample time to organize and campaign for such elections; and

(ii) all candidates were permitted full access to the media;

(2) is showing respect for the basic civil liberties and human rights of the citizens of Cuba;

(3) is substantially moving toward a market-oriented economic system based on the right to own and enjoy property;

(4) is committed to making constitutional changes that would ensure regular free and fair elections and the full enjoyment of basic civil liberties and human rights by the citizens of Cuba;

(5) has made demonstrable progress in establishing a independent judiciary; and

(6) has made demonstrable progress in returning to United States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or after January, 1959, or providing full compensation for such property in accordance with international law standards and practice. . .

SECTION 301. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Individuals enjoy a fundamental right to own and enjoy property belonging to United States nationals by the Cuban Government, and the subsequent exploitation of this property at the expense of the rightful owner, undermines the comity of nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic development.

(2) The wrongful confiscation or taking of property belonging to United States nationals by the Cuban Government, and the subsequent exploitation of this property at the expense of the rightful owner, undermines the comity of nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic development.

(3) Since Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959--

(A) he has trampled on the fundamental rights of the Cuban people; and

(B) through his personal despotism, he has confiscated the property of--

(i) millions of his own citizens;

(ii) thousands of United States nationals; and

(iii) thousands more Cubans who claimed asylum in the United States as refugees because of persecution and later became naturalized citizens of the United States.

(4) It is in the interest of the Cuban people that the Cuban Government respect equally the property rights of Cuban nationals and nationals of other countries.

(5) The Cuban Government is offering foreign investors the opportunity to purchase an equity interest in, manage, or enter into joint ventures using property and assets some of which were confiscated from United States nationals.

(6) This "trafficking" in confiscated property provides badly needed financial benefit, including hard currency, oil, and productive investment and expertise, to the current Cuban Government and thus undermines the foreign policy of the United States--

(A) to bring democratic institutions to Cuba through the pressure of a general economic embargo at a time when the Castro regime has proven to be vulnerable to international economic pressure; and

(B) to protect the claims of United States nationals who had property wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban Government.

(7) The United States Department of State has notified other governments that the transfer to third parties of properties confiscated by the Cuban Government "would complicate any attempt to return them to their original owners."

(8) The international judicial system, as currently structured, lacks fully effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property and for unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property by governments and private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the property.

(9) International law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.

(10) The United States Government has an obligation to its citizens to provide protection against wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their citizens, including the provision of private remedies.

(11) To deter trafficking in wrongfully confiscated property, United States nationals who were the victims of these confiscations should be endowed with a judicial remedy in the courts of the United States that would deny traffickers any profits from economically exploiting Castro's wrongful seizures.

SECTION 302. LIABILITY FOR TRAFFICKING IN CONFISCATED PROPERTY CLAIMED BY UNITED STATES NATIONALS.

(a) Civil Remedy.--

(1) Liability for trafficking.--

(A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person that, after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the effective date of this title, traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property for money damages . . .

SECTION 401. EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF ALIENS WHO HAVE CONFISCATED PROPERTY OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS OR WHO TRAFFIC IN SUCH PROPERTY.

(a) Grounds for Exclusion.-- The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Attorney General shall exclude from the United States, any alien who the Secretary of State determines is a person who, after the date of the enactment of this Act--

(1) has confiscated, or has directed or overseen the confiscation of, property a claim to which is owned by a United States national, or converts or has converted for personal gain confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national;

(2) traffics in confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national;

(3) is a corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a controlling interest of an entity which has been involved in the confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national; . . .

DOCUMENT 19
May 2002

President Carter's speech to The University of Havana

In a historic, uncensored address aired on television throughout Cuba, former President Jimmy Carter criticized both Cuba and the U.S. for contributing to the poisonous relationship between the two nations. While praising the nation's health and education system, he frankly criticized Castro for preventing democratic reforms in Cuba. He pointed out that most Americans support an end to the embargo and travel restrictions, but also believe that the Cuban government must improve its human rights record. He called for a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Cuba.

I appreciate President Castro's invitation for us to visit Cuba, and have been delighted with the hospitality we have received since arriving here. It is a great honor to address the Cuban people. . .

The dictator Fulgencio Batista was overthrown more than 43 years ago, and a few years later the Cuban revolution aligned with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Since then, our nations have followed different philosophical and political paths.

The hard truth is that neither the United States nor Cuba has managed to define a positive and beneficial relationship. Will this new century find our neighboring people living in harmony and friendship? I have come here in search of an answer to that question.

There are some in Cuba who think the simple answer is for the United States to lift the embargo, and there are some in my country who believe the answer is for your president to step down from power and allow free elections. There is no doubt that the question deserves a more comprehensive assessment.

I have restudied the complicated history (in preparation for my conversations with President Castro), and realize that there are no simple answers.

I did not come here to interfere in Cuba's internal affairs, but to extend a hand of friendship to the Cuban people and to offer a vision of the future for our two countries and for all the Americas.

That vision includes a Cuba fully integrated into a democratic hemisphere, participating in a Free Trade Area of the Americas and with our citizens traveling without restraint to visit each other. I want a massive student exchange between our universities. I want the people of the United States and Cuba to share more than a love of baseball and wonderful music. I want us to be friends, and to respect each other.

Our two nations have been trapped in a destructive state of belligerence for 42 years, and it is time for us to change our relationship and the way we think and talk about each other. Because the United States is the most powerful nation, we should take the first step.

First, my hope is that the Congress will soon act to permit unrestricted travel between the United States and Cuba, establish open trading relationships, and repeal the embargo. I should add that these restraints are not the source of Cuba's economic problems. Cuba can trade with more than 100 countries, and buy medicines, for example, more cheaply in Mexico than in the United States. But the embargo freezes the existing impasse, induces anger and resentment, restricts the freedoms of U.S. citizens, and makes it difficult for us to exchange ideas and respect.

Second, I hope that Cuba and the United States can resolve the 40-year-old property disputes with some creativity. In many cases, we are debating ancient claims about decrepit sugar mills, an antique telephone

company, and many other obsolete holdings. Most U.S. companies have already absorbed the losses, but some others want to be paid, and many Cubans who fled the revolution retain a sentimental attachment for their homes. We resolved similar problems when I normalized relations with China in 1979. I propose that our two countries establish a blue-ribbon commission to address the legitimate concerns of all sides in a positive and constructive manner.

Third, some of those who left this beautiful island have demonstrated vividly that the key to a flourishing economy is to use individual entrepreneurial skills. But many Cubans in South Florida remain angry over their departure and their divided families. We need to define a future so they can serve as a bridge of reconciliation between Cuba and the United States.

Are such normal relationships possible? I believe they are.

Except for the stagnant relations between the United States and Cuba, the world has been changing greatly, and especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. As late as 1977, when I became president, there were only two democracies in South America, and one in Central America. Today, almost every country in the Americas is a democracy.

I am not using a U.S. definition of "democracy." The term is embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Cuba signed in 1948, and it was defined very precisely by all the other countries of the Americas in the Inter-American Democratic Charter last September. It is based on some simple premises: all citizens are born with the right to choose their own leaders, to define their own destiny, to speak freely, to organize political parties, trade unions and nongovernmental groups, and to have fair and open trials.

Only such governments can be members of the OAS, join a Free Trade Area of the Americas, or participate in the Summits of the Americas. Today, any regime that takes power by unconstitutional means will be ostracized, as was shown in the rejection of the Venezuelan coup last month.

Democracy is a framework that permits a people to accommodate changing times and correct past mistakes. Since our independence, the United States has rid itself of slavery, granted women the right to vote, ended almost a century of legal racial discrimination, and just this year reformed its election laws to correct problems we faced in Florida 18 months ago.

Cuba has adopted a socialist government where one political party dominates, and people are not permitted to organize any opposition movements. Your constitution recognizes freedom of speech and association, but other laws deny these freedoms to those who disagree with the government.

My nation is hardly perfect in human rights. A very large number of our citizens are incarcerated in prison, and there is little doubt that the death penalty is imposed most harshly on those who are poor, black, or mentally ill. For more than a quarter-century, we have struggled unsuccessfully to guarantee the basic right of universal health care for our people. Still, guaranteed civil liberties offer every citizen an opportunity to change these laws.

That fundamental right is also guaranteed to Cubans. It is gratifying to note that Articles 63 and 88 of your constitution allows citizens to petition the National Assembly to permit a referendum to change laws if 10,000 or more citizens sign it. I am informed that such an effort, called the Varela Project, has gathered sufficient signatures and has presented such a petition to the National Assembly. When Cubans exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will see that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.

Cuba has superb systems of health care and universal education, but last month, most Latin American governments joined a majority in the United Nations Human Rights Commission in calling on Cuba to

meet universally accepted standards in civil liberties. I would ask that you permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisons and that you would receive the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner to address such issues as prisoners of conscience and the treatment of inmates. These visits could help refute any unwarranted criticisms.

Public opinion surveys show that a majority of people in the United States would like to see the economic embargo ended, normal travel between our two countries, friendship between our people, and Cuba to be welcomed into the community of democracies in the Americas. At the same time, most of my fellow citizens believe that the issues of economic and political freedom need to be addressed by the Cuban people.

After 43 years of animosity, we hope that someday soon, you can reach across the great divide that separates our two countries and say, "We are ready to join the community of democracies," and I hope that Americans will soon open our arms to you and say, "We welcome you as our friends."

DOCUMENT 20
May 20, 2002

President George W. Bush's speech on Cuba: Reaction to Jimmy Carter's speech

On the 100th anniversary of Cuban Independence, days after Carter's speech, President Bush declared that the U.S. would not liberalize its trade policy until Castro made a commitment to democratic reforms.

Bienvenidos. Welcome to the White House for the 100th anniversary of Cuban independence. Today we honor the ties of friendship, and family, and faith, that unite the Cuban people and the people of the United States.

We honor the contributions that Cuban-Americans have made to all aspects of our national life. And today, I am issuing a proposal and a challenge that can put Cuba on the path to liberty. . . .

Cuba's independence one century ago today was the inspiration of great figures such as Felix Varela. It was the result of determination and talent on the part of great statesmen such as Jose Marti, and great soldiers such as Antonio Maceo and Maximo Gomez. Most of all, Cuba's independence was the product of the great courage and sacrifice of the Cuban people.

Today, and every day for the past 43 years, that legacy of courage has been insulted by a tyrant who uses brutal methods to enforce a bankrupt vision. That legacy has been debased by a relic from another era, who has turned a beautiful island into a prison. In a career of oppression, Mr Castro has imported nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, and he has exported his military forces to encourage civil war abroad.

He is a dictator who jails and tortures and exiles his political opponents. We know this. The Cuban people know this. And the world knows this. After all, just a month ago the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, in a resolution proposed by the nations of Latin America, called upon Cuba's government to finally - to finally - begin respecting the human rights of its people.

Through all their pains and deprivation, the Cuban people's aspirations for freedom are undiminished. We see this today in Havana, where more than 11,000 brave citizens have petitioned their government for a referendum on basic freedoms. If that referendum is allowed, it can be a prelude, a beginning for real change in Cuba.

The United States has no designs on Cuban sovereignty. It's not a part of our strategy, or a part of our vision. In fact, the United States has been a strong and consistent supporter of freedom for the Cuban people. And it is important for those who love freedom on that beautiful island to know that our support for them will never waver.

Today, I'm announcing an Initiative for a New Cuba that offers Cuba's government a way forward towards democracy and hope, and better relations with the United States.

Cuba's scheduled to hold elections to its National Assembly in 2003. Let me read Article 71 of the Cuban Constitution. It says, "The National Assembly is composed of deputies elected by free, direct, and secret vote." That's what the constitution says. Yet, since 1959, no election in Cuba has come close to meeting these standards. In most elections, there has been one candidate, Castro's candidate.

All elections in Castro's Cuba have been a fraud. The voices of the Cuban people have been suppressed, and their votes have been meaningless. That's the truth. Es la verdad. In the 2003 National Assembly

elections in Cuba, Cuba has the opportunity to offer Cuban voters the substance of democracy, not its hollow, empty forms.

Opposition parties should have the freedom to organize, assemble, and speak, with equal access to all airwaves. All political prisoners must be released and allowed to participate in the election process. Human rights organizations should be free to visit Cuba to ensure that the conditions for free elections are being created. And the 2003 elections should be monitored by objective outside observers. These are the minimum steps necessary to make sure that next year's elections are the true expression of the will of the Cuban people.

I also challenge Cuba's government to ease its stranglehold, to change its stranglehold on private economic activity. Political and economic freedoms go hand in hand, and if Cuba opens its political system, fundamental questions about its backward economic system will come into sharper focus.

If the Cuban government truly wants to advance the cause of workers, of Cuban workers, surely it will permit trade unions to exist outside of government control. If Cuba wants to create more good-paying jobs, private employers have to be able to negotiate with and pay workers of their own choosing, without the government telling who they can hire and who they must fire.

If Cuba wants to attract badly needed investment from abroad, property rights must be respected. If the government wants to improve the daily lives of its people, goods and services produced in Cuba should be made available to all Cuban citizens. Workers employed by foreign companies should be paid directly by their employers, instead of having the government seize their hard-currency wages and pass on a pittance in the form of pesos. And the signs in hotels reading "Solamente Turistas [only tourists]" should finally be taken down.

Without major steps by Cuba to open up its political system and its economic system, trade with Cuba will not help the Cuban people. It's important for Americans to understand, without political reform, without economic reform, trade with Cuba will merely enrich Fidel Castro and his cronies.

Well-intentioned ideas about trade will merely prop up this dictator, enrich his cronies, and enhance the totalitarian regime. It will not help the Cuban people. With real political and economic reform, trade can benefit the Cuban people and allow them to share in the progress of our times.

If Cuba's government takes all the necessary steps to ensure that the 2003 elections are certifiably free and fair - certifiably free and fair - and if Cuba also begins to adopt meaningful market-based reforms, then - and only then - I will work with the United States Congress to ease the ban on trade and travel between our two countries.

Meaningful reform on Cuba's part will be answered with a meaningful American response. The goal of the United States policy toward Cuba is not a permanent embargo on Cuba's economy. The goal is freedom for Cuba's people.

Today's initiative invites the Cuban government to trust and respect Cuban citizens. And I urge other democracies, in this hemisphere and beyond, to use their influence on Cuba's government to allow free and fair National Assembly elections, and to push for real and meaningful and verifiable reform.

Full normalization of relations with Cuba - diplomatic recognition, open trade, and a robust aid program - will only be possible when Cuba has a new government that is fully democratic, when the rule of law is respected, and when the human rights of all Cubans are fully protected.

Yet, under the Initiative for a New Cuba, the United States recognizes that freedom sometimes grows step by step. And we'll encourage those steps. The current of history runs strongly towards freedom. Our plan

is to accelerate freedom's progress in Cuba in every way possible, just as the United States and our democratic friends and allies did successfully in places like Poland, or in South Africa. Even as we seek to end tyranny, we will work to make life better for people living under and resisting Castro's rule.

Today I'm announcing a series of actions that will directly benefit the Cuban people, and give them greater control of their economic and political destiny. My administration will ease restrictions on humanitarian assistance by legitimate U.S. religious and other non-governmental organizations that directly serve the needs of the Cuban people and will help build Cuban civil society. And the United States will provide such groups with direct assistance that can be used for humanitarian and entrepreneurial activities.

Our government will offer scholarships in the United States for Cuban students and professionals who try to build independent civil institutions in Cuba, and scholarships for family members of political prisoners. We are willing to negotiate direct mail service between the United States and Cuba. . .

. . . And in the months ahead, my administration will continue to work with leaders all around our country, leaders who love freedom for Cuba, to implement new ways to empower individuals to enhance the chance for freedom.

The United States will continue to enforce economic sanctions on Cuba, and the ban on travel to Cuba, until Cuba's government proves that it is committed to real reform. We will continue to prohibit U.S. financing for Cuban purchases of U.S. agricultural goods, because this would just be a foreign aid program in disguise, which would benefit the current regime.

Today's initiative offers Cuba's government a different path, leading to a different future - a future of greater democracy and prosperity and respect. With real reform in Cuba, our countries can begin chipping away at four decades of distrust and division. And the choice rests with Mr Castro.

Today, there is only one nation in our hemisphere that is not a democracy. Only one. There is only one national leader whose position of power owes more to bullets than ballots. Fidel Castro has a chance to escape this lonely and stagnant isolation. If he accepts our offer, he can bring help to his people and hope to our relations.

If Mr Castro refuses our offer, he will be protecting his cronies at the expense of his people. And eventually, despite all his tools of oppression, Fidel Castro will need to answer to his people.

Jose Marti said, "Barriers of ideas are stronger than barricades of stone." For the benefit of Cuba's people, it is time for Mr Castro to cast aside old and failed ideas and to start to think differently about the future. Today could mark a new dawn in a long friendship between our people, but only if the Castro regime sees the light.

Cuba's independence was achieved a century ago. It was hijacked nearly half a century ago. Yet the independent spirit of the Cuban people has never faltered. And it has never been stronger than it is today. The United States is proud to stand with all Cubans, and all Cuban-Americans, who love freedom. And we will continue to stand with you until liberty returns to the land you love so well.

Viva Cuba Libre.

DOCUMENT 21
2001

Center for Responsive Politics' study on Cuban-American campaign donations


The study examines how receiving money from Cuban Americans affected congressmen's voting on the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms Burton Act.



The following charts illustrate the voting patterns in Congress with respect to recipients of Cuban-American political donations. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 are shown in detail because of their contentious nature in Congress . . .

Comparing those legislators who voted to approve the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton Act with those who did not, it's clear that those who voted 'yes' received much more money from the Cuban-American community on average. However, the most striking detail is that those law-makers who received no money at all voted in the same pattern as those who did. This calls into question whether the campaign money had any influence on the eventual result.

In the case of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, House members with contributions from Cuban-American individuals or the Free Cuba PAC voted 5:1 in favor of the bill. Those who received no money supported it by a 3:1 margin. The correlation was stronger among Democrats; Republicans were only slightly more likely to vote for the bill after receiving contributions. In the Senate the money made no difference, as the bill passed by unanimous consent.

Four years later, when the Helms-Burton Act came up for a vote, the money appeared to have virtually no effect in either house of Congress. The bill passed by a 4:1 margin in the House and by nearly as wide a margin in the Senate. While Democrats were less likely to support the bill than Republicans, the fact that they received campaign contributions from Cuban-Americans made virtually no difference in how they voted.





DOCUMENT 22
July 19, 1996

“The Americas Canada's Hypocritical Foreign Policy Coddles Cuba”: Wall Street Journal editorial

In this article, Ros-Lehtinen criticizes Clinton for caving to international criticism of the Helms-Burton Act, and goes on to condemn critical nations like Canada for trading with Cuba in spite of its poor human rights record. She defends the theory that diplomatic measures have failed to change the Cuban government's behavior, and that added economic pressure like that outlined in the Helms-Burton Act was necessary to improve the human rights situation. Wall Street Journal, New York; July 19, 1996.

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On Tuesday, President Clinton signed a waiver delaying the implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton law. Title III would have allowed Americans to sue foreigners trafficking in property expropriated by Cuba. Spinning the story, the Clinton administration took credit for dodging an international incident - - by satisfying those who use expropriated property -- but at the same time "recognizing " the victims and their losses. The truth is that avoiding international economic retaliation proved to be more expedient than championing Americans' private property rights.

Canada has led the international charge against American attempts to tighten the Cuban embargo as a means of hastening the end of Fidel Castro's regime. Pondering Canada's criticism of U.S.-Cuba policy, I am struck by an awesome contradiction. While Canada has often been an outspoken critic of totalitarian regimes and has used embargoes to try to effect change, it is comfortable in recommending tolerance of Mr. Castro.

The 37-year dictatorship in Cuba has been summarily dismissed by the Canadian government. But with Mr. Castro's Feb. 24 MiG attack on two unarmed U.S. civilian planes and the tightening of the U.S. embargo by way of the Helms-Burton legislation, the duplicity of Canada's policy toward totalitarian regimes has been revealed.

Cubans living under Mr. Castro suffer economically, physically and emotionally. There are numerous examples of political prisoners held on charges of enemy propaganda, contempt, dangerousness and rebellion. These prisoners are held without food or water and they are tortured. . . .

Canada ignores the suffering of the Cubans, who are its hemispheric neighbors, yet assumes a leadership role in safeguarding the rights of people far from its shores.

Consider Nigeria, where the people endure a brutal dictator. When Nigerian dictator General Sani Abacha sentenced Nigerian Nobel Peace Prize nominee Ken Saro-Wiwa to death in October 1995, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien was the first world leader to publicly decry this miscarriage of justice. He classified it as one of the worst examples in recent times of unjust punishment without judicial process. A month later, when Saro-Wiwa and eight other prisoners were summarily executed, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy quickly acknowledged that none of the traditional diplomatic levers had been successful in influencing the regime in Nigeria to change its policies and that further international action was required.

The Canadian government, one of the most vocal advocates of constructive engagement with the Castro regime confesses that such a policy failed with Nigeria because diplomacy is not an approach understood

by dictators. The Canadians and their South African counterparts have acknowledged the difficulty in establishing a premise of mutual understanding when the aims and objectives of the parties involved are diametrically opposed.

Since then, the Canadian government has taken the lead on sterner measures against the Abacha regime, including an oil embargo, freezing foreign assets of Nigerian rulers, suspending airline flights to Nigeria, the suspension of new multilateral economic aid and other economic sanctions.

Canadian officials are compelled to mobilize the British Commonwealth, the European Union, and others against Abacha's reign of terror in Nigeria. They know that democracy and human rights must be real, enforceable goals and not just rhetoric, as Canadian Prime Minister Chretien has stated repeatedly: "If the Commonwealth can translate rhetoric into action, its citizens may be able to expect some relief from oppressive governments. When you go from a declaration of principles, you have to be able to enforce it."

Another senior Canadian official has said that the new, stiffer actions against Nigeria "enhance the image and the sense that Canada is moving with the times and is responsive to issues of governance and human rights." These same standards should apply to the Castro regime.

Canadian officials have publicly expressed their outrage over the fact the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group have not been permitted to visit Nigeria," . . .

And yet Canada remains silent on the fact that the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Cuba has been repeatedly denied entry into Cuba and prevented from conducting any evaluations there. Meanwhile, Canadian tourists and investors have been given virtually unlimited access to the island's resources and to the Castro regime's trade ministers and economic advisers.

The parallels between Nigeria and Cuba are clear. But Canadian government officials, business leaders and policy experts ignore them. They have chosen a policy of apathy regarding the people of Cuba. They are not concerned that this approach runs contrary to the basic democratic ideals and moral tenets that Prime Minister Chretien has stated are the guiding principles of Canada's overall foreign policy and its efforts in Nigeria.

In evaluating its priorities, the Canadian government has decided that trivializing the lack of freedom and the human rights abuses in Cuba is preferable to losing \$100 million in investments for Canadian companies or negatively affecting bilateral trade, which totals \$575 million a year.

Canada's attitude toward Cuba is flatly hypocritical. Nothing else explains policies that view the suffering of the Nigerian people as more important than that of the Cubans. Canada's policy shows a willingness to sacrifice the welfare of the Cuban people for greater Canadian investor profits.

Mr. Chretien, act on your stated commitment to the protection of human rights and the ideals of freedom and liberty. Do not continue to follow this policy of moral turpitude with regard to the Castro regime.

DOCUMENT 23

July 22, 1996

“Helms-Burton Backfire”: Washington Post editorial

In this article by Ana Julia Jatar, a senior fellow at Inter-American Dialogue, she criticizes the Helms-Burton Act. Jatar argues that by passing the Helms-Burton Act and focusing on the issue of American property rights in Cuba, the U.S. missed a great opportunity to harness disaffection among the Cuban people toward the government. Instead the passage of this hostile act allowed Castro to rally support for his government in opposition of the "cruel" policies of the U.S. The Washington Post: Washington, D.C.; July 22, 1996. Reprinted with permission of the author.

For anybody wanting to find out the real impact of the Helms-Burton Act on Cuba, I strongly advise a trip to the island. This legislation, supposedly designed to get rid of Fidel Castro, is doing wonders to generate support for his regime at home and abroad. Cubans may disagree with their government, and they have been doing so with passion. But with the Helms-Burton Act all such disagreement turns into support. This law has convinced them, paraphrasing Churchill, that socialism is the worst of all systems, except for the alternatives.

Discontent has been growing since economic reforms were initiated in Cuba in 1991 as a response to the collapse of the Soviet Union. These changes have increased tensions among different sectors of society and between these groups and the government.

Traditional elites -- doctors, officers and educators -- wonder why they are earning 20 times less than anybody working in the dollar economy. In turn, those working for dollars in the small emerging private sector feel tired of the envy and wrath of those still caught in the depressed peso economy. While they need more freedom and reforms to flourish, they are upset by the drastic introduction of new taxes.

The young are fed up with ideology and revolutionary heroes. The old are disillusioned after giving their lives to a revolution that did not turn out as expected. A 70 year-old pensioner who receives 120 pesos a month (U.S. \$6) complains: "Instead of raising my pension the government is going to lend money to those people in the private sector." This is how he sees the announced banking reform, which is much needed to provide some financial services to the emerging private sector.

Entangled in the worst of capitalism and socialism, Cubans are impatiently waiting for their government to make up its mind. Most of them already have.

The United States has an unprecedented opportunity to leverage the existing discontent in favor of economic freedom and political openness. Instead, the U.S. policy has been more concerned with the divisive issue of the property rights of exiles and U.S. corporations.

While the Helms-Burton's stated goal is "to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity," most of its new provisions are devoted to property claims.

The law, whose most controversial provisions have been delayed until next year by President Clinton, allows U.S. citizens (including Cuban Americans) to file suit in U.S. courts for the equivalent of the value of their confiscated properties since Jan. 1, 1959, plus the accumulated interest to date. This magnitude represents several times the current value of those assets.

"We can't pay the estimated \$100 billion we supposedly owe to those who left. It represents for us 50 years of exports," a self-employed Cuban tells me while negotiating the price for a pair of shoes I want to buy from him. Helms-Burton has united Cubans behind their government in defending the little they have left.

The Castro regime has translated the law and made it widely available. It is read and discussed at schools, universities, local organizations, factories, farms, everywhere. It is the source of a new creed, and it has rekindled ideology, even among the youngest born after the revolution who had refused to share the hates and hopes of their parents. Right now hundreds of students from the University of Havana are analyzing 25,000 files from the National Archives, containing the legal proceedings against those accused of embezzlement during the Batista regime before Castro.

"By setting this specific date in the Helms-Burton Law, they not only included assets expropriated as a result of the revolution since the Nationalization Law was passed in 1960, but also the assets owned by criminals who fled the country in December 1958," said a 20-year-old law student to whom, until now, the Batista regime was only a chapter in history books. These students are calculating the losses caused by crimes committed by those who left, so those who stayed also can establish the amount of their claims.

By bringing back the issue of property rights and the division between the "haves" who left and the "have-nots" who stayed, Helms-Burton has reunited the Cuban society behind the Castro government, and deepened feelings of distrust against the United States. Read from Havana, U.S. policy seems more concerned with old properties than with new democracy.

DOCUMENT 24

May 7, 1998

“Cuba's Economic Transition and its Implications for U.S. Policy”: Testimony

This is the testimony of Philip Peters, senior Fellow at the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution, before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House, Ways and Means Committee. Peters argues that rather than maintaining economic restrictions, the U.S. government should, through trade, encourage Cuba to add to the limited market reforms it has enacted since the fall of the Soviet Union. He argues that it is time for the U.S. to recognize that sanctions have clearly failed in their stated goal to remove Castro from power.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to join you as you review the situation in Cuba and American economic and trade policy toward Cuba. I run research projects on Cuba and other topics at the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution, but the views I express here are my own.

I'll summarize my statement as follows: Cuba's economy has survived the shock inflicted by the end of the Soviet Union, and it has begun to recover; one means of recovery has been to change its economic policies, including the introduction of market-oriented reforms; these reforms offer clear benefits to the Cuban people, and they create opportunities for the United States to encourage further reform; to seize those opportunities, the United States would have to move from a policy that promotes the isolation of Americans and Cubans from each other to a policy that accepts some degree of engagement as a means of promoting American values.

Surviving the post-Soviet shock

I'll begin by offering some perspectives on the Cuban economy based on my research and travel there.

The end of the Soviet bloc deprived Cuba of subsidies equaling one fourth of its GDP, and it broke trading relationships with the USSR and Eastern Europe that accounted for over two thirds of Cuba's foreign commerce. As a result, the economy was at a near-standstill by 1992-1993, when GDP had contracted by over a third, international credit and reserves were collapsing, and Havana's streets were often devoid of vehicular traffic.

Today, Cuba is no economic paradise; many goods are scarce, peso salaries provide weak purchasing power, and infrastructure is in need of renewal across the board. But there has been improvement: growth has been restored (7.8% 1996, 2.5% 1997), and the currency has been stable at about twenty pesos to the dollar for over a year.

In Havana, there are traffic jams, and one sees some construction projects in progress. Perhaps the most unique feature of Cuba's economy is its duality; two economies work side by side, one in pesos, one in dollars, and many Cubans operate in both.

A number of factors account for Cuba's recuperation, including austerity, remittances from abroad, and policy changes that are generating new sources of income and employment.

Some of these policy changes adapt the current system without changing it fundamentally. State enterprises are not being privatized, but they are being forced to meet financial targets, and their subsidies are being phased out. Ministries and state enterprises have laid off workers. The military has been downsized by about half, and a report from Havana last week indicates that about half Cuba's military

personnel are engaged in agriculture or other civilian production. (That may be one reason why the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, General Wilhelm, noted in an interview last week that Cuba no longer poses a military threat to the United States.)

Market-oriented reforms

But other reforms are more significant because they are introducing elements of capitalism to Cuba's socialist economy.

I want to be careful to place these reforms in context. Cuba is surrounded by market economies, and for the past decade and more, many of these Caribbean and Latin American nations have worked to make their economies more open to competition and investment, both domestically and internationally. Compared to policies in place in these neighboring countries - indeed, compared to the liberalizing policies that many of us would argue would best bring prosperity to Cuba - Cuba's reforms to date are carefully limited and their pace is very measured.

But seen from inside Cuba, the changes brought by these reforms are far more significant than they appear from here, and their impact on the lives of individual Cubans is far more important than we can imagine from afar.

Foreign investment is one example. Total foreign investment in Cuba is relatively small - one analyst, Maria Werlau, estimates that total inward investment between 1990 and 1995 was less than half Chile's investment in Argentina during that period. Because of Cuba's legal and regulatory environment and other factors, in most areas Cuba is not a strong competitor for inward investment in the Caribbean basin.

But after a three-decade drought, the impact of new investment on the economy and on the workforce is significant. A growing tourism sector has attracted, according to official data, over a million tourists annually for the past two years. As a result, hotels, restaurants, and retail shops are being built. Tourist spending is sustaining some small businesses, and contributing to the restoration of Old Havana. Foreign investment has boosted mineral production. It has improved telecommunications for the average Cuban and for Cuba's international business community, providing better service, modernizing infrastructure, and diversifying services.

These investments take the form of joint ventures with state entities, so they do not represent a devolution of decision-making to a private sector. Cuban government plans dictate which kinds of projects are pursued, and which joint ventures are brought to fruition.

But in many ways, these investment projects, or "mixed enterprises," as they are called in Cuba, are bringing parts of the Cuban workforce into a more capitalist world. Many receive training, whether in international business practices, customer service in hotels, or mining methods and safety. They also receive better pay than Cubans working for the state, because in addition to their standard peso salary, many receive pay supplements, either in dollars or in kind. Significantly, some of these supplements come in the form of monthly bonuses tied to production levels.

For example, I met a 35-year-old Cuban sales representative for a European manufacturer of industrial equipment who is paid 250 pesos plus \$100 per month - for a total of five times a Cuban doctor's salary. This man loves his work; he travels from province to province building sales leads, taking orders, learning how to work in a multinational company as he helps to modernize his country's industry.

Agricultural reform is also having an impact. Management structures are changing on Cuban state farms and cooperatives, and more significantly, some market mechanisms are being introduced.

On some cooperatives, farmers who work individually or collectively are no longer working exclusively for the state. They still receive their seeds, equipment, fertilizer, and fuel from the state, and in return they fulfill a production quota for delivery to the state. However, once the quota is fulfilled, they grow crops of their own choice, either for their own consumption or for sale on the market.

This quasi-private surplus production is the source of supply for the farmer's markets that operate throughout Cuba, about twenty in Havana alone. At these markets, prices are high for Cubans earning pesos only (a pound of pork costs five percent of a doctor's monthly salary, about fifteen percent of a worker's pension), but they bustle with customers, and they are competitive. A local economist measured a six percent drop during 1997 in the cost of a basic market basket of goods.

From our point of view, and surely from the point of view of many Cubans, these reforms have a long way to go. To take just one example, all agricultural inputs are procured, held, and distributed by the state. But for the first time in over a decade, Cuba is decentralizing decision-making in agriculture, some farmers are having a greater say in their work and gaining the opportunity to profit from their surplus, that surplus has generated a network of markets that operate by supply and demand, and those markets are generating private employment for producers, truckers, and vendors.

Small business has made a start in Cuba. Among Cuba's reforms, this one represents the most significant grant of autonomy to individuals. Simply put, it was illegal five years ago for a Cuban citizen to quit a job and set up shop as a carpenter, food vendor, locksmith, restaurateur, or mechanic. Today it is legal, and over 150,000 Cubans have business licenses, and are working entrepreneurs.

I'll hasten to add that this is not a small business economy of the kind that you or I would set up if we were writing the rules. Most are one-person businesses, prohibited from hiring employees. Restaurants are limited to twelve seats. For most, there is no wholesale supply market. Cuban officials say that future policy changes may address these issues, but it is not clear when these changes will be debated, or when they would take effect.

I was in Cuba in March, following up on research I did on Cuba's small businesses in December 1996. This time, I was joined by Professor Joseph Scarpaci of Virginia Tech, and together we had the opportunity to interview 152 entrepreneurs.

Many chafe at the limitations imposed on their business activity, and they openly complain. They do not like paying income taxes, which were re-instituted in Cuba two years ago after being abolished for 36 years. They dislike regulations, some dread inspectors, and some tell stories of arbitrary decisions by inspectors enforcing regulations.

Still, they take advantage of the opportunity before them. And many succeed. On average, after taxes and business expenses are paid, they take home seventy percent more than doctors, who are very high in the peso salary structure. (That is an underestimation, I believe, because some work only part time, and many probably understated their earnings to us.) They like their autonomy; "Here, I am the boss," they say, like entrepreneurs everywhere. They are re-learning the arts of entrepreneurship and service, giving new vitality to cities and towns that were devoid of commerce just five years ago. And they have created a clear example that an economic reform of this type can succeed.

"Self-employment," as they call this small business activity, is a new path for recent graduates, retirees, laid-off state workers, mid-career people who opt for independence. About four percent of the labor force is in small business, many more if unlicensed businesses are counted. For some, it's a part-time endeavor to supplement pension income, but for many, it's the way they support their families, and it's a very conscious step into a new, unplanned economy.

Implications for U.S. Policy

"New economy" may seem too strong a description when one considers that socialism still reigns in Cuba. But consider that whereas a decade ago Cuba had nothing but the state's economic apparatus and the black market, today a legal, private economy is emerging, much of it denominated in dollars and working according to market incentives.

In my view, while Cuba's economic reforms are limited, they have a positive impact on many thousands of individual Cubans and their families, and the United States could adopt policies that would spur growth of the new economy, while encouraging further reforms.

However, this would require a significant change in our political approach to Cuba.

Current U.S. policy aims to deny hard currency to the Cuban government, and seeks to limit or block dollars flowing to Cuba through remittances, investment, or tourism. Many of these funds clearly do reach the government, through taxes or receipts in the state's retail enterprises. Some are kept in dollar savings accounts, generating capital for small-scale investment projects.

But these funds also sustain Cuba's new economy. The hotel maid who earns dollar tips may pay a seamstress who has a home business. A miner may spend his dollar pay supplement in a farmer's market, supporting the non-state side of Cuban agriculture. A retiree may save his relatives' remittances and gives his son seed capital to start a mechanic's shop. I recently received a report from Cuba that a hotel joint venture, seeking to replace imports, is contracting with a private farmers' cooperative to supply produce. So in Cuba as elsewhere, private economic activity has multiplier effects.

How could U.S. policy react to these developments?

Clearly, Americans agree that our foreign policy should reflect our values, and as long as Cuba maintains its current political system, we should express our disagreement with that system.

But it is not clear to me that the principal means we have chosen to express that disagreement - a policy that isolates the Cuban and American people from each other, and that clearly seeks to bring political change by harming Cuba's economy - is the best way to achieve that goal. It is not a policy we pursued toward other communist countries, even at the height of the Cold War. And our policy is not welcomed by those it is intended to benefit. Cuba's bishops long ago called it "cruel," Cuba's dissidents disagree with it, and Cubans one meets on the street, even those who criticize their government always seem to ask when relations will normalize.

In my view, we should be able to craft a policy that continues to express our fundamental political differences, but does not block broad contacts between America and Cuba, and that recognizes and encourages any positive developments occurring on the island.

I would respectfully suggest a few measures that meet those criteria. They represent a shift from a policy of isolation to one of engagement. They would begin to supply an element that is missing from current policy: a sense of confidence that greater contact between American and Cuban societies would transmit American values and advance American interests.

Promoting Change

Until two years ago, U.S. law encouraged sanctions in carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in Cuba. Today, current law freezes U.S. economic sanctions until Cuba's government "does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro." It directs the President to name new U.S. officials and committees to promote "market-based development in Cuba" - only after Cuba's political system has undergone systemic change.

I would argue that we would do better to encourage positive economic change even in the absence of political reforms. In that sense, the previous law was a more useful foreign policy tool - it would allow sanctions to be modified as conditions change in Cuba. It thus made sanctions a tool to promote change, and it gave that tool practical value not just in a situation where Cuba changes radically, but also in scenarios where there are positive, gradual changes that we want to encourage. . . .

In March, a Havana priest told me that "governments always find a way to survive " economic sanctions. Referring to United States policy, he said, "There is nothing positive in isolating a people."

Mr. Chairman, as Cuba's government prepares to celebrate forty years in power at the end of this year, this is a good time to question the assumptions that have long guided our approach to Cuba. We should summon the confidence that this priest and many other Cubans already have in us - that in Cuba as elsewhere, Americans will do more for our own values as protagonists rather than as spectators.

Thank you.

DOCUMENT 25

May 21, 2002

Testimony of Ambassador Dennis Hays before a Senate committee.

Testimony of Ambassador Dennis K. Hays, Executive Vice President of Cuban American National Foundation before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Sub-Committee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism Hearing on U.S. Trade Policy with Cuba. The Ambassador praises current U.S. policy. Responding to a movement in Congress to ease restrictions on trade with Cuba, Hays argues that sanctions have forced Castro to reduce the size of his military and have made it economically unfeasible for him to support revolutionary movements in other parts of Latin America. Referencing Cuba's economic weakness, he argues that U.S. businesses would benefit very little from increased economic ties.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and the Committee to discuss U.S. trade policy with Cuba.

There are times in foreign affairs when the right thing and the smart thing are the same thing. Through successive Administrations, Republican and Democratic alike, America has stood with the people of Cuba and against a repressive regime that provides neither food nor hope. Where other nations have chosen to compromise their principles and the tenets of good business, we as a people have been steadfast both to our ideals and to common sense. Our trade policy toward Cuba serves to safeguard our national interests, foster reform, and protect the American taxpayer.

In the forty-three years of its existence, the regime of Fidel Castro has gone to extraordinary lengths to crush the human spirit and individual initiative. Even now, in the 21st century, Cuban farmers are told what to plant, Cuban workers in joint ventures have over 95% of their wages stolen by the state, and Cubans are forbidden to buy or sell property. And this, of course, concerns only economic restrictions.

The political record of the Castro regime is far worse, with the legacy of the revolution a tragic montage of thousands of deaths by firing squad, the denial of medical care to political prisoners, and brutal actions against civilians. Added to this, of course, is the regime's culpability in the execution and premeditated murder of at least thirty American citizens. It is for these reasons that we stand with the people of Cuba and agree with President Bush that before our sanctions are lifted, prisoners of conscience must be freed, free speech, a free press and the right of association must be restored, and Cuba must commit to a path that leads to free and fair multiple party elections.

The purpose of this hearing is to assess U.S. trade policy from an economic perspective. I would thus like to discuss our trade embargo and its impact on both Cuba and the United States, why Cuba under Castro is not an attractive trading partner and what the Cubans hope to accomplish with their current charm offensive. Finally, I would like to note what we can do to hasten the day when Cuba is again a full economic partner of the United States.

The US Embargo Against Cuba

Economic sanctions, when applied appropriately and conscientiously, remain an effective tool of foreign policy. Economic sanctions afford us the ability to fine-tune our response to the provocations of terrorist, criminal, and outlaw states in a firm, but non-military, manner. Sanctions do suffer from one major weakness, however, a persistent expectation that they, by themselves, can solve every problem - be it too

high tariffs or the rampages of a bloodthirsty dictator. Such excessive expectations mask the very real successes sanctions have had over the years in denying resources to rogue states and forcing dictators to amend, adapt, or reform their ways.

Like any Marxist economy, Cuba requires unearned external inputs to avoid a constant downward spiral. Unable to generate real economic growth, the regime desperately seeks foreign sources of funds to subsidize its inefficient system. For many years, the Cubans had the Soviets, who pumped money into Cuba at a rate of seven hundred thousand dollars (\$700,000) an hour, twenty-four hours a day for almost two decades. When in the early 90's the Soviets were no longer willing or able to continue with this, Castro rejected Gorbachev's advice to adopt market reforms and instead inflicted a 35-60% reduction in the average Cuban's (not his own, of course) standard of living.

This failure to reform had important results with respect to our national security. Cuba's military has shrunk from the largest in Latin America, with over 300,000 troops, to fewer than 50,000. More strikingly, Cuba's Navy and Air Force have all but ceased to be effective units except against tugboats full of children (Marzo 13) or unarmed Cessnas (Brothers to the Rescue). Cuba's ability to expand its biotech laboratories has been diminished, although the distress sale of advanced technology to other terrorist states is equally troubling. At the same time, Castro's ability to finance and support subversive groups throughout the hemisphere has been greatly restricted and the region has enjoyed an unprecedented decade of democratic reform.

The embargo also does more –it creates pressure for democratic and economic reform. In 1993 Castro had no choice but to legalize the use of dollars and permit direct remittances from relatives in the US in an attempt to capitalize on the concern of Cuban Americans for their starving relatives. In 1994 he authorized "farmers markets" that for the first time gave at least a limited amount of freedom to farmers to grow and sell crops. That same year he slashed the military budget, permitted "self-employment" in a restricted number of fields, relaxed the criteria for family visits, and even restored some selective religious freedoms. For an explanation as to why Castro did these things, you need only listen to his remarks. Castro told his rubber stamp National Assembly, "We are forced to do things we would never otherwise do because of the economic necessities of the times."

The record over the past forty years is clear. Castro reforms when he must, represses when he can. A unilateral lifting of our embargo would give him an undeserved respite, and lead – as it always has in the past – to more rather than fewer restrictions on the Cuban people.

Cuba as a Business Partner

As a place to do business, Cuba consistently ranks at the very bottom of the list. Chad, Burma, and Turkmenistan are all more attractive places to invest. In fact, Cuba ranks 151st out of 154 countries on this year's Index of Economic Freedom, somehow edging out the likes of Libya and Iraq. There are countries in the world poorer than Cuba, but no nation this side of North Korea works as hard to stifle individual initiative or to minimize the meaningful participation of its citizens in business activity. In Cuba, private property, the sanctity of contracts, free labor unions, and an independent judiciary are all alien concepts.

Foreign corporations that want to do business in Cuba do so on Castro's terms – or not at all. This makes foreign investors complicit in a host of unsavory business practices. Independent labor and human rights' groups ranging from Amnesty International to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions have documented these abuses exhaustively. Although Cuba has long been a signatory to key U.N. International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions, Castro's regime ignores practically all of them. Foreign businessmen and women are expected to not only comply with rules that deny Cuban workers their rights, but to inform on any worker who complains. Fortunately, international law is catching up with such predatory behavior. Corporations that choose to violate labor and human rights are trading

short-term profits for a long-term liability. Aggrieved citizens across the globe are taking companies that collude with corrupt and dictatorial rulers to court – and they are winning. No longer can foreign corporations escape responsibility for their actions by claiming they were in compliance with local law, knowing full and well that such laws were in violation of international standards.

Finally, Cuba is not, under Castro, a great market for the United States. Cuba ranks last in the hemisphere in GDP per capita, below even Haiti. Cuba is in default on practically every loan it has ever taken. Cuba is in default to Russia, to the European Union, to its Latin American neighbors, to South Africa, to the nations of Asia, and to two-thirds of the members of NAFTA. In fact, about the only country in the world without uncollectable debt is the United States. As the International Trade Commission reported last year, "Cuba stopped payment of all its foreign commercial and bilateral official debt with non-socialist countries in 1986. Because US financial institutions were prohibited from financial dealing with Cuba, there was no US exposure to Cuba's foreign debt moratorium." Thanks to our embargo, the American taxpayer has not had to bail out any American business or bank shortsighted enough to ignore the record and take a risk on Castro.

Castro's Charm Offensive

Castro is desperate for new sources of funding. Having run out of credit in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and Canada, Castro has only the United States and Antarctica left as possible sources of new credit. Realizing that no penguin would be so gullible as to loan anything to a deadbeat of his magnitude, Castro has focused on his only remaining hope - us. Thus, we have seen what has come to be known as the "charm offensive."

This offensive has three parts. First, Castro did not formally oppose the placement of terrorists in Guantanamo –although Castro's Attorney General, Juan Escalona, did manage to publicly state that he "hoped the Taliban would escape and kill Americans" before he got the new Party line. Second, Cuba has purchased American agricultural products. It is important to note that the money for these purchases reportedly comes from funds that were supposed to go to the Europeans and others for debt repayment. This is especially ironic, as all agricultural trade other than ours involves heavy subsidies, below market barter arrangements, concessionary financing, and/or debt forgiveness. Now, the pittance these nations expected in payment from Castro is denied them and being used to finance their replacement. Third, Castro has invited everyone he can think of to visit Cuba to take the usual guided tour of the regime's Potemkin Village facilities.

Current Policy

We initially opposed the revision of the law a year and a half ago that permitted the sale of US agricultural products to Cuba on a cash basis. We took this position because Castro has always used food as a means of control. The ration card, it is important to remember, came into mandatory use prior to the imposition of US sanctions. When informed of this change in US policy, Castro at first vowed he would not buy "a single grain of rice." Some months ago, however, he reversed himself and is now purchasing a significant amount of US agricultural products. And, because the law requires it, he pays cash for his purchases. There now is a proposal that this compromise - that has resulted in sales for farmers and protection for the taxpayer - be amended to permit the financing of sales. This would, in effect, move us from getting paid, to accepting Castro's promise to pay. I strongly urge that anyone advocating this change conduct a due diligence review of Cuba's past and current payment history before rushing to judgment.

Moreover, the pattern of Cuba's agricultural purchases can be explained not so much by economics as by politics. Each purchase has been carefully designed by the regime to reward companies or individuals perceived to be sympathetic to Castro's desire to reach deep into America's pocket. In much the same

way, regime officials often travel around the United States more for the purpose of propaganda than for business development. The US should distinguish between Cuban technocrats, who may travel to perform necessary inspections, and Castro's agents, sent to sell us an unsavory bill of goods. . .

The Road Ahead

Our embargo on Cuba is a policy tool, not a policy. It is a means to an end. At present our embargo successfully restricts the flow of resources to a recalcitrant regime and exerts constant pressure for reform. It is also a valuable bargaining chip for the day when Cuba chooses or is forced to accept real economic and political reform. Something for something has always been an integral part of our policy. Giving something for nothing, however, is rarely a good idea, either in agricultural sales or in foreign policy. Although some argue that engagement with a repressive regime can foster change, there is no empirical evidence that this has ever happened, in Cuba or elsewhere. Our Canadian, Latin, and European allies no longer even try to make this case.

Embargos are, by definition, defensive in nature. To successfully empower the citizens of a nation to regain control over their own destiny, more is needed. We need to draw on our experience in Eastern Europe, South Africa, and elsewhere and support democracy proponents, human rights activists, independent journalists and economists, and budding entrepreneurs in Cuba. We are always better off trading with a prosperous democracy than with a bankrupt dictatorship. A free, independent Cuba that respects the rights of its citizens, and provides opportunities for private enterprise, is the partner we need. It is in our national interest, and in our common stake in humanity to not settle for anything less. Thank you.

DOCUMENT 26
May 15, 2002

”A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba”: Cuba Working Group policy statement

Criticizing current U.S. policy towards Cuba, this group of congressmen argues that current policy is not supported by the American public and does not make sense strategically. They call for ending travel restrictions, allowing unrestricted exports of medical and agricultural products to Cuba, expanding educational exchange programs between the two nations, repealing the Helms-Burton Act and expanding security cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba.

U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC

. . . As the Administration re-examines U.S. policy toward Cuba, we respectfully invite President Bush and Secretary of State Powell to consider a series of proposed policies that will increase American influence in Cuba and serve a variety of concrete American national interests.

We are a bipartisan group of Members of Congress with diverse backgrounds and political philosophies. We are unanimous in our criticism of the Cuban government’s abysmal human rights record, its refusal to allow free elections or the creation of opposition political parties, and its failure to respect freedom of the press and rule of law. It is our desire to see Cubans enjoy greater political and economic freedom.

In our efforts, we heartily embrace the message of Pope John Paul II, who began his visit to Cuba, in 1998 by urging:

“May Cuba, with all its magnificent potential, open itself to the world, and the world open itself up to Cuba, so that this people, which is working to make progress and which longs for concord and peace, may look to the future with hope.”

American policy toward Cuba lacks support among the American public, the Congress, the international community, and most importantly, inside Cuba, among dissidents, clergy, and average Cuban citizens. Moreover, the U.S. policy objective of a peaceful transition to a stable, democratic form of government and respect for human rights in Cuba has gone unmet. After four decades, the U.S. embargo has failed to produce meaningful political and economic reform in Cuba.

U.S. policy is also at odds with the values and long-term strategies that the President and Secretary of State passionately advocate when they promote engagement around the world. Indeed, our nation’s engagement of communist China and North Korea – countries that have significant human rights problems and that pose serious threats to American security – undermines support for our Cuba policy by making it appear inconsistent and unprincipled.

Cuba should not be an exception to our nation’s engagement policy. Because Cuba is a neighbor and our nations share deep historical ties and current interests, Cuba should be at the center of our engagement policy, even as we press our human rights agenda at every opportunity.

Current U.S. policy seeks to assist the Cuban people and to promote a “rapid and peaceful” transition to democracy, yet many of its elements work in the opposite direction.

The embargo and other instruments intended to promote Cuba’s economic and political isolation have indeed cut Cuba off from the benefits of trade with the United States, but Cuba is by no means isolated – Havana maintains commercial and diplomatic relations with scores of countries, including America’s

closest allies. Where American policy has succeeded, in isolating the Cuban and American people from each other, it has severely limited American influence at a critical moment in Cuban history.

Bereft of Soviet bloc aid and trade for a decade, Cuba is experimenting with elements of markets and capitalism, such as small enterprise, free-market sales of farm produce, foreign investment, and state enterprise reform, to generate jobs and growth.

Cuba's next generation will have to decide whether to expand these reforms, and will have to face a range of other economic, political, and diplomatic choices with important consequences for Cubans and Americans alike. Rather than keep the Cuban people at arm's length under the pretense of being "tough" on Fidel Castro, now is the time for America to engage to the maximum at all levels of Cuban society.

There are two main arguments in opposition to engagement with Cuba. We respectfully offer a differing view.

First, it is argued that engagement with Cuba is not warranted because, unlike China, Cuba has not reformed its economy. This ignores a series of significant reforms that have, despite their limited scope, given hundreds of thousands of Cubans opportunities to work in small enterprise or other market-based settings, increasing their earnings and improving their families' livelihoods. While our decision to engage China in 1972 was based on a number of complex factors, it is important to note that this occurred well before that country embarked on its economic reform program.

Second, it is argued that engagement would "cast a lifeline" to the Cuban government. Yet Cuba's government, in power 43 years, is by no means on the brink of collapse – not even its strongest political opponents in Cuba argue that this is the case, in spite of its economic difficulties. Nor was the Cuban government's political stability threatened by the economic catastrophe of 1992-1994. By basing policy on a flawed assessment of the political situation inside Cuba, the United States has closed off avenues of engagement that would benefit the Cuban people and serve American interests.

In a spirit of bipartisanship and with every interest in joining the Administration in a dialogue, we offer the following recommendations to improve American policy toward Cuba. Where legislative remedies are possible, the Cuba Working Group will seek out appropriate vehicles for such action. Where policy requires action by the Executive branch, the Cuba Working Group advises that such action be taken and will support the President's efforts to undertake such action.

I. Repeal the travel ban

Freedom to travel is a basic right of Americans. As Americans exercise that right they expose people abroad to our ideas, values, and culture, constituting a major source of American influence. . .

The Cuba travel ban is an unwarranted intrusion on the rights of American citizens; it criminalizes normal and constructive activity by American citizens, and it closes off a powerful source of American influence in Cuba.

The current system, under which the Treasury Department licenses limited categories of travel, is a wasteful bureaucratic exercise that acts as a deterrent even for Americans such as educators, humanitarian donors, and religious groups, whose activities could qualify for a license. Contact between Americans and Cubans should be promoted by allowing full freedom of travel for Americans, not through a federal licensing process that requires citizens to ask permission of their government to visit a neighboring country. . .

II. Allow normal, unsubsidized exports of agricultural and medical products

U.S. law currently permits the sale of food and medicines to Cuba. However, cumbersome U.S. administrative procedures and restrictions complicate and impede such trade, which could be of significant benefit to the American economy. Far from focusing attention on Cuba's failed domestic policies, U.S. restrictions send the signal that America wants to use economic deprivation as a tool for political change. . .

III. End restrictions on remittances

Cuban-Americans are limited in the amount of money they can send to support their families in Cuba. This limit, \$100 per month per household, is an unwarranted government intrusion on private acts of support and charity between family members. Remittances make a crucial difference in the well being of many thousands of Cuban families, and they enable many to acquire the modest resources with which to start small enterprises. Remittances free Cuban families from dependence on the government and fuel the continued growth of a dollar economy, independent of the state. We recommend full repeal of the limit on remittances.

IV. Sunset Helms-Burton in March 2003

The Libertad Act of 1996, also known as “Helms-Burton,” was enacted on the premise that by tightening the embargo, it would disrupt the Cuban economy and topple the Cuban government. Among the law’s provisions are:

- Severe limitations on the President's foreign policy prerogatives. Helms-Burton codified the embargo, which had previously been an executive order, into law. The President lost the ability to modify the embargo in calibrated ways in response to incremental reforms that could take place in Cuba. . . .
- A distorted definition of democracy and a failure to acknowledge the possibility of anything other than the total and instantaneous transformation of the Cuban state. Eight specific conditions are established before any transitional government can be recognized by the United States. And even if the Cuban people open their political system and hold a multiparty election with international observers, that government will not be recognized if it includes Fidel or Raul Castro. . .

VI. TV/Radio Marti

The U.S. government has spent over \$400 million in taxpayer money on radio and television broadcasts directed at Cuban citizens. These broadcasts are meant to provide news and information to the Cuban people that they otherwise could not acquire through the controlled media of the Cuban state. In principle, this is a worthy effort but in practice its record has been mixed. Radio Marti’s audience has declined to five percent of the total population, according to the latest survey by the U.S. government’s Broadcasting Board of Governors, and serious questions exist about the quality of its broadcasts and the administration of the station.

TV Marti goes on the air at 3:30 a.m. and signs off at 8:00 a.m. every day. It operates when nobody watches because international broadcast rules require that the U.S. not interfere with Cuban broadcast transmissions. To ensure that not even Cuban insomniacs tune in, the Cuban government jams TV Marti. Consequently, TV Marti reaches no audience in Cuba and is utterly without purpose.

We recommend:

- Termination of TV Marti, which will save about \$10 million annually, until technology is developed and implemented to overcome the Cuban government’s jamming.

- Comprehensive efforts to improve Radio Marti through financial audits, rigorous independent assessments of audience reaction and program quality, and an examination of the impact of moving Radio Marti from Washington to Miami.

VII. Scholarships

In place of the failed communication effort of TV Marti, the United States should promote educational programs with a proven track record that will achieve real communication between Americans and Cubans. We recommend that the funds saved from the termination of TV Marti should be used to support educational exchange programs with a proven track record, such as Fulbright scholarships, that will promote real communication among thousands of Americans and Cubans. Much like our exchange programs with Vietnam, these programs must be designed to ensure that the Cuban government has no role in selecting the participants.

VIII. Expand security cooperation

Cuba and the United States share some common hemispheric security and environmental protection interests. Where once Cuba may have posed a military challenge to the United States, we note that the Cold War is over. Today the most serious possible security threat from Cuba is that of an uncontrolled migration in the Florida straits that could result from economic disaster or a political crisis on the island. Cuba's current military capabilities were described as "residual" and "defensive" by the Pentagon in 1998 in a Defense Intelligence Agency report that - contrary to recent statements of Undersecretary of State John Bolton - represented the comprehensive assessment of the entire U.S. intelligence community.

Regarding Mr. Bolton's charge that Cuba may be involved in the production of biological weapons, we note that he presented no evidence to the American people or Congress. In fact, the Administration omitted Cuba from a list of potential biological weapons producers just last November. Contradicting Mr. Bolton's statement that Cuba has "at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort," Secretary of State Powell said that Cuba is not conducting such research, but that it has the ability to do so. "We do believe that Cuba has a biological offensive research capability," Secretary Powell said. "We didn't say it actually had such weapons but it has the capacity and capability to conduct such research and this is not a new statement."

Despite such concerns, Cuba and the United States already cooperate in a limited fashion in controlling migration and combating drug trafficking. The United States has a compelling interest in building on that cooperation to achieve results in other areas of mutual interest.

Cuba has expressed a desire to negotiate a broad security agenda with the United States. We urge the Administration to enter such a discussion to determine whether additional agreements can be reached to serve U.S. interests. The discussion should include matters of international crime, drug smuggling, and terrorism; in particular we believe it would be constructive to move beyond the limited but productive case-by-case cooperation in counternarcotics. We also urge the Administration to begin discussions on environmental protection, including Coast Guard contingency planning for environmental disasters. This is particularly important as Cuba begins oil exploration off its northwest coast.

IX. Certified Property Claims

Progress in economic and political relations eventually will require the settlement of claims for expropriations of \$1.2 billion in U.S. property by the Cuban government in 1959 and 1960. The forty-year old U.S. trade embargo was initiated because of these expropriations. America's major allies and trading partners have reached property claims settlements with Cuba, just as America has done with China, Vietnam, and Eastern European countries. We do not recommend here the kind of claims settlement that would be appropriate with Cuba. However, we strongly urge the Administration to devote

serious attention and creative effort to the issue in order to obtain the compensation American claimants deserve.

DOCUMENT 27
2002

U.S. census table of Cuban agricultural exports

The table demonstrates the dramatic increase in agricultural exports to the U.S. from Cuba as a result of eased trade restrictions.

U.S. Exports to Cuba from 1998 to 2002

(In thousands of dollars)

End-Use Code	Value 1998	Value 1999	Value 2000	Value 2001	Value 2002
Wheat	0	0	0	0	22,789
Rice	0	0	26	0	6,266
Soybeans	0	0	0	0	20,922
Oilseeds, food oils	0	0	0	0	21,532
Corn	0	0	0	2,327	22,739
Animal feeds	0	0	0	0	19,281
Meat, poultry, etc.	0	0	0	1,959	21,889
Dairy products and eggs	0	0	0	0	824
Fruits, frozen juices	0	0	0	0	465
Vegetables	0	0	0	0	197
Nuts	0	0	0	0	11
Bakery products	0	0	0	0	132
Other foods	63	0	0	288	1,515
Wine and related products	0	0	0	0	46
Alcoholic beverages, excluding wine	0	0	0	0	7
Agric. farming-unmanufactured	0	0	0	0	3
Agriculture-manufactured, other	0	4	0	0	25
Total	63	4	26	4574	138,643

<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/exports/c2390.html>